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This work proposes a mathematical paradigm for modeling the rise and fall of coalitions 
during intrastate conflicts. It proposes that misalignment of preferences within 
constituencies drives instability, which can lead to revolution. To arrive at preference for 
an issue, the model considers two components: ideology and fervor. It shows that 
ideology tends to remain static while fervor changes rapidly. With the preferences of a 
society mapped according to constituents’ ideology and fervor, the model then considers 
how coalitions exercise control in their quests for dominance. 
The model builds upon the foundation of expert thought on intrastate conflict. It 
uses their generally qualitative assessments and employs measurable data and linear 
algebra to give a more formal depiction of the dynamics at play.   
Mapping populations in this manner may give insight into optimal strategies for 
eliciting stability or instability in a state. Using a hypothetical country in a developing 
revolution, the work implements the map to depict a government’s attempts to stabilize a 
devolving intrastate system. It shows how rival coalitions can rapidly rise from 
irrelevance to preeminence by manipulating fervor. The work concludes by depicting the 
impacts of various third-party strategies for intervening in intrastate conflicts. 
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Artificial Control:  populace compliance based on the government’s use of force  or 
payment to buy allegiance. 
Disequilibrium:  the divergence of values and social mores once shared by governments 
and the societies they seek to  govern. 
Fervor:  the passion a given person or coalition feels for one or more issues. 
Ideology:  how a person associates with a given issue.  
Intrastate Conflict:  sustained combat between or among armed forces that takes place 
within territorial boundaries of a state system member and leads to 1,000 battle 
related  deaths annually. 
Natural Control:  when the populace recognizes the government’s legitimate rule and 
complies with its authority. 
Preference:  the composite of fervor and ideology. 
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Mapping populations, according to issues with revolutionary potential, provides 
the various leaders and decision makers within a government with cartographic 
depictions of demographic topography. In 1973 two ancient silken maps from the second 
century B.C. were excavated from the tomb of a Hunan prime minister’s son.1  One was a 
detailed terrain map of China from Hunan province to the South China Sea.2  The second 
described the defenses of the kingdom after more than a decade of war.3  Such rich 
history reveals that maps have been an essential component of strategy development for 
millennia.   
Today, military tacticians and civilian planners use maps to deploy forces and 
plan cities. Each seeks to maximize their strategy either against a military enemy, as the 
tactician can attest, or against the ravages of time and the pressures of a budget, as the 
civil planner may argue. Thorough comprehension of the terrain, coupled with the proper 
use of military and civilian resources, has favored the meticulous analyst over time.   
Employing resources with respect to terrain, time, and enemy are not the only 
factors in war. The lessons of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have taught us the value of 
understanding all of the factors in conflict. We have found that now—more than ever—
we need the support of the populace to resolve conflicts. The fundamental nature of 
conflict has not changed in the Information Age, but the global state of affairs 
emphasizes the necessity of documenting and analyzing the human terrain to the same 
accuracy modern day cartographers can map the Earth.   
As power with global interests, the United States must achieve a greater level of 
resolution of the forces at play in foreign nations. Essentially, ideologically-based 
                                                 
1 John Noble Wilford, The Mapmakers (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 8. 
2 Wilford, The Mapmakers, 8. 
3 Wilford, The Mapmakers, 8. 
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coalitions are unknown until conflict has already emerged; the population map provides a 
route to successfully navigate the many obstacles that nations face on the path to stability.  
Governments can be empowered by or topple at the hands of their citizens. A 
recent illustration of this phenomenon was all too apparent across northern Africa and the 
Middle East with the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, and continues to this day. 
Numerous claims of unpredictability and analytical ineptness on the part of academics 
and government officials were the common threads between the various sources of media 
and public debate on the subject. The people of the region were calling for change long 
before the self-immolation of the Tunisian merchant.   
Why did the signs go unnoticed?  This work contends that the signs were 
overlooked in part due to a lack of knowledge by international bodies and governments of 
nations. Their failure to assign the appropriate level of significance to the inherent social 
dynamics within countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya prevented analysts from 
appreciating the tenuous circumstances.   
The various domestic coalitions in each state held the key to illuminating the 
ideological stance of the people and their relative distance from the government. 
President Barack Obama publicly offered U.S. moral support for the people of the 
afflicted region while calling for some regimes to reform and others to step down.   These 
societies were internally and externally unified against their respective authoritarian 
regimes, until the leadership stepped down, or in Muammar Gadhafi’s case, was 
eliminated.   
The upheaval and regional disruption throughout the Middle East challenged the 
United States’ ability to comprehend the diversity and homogeneity of the issues at center 
stage; furthermore the international community failed to notice the importance of 
identifying the other political issues waiting to be addressed. Power brokers at the head of 
a multitude of coalitions and latent issues fueled the internal political conflicts. The 
unique transnational situation hindered the development of strategic options for the 
United States and its allies largely due to confusing rhetoric not founded on objective 
analysis.   
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In the past, negotiating the internal dynamics of a foreign population under 
tenuous circumstances, like those posed during the Arab Spring, required recondite 
knowledge of a state’s internal coalitions at play. Knowing who should be coopted for 
achieving common national interest and identifying the parties within states that will 
breed political discontent and instability is available with the population map created in 
this work. A population map groups coalitions based on their ideological positions and 
passion for issues that have the capacity to incite revolutionary behavior. The map creates 
a more complete strategic picture. 
1. Purpose 
This work introduces a contemporary mapping technique to display and compare 
the fervor of ideologically-based coalitions within a given society. To illustrate the 
technique’s capabilities, this work depicts a hypothetical intrastate conflict scenario 
through an examination of the conflict as analysts would use the map to determine 
strategies.   
Thoroughly understanding the ideological positions of the coalitions in play 
enables the analyst to attain an objective measurement for a country’s societal priorities. 
The fervor, or passion, with which individuals in coalitions express and endorse their 
ideology, is a paramount component. The composite of ideology and fervor yields 
preference, which dictates the shape of the map.   
The population map identifies the various coalitions and their position on issues 
(e.g., social, governmental, and economic), depicted by relative position to other 
coalitions, that are critical to understanding the political stability of the nation-state.   
Issues of importance to the citizenry are the fundamental building blocks that lead 
to political stability or sow the seeds of revolution. This population map focuses on issues 
that harness revolutionary potential, and allows the analytical strategists to maneuver 
societal dynamics in order to build or fracture coalitions for achieving the desired 
outcome.     
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To effect meaningful change, it is necessary for governments and interventionists 
to develop a clear picture of the societal terrain beyond the scope of demographic 
surveys. The mathematical model proposed by this thesis has many uses. This work 
describes the tool as an objective, visual display that depicts the relative unity or 
disjointedness between societies and their governments. Internally, the model gives 
coalitions insight into strategies for obtaining a relative advantage over adversaries. 
Externally, it also proposes a methodology for intervening actors to determine which 
coalition is in their national interests to support.   
Ignorant of the population’s position on contentious issues and the dynamics 
between the existing and emerging coalitions, the interventionist is uncertain of who to 
support to maximize its gains. 
This work establishes a unique definition of a population’s preference for an issue 
as a function of fervor and ideology. Furthermore, arguing that a true gauge of a 
population requires a measure of both, this work integrates artificial and natural control 
into the map as a barometer for stability.   
The ideology measures one’s position with a given issue from complete 
opposition to complete support. Yet, a person who supports two issues will almost surely 
prioritize one over the other. Naturally, the person has greater fervor for the higher 
priority issue. In this sense, fervor scales the ideology of an individual. We examine how 
ideology changes slowly, if at all, and requires huge investments to alter. On the contrary, 
fervor—which is the passion felt for a given issue in a single snapshot—changes rapidly.   
The combination of ideology and fervor for a surveyed population yields a 
population’s preference distribution curve for an issue. Our model considers all of the 
issues that matter to a society, and places them into an objective map that gives the 
population density for each possible combination of positions for multiple issues. In other 
words, we take several distribution curves to produce a single distribution surface, which 
is depicted graphically for ease of use. Establishing a mathematical model that provides 
an objective paradigm of populations provides leaders with the confidence to trust 
subjective decisions.   
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2. Scope 
Revolutionary potential is the degree to which a state and the society it governs 
are in disequilibrium.4  Mapping populations, according to issues with revolutionary 
potential, provides the various leaders and decision makers within the government with 
cartographic depictions of demographic topography, which illuminates strategic options 
for achieving United States objectives. U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan attests 
to the importance of a comprehensive collection of information that informs the warrior-
diplomat where consensus and disagreement exists. Population mapping along these 
research lines serves to empower our service members and government employees with 
the ability to influence political outcomes according to our national interests.   
B. OUTLINE  
Chapter I, “Introduction,” provides the body of research necessary to establish the 
theoretical framework for the mathematical model. Initially the chapter lays the 
contextual foundation for the reader to understand the revolutionary dynamics of a 
society revealed through a close examination of the equilibrated relationship between 
society and state. This sets the stage for a look into intrastate conflict, how it is defined, 
categorized, and fueled by a complex host of factors that leads to revolutionary conduct. 
Third-party intervention is reviewed to reveal the propensity with which it is executed, its 
importance to bring about strategic results on behalf of the actor, and as the primary role 
fulfilled by the United States or NATO in intrastate conflict. Next, the principle 
components of the population map are introduced—ideology (the shape of the preference 
curve) and fervor (the scale of the preference curve). Last, a discussion on social 
movements is introduced to benefit the reader’s conception of collective conduct toward 
coalition objectives. 
                                                 
4 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 74–75. 
Johnson does not turn the phrase, “revolutionary potential,” in his book. However, in the chapter titled:  
“The Disequilibriated Social System,” Johnson describes in depth the concept that the values once shared 
by governments and the societies they seek to govern diverge. The divergence, regardless of the causes, 
leave the state in a position where the potential for a revolution is comparatively higher than when the 
government and society are more ideologically and legally aligned. 
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Chapter II, “The Model,” utilizes ideology and fervor in the context of the model. 
Also, the chapter investigates the deductive steps to build the model in detail. The chapter 
begins by explaining how the model is an intuitive method of building the map. As the 
chapter progresses an explanation of how coalitions with similar ideologies naturally 
align sets up the following section. Introducing the concept of assisted preference and 
how to co-opt coalitions that fall outside the natural span of control establishes the frame 
of reference for the model acting as a stability barometer. In the final part of the chapter, 
an explanation of how extending the model provides users with modeling capabilities in 
multiple dimensions establishes the basis for the hypothetical vignette in Chapter III. 
Finally, Chapter II explains how changes in fervor and ideology change the nature of the 
map, benefiting some coalitions and harming others. 
Chapter III, “Dynamics of the Model,” uses the hypothetical country of Doulah to 
illustrate how the population map could be used throughout the evolution of an intrastate 
conflict. The scenario breaks down into three scenes: the first scene explains the 
underlying societal conditions and dynamics that lead to the conflict; the second scene is 
the mobilization of an insurgency against the state; finally, in the third scene, the chapter 
concludes by offering examples of a few potential outcomes.   
Chapter III builds upon the rudimentary theories outlined in Chapter II, and 
demonstrates the objective mathematical model when realized as a population map of a 
state. The chapter uses well-established, though largely qualitative, principles of social 
movement and coalition politics to develop and translate the theory into an objective 
model that captures the dynamics at play. The vignette uses simple examples to relate the 
model to political, military, and diplomatic readers (the appendices provide complete 
mathematical explanation of the model). At the end of Chapter III, the reader will 
understand the working concept of the population map based upon issues within a 
population. The reader will further appreciate how different issues generalize and form a 
three dimensional map that charts population densities according to positions on given 
issues.   
Chapter IV, “Conclusion and Recommendations,” outlines the author’s 
conclusions and recommendation on the utilization of the proposed population map. The 
 7 
authors also provide recommendations on how future endeavors should be pursued to 
strengthen the model’s outputs and areas to which the proposed population map may be 
addressed. 
C. THE ROOTS OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT: ISSUES THAT MATTER 
This thesis seeks to develop a mathematical model that explains what a population 
looks like when graphed, similar to the way cartography maps perturbations on the 
ground. Why should someone seek to map a population’s characteristics like terrain?  
Who could possibly use a population map, and to what end?  These are valid questions, 
and their answers develop over the course of the thesis. More important are the methods 
of getting to the answers. 
Revolution, a specific subset of intrastate conflict, is a contentious term that 
invites a wide variety of definitions and theories. Social contingency theory argues that 
revolution is the exception, not the rule.5  Hobbesian thought argues that social coherence 
is the product of coercion, and a loss of coercion equals social unrest.6  Contingency 
theory, on the other hand, appears to have fewer incongruities and its groupings explain 
social situations better.7  Albert K. Cohen recommends four categories of revolution:  (1) 
actor-oriented theories, (2) structural theories, (3) conjunction theories, and (4) process 
theories.8  We posit that revolutions have elements of each group within them. However, 
the primary groups that drive our population map are conjunction theory9 and process 
theory10. First, this thesis explains intrastate conflict in the context of conjunction theory 
because it accepts the most applicable elements of actor-oriented theory and structure 
                                                 
5 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 169. 
6 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 169. 
7 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 170. 
8 Albert Kircidel Cohen, Deviance and Control (Englewood Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall, 1966), 41–47. 
9 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 178–179. Conjunction theory combines actor-oriented and structural 
theories of revolutions and constitute the mainstream of research. This theory places revolutions as a subset 
of social movements. Conjunction theorists seek to understand the origins of social movements, their 
ideology, structure, recruitment, and life cycle. 
10 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 185. Process theory emphasizes the notion of contingency. New 
information and situations develop continuously, and an outcome can never be predicted simply on the 
basis of an explanation of a movement’s origin. The contingency process attempts to mirror the full 
complexity of the real world and how events unfold. 
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theory (these aid us in defining our terms fervor and ideology). Second, process theory, 
most appropriately explains how one can use the model to identify the trends of a 
questionable society (covered in depth in Chapter III). 
1. Defining and Categorizing Intrastate Conflict 
In the period between 1945 and 2007 there were approximately 241 conflicts 
across the globe that fall under the spectrum of interstate, non-state, intrastate, and extra-
state wars.11  Since 1945 the frequency of conflict has been on the rise and of the 
inclusive conflicts, approximately 70% of them were intrastate conflicts.12  According to 
Sarkees and Wayman, intrastate wars are, “sustained combat between or among armed 
forces that takes place within territorial boundaries of a state system member and leads to 
1,000 battle related deaths annually.”13 Specifically, this classification of conflict 
includes subcategories of conflict such as civil war, regional war, or inter-communal 
war.14 Since internal conflicts are rampant in the current global environment, states’ 
ability to negotiating peace is contingent upon their ability to objectively depict each 
stakeholder’s strategic position. 
All United States involvement in intrastate conflict since 1945 has been in 
response to the civil war category.15  Distinctive to civil wars is the prerequisite that the 
national government responsible for the territorial boundary is one of the warring parties 




                                                 
11 Meredith R. Sarkees and Frank W. Wayman, Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-state, Extra-
state, Intrastate, and Non-state Wars, 1816 – 2007 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010). 
12 Correlates of War, “Correlates of War v. 4.0, 1816–2007,” accessed February 2, 2013 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
13 Sarkees, Resort to War, 64. 
14 Sarkees, Resort to War, 64. 
15 “Correlates of War.” 
16 Sarkees, Resort to War, 66.  “Effective Resistance has two necessary conditions: 1) both sides re 
initially organized for violent conflict; 2) the weaker side is able to inflict at least 5% of the number of 
fatalities it sustains.”  
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Most relevant to the classification of civil wars are the motives and objectives of the 
insurgent force that seeks to overthrow the central governing authority or to resolve a 
regional interest.17   
Regional interests are founded on the intention to secede from a specified 
territory, see the replacement of the government by a more befitting regime, or to redress 
abuses experienced by a geographic district.18  The objectives over the course of the 
conflict evolve. As the objectives change, they adapt based on the transformation of the 
insurgent coalition. The insurgency’s strength is relative to the power of its constituent 
groups, and its ability to provide a valid representation of violence for the cause.19  
Intrastate conflict is a complex compilation of violent internal struggles that take on a 
variety of forms that manifest as acts of politicide, genocide, military coups, armed 
secessionist movements, and religious or ethnic related contention.20  The persistence of 
intrastate warfare continues to engage the United States in the affairs of other nations, 
and understanding who to help is critical. 
Most internal conflicts result from a combination of multiple factors that lead to a 
breakdown in discourse between society and the state. Grievances (violation of norms) 
and greed (payoffs or gains) substantiate the root causes of insurgency and its 
objectives.21  This research focuses on those factors most relevant to the relationship 
between the society and the central government that lead to the greed and grievances 
worth risking life and livelihood.   
Providing essential services, protection from internal and external threats, 
managing law and order amongst the populace, and providing economic opportunity to 
support the welfare of individuals marks the social contract. A social contract exists 
between citizens and their governments that bind them together. A state is in equilibrium 
                                                 
17 Sarkees, Resort to War, 67. 
18 Sarkees, Resort to War, 67. 
19 Sarkees, Resort to War, 68. 
20 Barbara Harff. “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955,” American Political Science Review 97 (2003):  57–73. 
21 Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 159. 
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when there is a mutually supportive and beneficial relationship between society and the 
government.22  Grievances find their origin in the context of the social contract, and form 
the basis for the condition of disequilibrium. Finally, illegitimate acts against the people 
weaken the social contract, notably by the abuse of power and authority. Covered in 
Chapter III, the hypothetical country of Doulah provides the model with a contextual 
foundation. The model assumes that Doulah’s society is out of equilibrium, and the 
government has a monopoly over the gains while the society at large suffers the 
grievances.23 
Natural and artificial controls govern equilibrium within a society.24  When the 
government uses a form of payment to buy allegiance or force to control the populace it 
exerts artificial control to maintain equilibrium between the society and the authority of 
the state.25  Indeed, when the populace recognizes the government’s legitimate rule and 
complies with its authority, the system has a high degree of natural control.26   
Illegitimate actions and policies create disequilibrium between the government 
and the people. Disequilibrium in societies results from a lack of confidence in the 
government, and sets the conditions for insurgent coalitions to rebel against the status 
quo. In response, the government compensates for the diminishing compliance of the 
populace to maintain order by exercising artificial control. Exerting artificial control, the 
state seeks to regain the lost equilibrium between the state and society.27  However, the 
use of side payments or force is not necessarily mandatory to regain equilibrium; rather 
sufficient government reform could accomplish the same feat.   
                                                 
22 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 83–90. If the society and government are experiencing 
disequilibrium then organized violence may be a revolution, a sign of social movements or other collectives 
challenging the authority of the state. As Johnson stated, the causes of disequilibrium are the failures of the 
homeostatic mechanisms to work, the product of sudden, intense, unprecedented pressure that incapacitates 
the system’s ability to self-regulate by way of institutional procedures and mechanisms to maintain 
equilibrium.   
23 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 83–90. 
24 Gordon H. McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare,” class notes for DA3802, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Winter 2012.   
25 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” 
26 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” 
27 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” 
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According to Johnson, the process of conservative change gives the government 
the ability to restore equilibrium by making political concessions or resolving public 
grievances.28  Representative forms of government attempt to appease the public in order 
to maintain influence and legitimacy. Less representative forms of government use a 
higher degree of artificial control measures, mainly in for form of force, to pacify 
dissenting populations. States can rectify disequilibrium by correcting departure from the 
status quo or by identifying the new socio-political preferences within the society and 
influencing expectations and fervor. Failure to understand the socio-political preferences 
can lead to a country with revolutionary potential. 
Revolutionary potential is when a society falls into disequilibrium where the 
government no longer represents the social mores of the society.29  Likewise, the 
population map assumes that natural and artificial controls are phenomena that allow a 
government to maintain its position as the head of the state.   
As the revolutionary potential in a country increases, the level of natural control a 
government has over the population decreases; hence, the amount of artificial control 
must be elevated to compensate for the void in the control apparatus. Leites and Wolf 
suggest the government’s overuse of artificial control mechanisms ultimately lead to 
diminishing returns for the state and launch society past the range of normal politics into 
tumultuous violence. When disequilibrium exceeds the capabilities of natural and 
artificial control to bring the relationship into balance, and a viable coalition has 
exceeded the range of normal politics, the government becomes less and less able to 
reform quickly enough to bring the state back into equilibrium. Defining moments such 
as exceeding the range of normal politics generally mark the beginning of a revolution. 
Germany had a long slow revolutionary slide. Prior to World War I the Austria-
Hungary Empire state was having a difficult time retaining the elements of natural and 
artificial control. Seeking to “Slavize” Austria-Hungary, disaffected youth rebelled at the 
                                                 
28 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 60, 90. Separate with a comma; find and fix all similar. 
29 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 83–90. 
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thought of assimilating Slavs into their society.30  When Gavrilo Princip—a Bosnian 
Serb—assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914, Adolf Hitler—then in his mid-
twenties, initially worried that German students had shot the Duke in order to free the 
German people from Ferdinand’s desire to assimilate Slavs with Germans.31  Hitler 
understood the tensions rising within German society. He anticipated such tenuous 
circumstances would lead to a climactic end if not defused. He seemed to have a working 
population map in his mind. Unitary rational actors can manipulate society without a 
population map when that society is in disequilibrium. Democracies and international 
actors/coalitions need a more substantial model. The following quote from Mein Kamphf 
highlights Hitler’s comprehension.  
…the Balkans were immersed in that livid sultriness which customarily 
announces the hurricane, and from time to time a beam of brighter light 
flared up, only to vanish again in the spectral darkness. But then came the 
Balkan War and with it the first gust of wind swept across a Europe grown 
nervous. The time which now followed lay on the chests of men like a 
heavy nightmare, sultry as feverish tropic heat, so that due to constant 
anxiety the sense of approaching catastrophe turned at long last to longing:  
let Heaven at last give free rein to the fate which could no longer be 
thwarted. And then the first mighty lightning flash struck the earth; the 
storm was unleashed and with the thunder of Heaven there mingled the 
roar of the World War batteries.32  
The disequilibrium that caused the First World War was not resolved during the 
interwar period, and the result was the Second World War. 
The duration of disequilibrium and the measure of artificial control directly 
relates to the amount of revolutionary potential within the state. Hitler felt the potential 
within Germany prior to World War I, and embraced the feeling during the interwar 
period.33  According to Chalmers Johnson, an examination of violence in society 
explains revolutionary potential. Johnson suggests that criminal, rather than 
                                                 
30 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 158–159. 
31 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 158–159. 
32 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 158. 
33 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 158 & 373. On page 373, Hitler outlines the need for a new philosophy. He 
introduced the twenty-five theses of the Nazi party’s new program to a crowd of nearly two thousand. 
Hitler understood how tenor and undercurrent within the society drive revolutionary potential. 
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revolutionary, acts of violence mark equilibrated states.34  Contrarily, revolutionary 
violence is the mark of a state in disequilibrium, which challenges the authority of the 
state—as evidenced by the Nazi party in the interwar period.35  A strengthened social 
contract between the populace and its government strengthens the fabric of society.  
In order to categorize disequilibrium, Johnson presents a fourfold typology for the 
causes of disequilibrium: exogenous and endogenous value changing causes (e.g., 
intervention by Christian missionaries, communist parties, etc.) and endogenous and 
exogenous environment changing forces (e.g., technological innovation or increased 
medical capabilities).36 In the context of preference and fervor these four categories lead 
to evolutionary preference changes.   
All four categories are equally sensitive to disequilibrium, however the swiftness 
of assimilation into the culture and government determine the degree of power deflation, 
or loss of authority, for the government and thus the likelihood of revolution.37  These 
hypotheses explain the onset of internal violence toward a government. The exogenous 
and endogenous incongruities in value and environment affect the sociocultural, 
economic, and political realms of society, and illustrate society’s disposition as fluid and 
noncontiguous.38  They help form the identity, attitudes, and perception of a population, 
and justify its actions.   
Grievances play an important role in understanding what fuels collective action 
against a state authority, the basis of the collective narrative, and the strategic objectives 
that they generate. Grievances are dynamic and idiosyncratic, and form the general 
outline of the population base from which the movement derives its key characteristics 
                                                 
34 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 62. 
35 Peter H. Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 31. 
While Germany maintained a monopoly of force during the 1920s and 30s it failed repeatedly to suppress 
private armies, including the SA—the Nazi Stormtroopers that would later become the SS. 
36 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 72. 
37 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 33, 72. 
38 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 72. 
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and support. Sociocultural, economic, and political grievances form the ideologies, 
attitudes, perceptions, and justify the actions of a resisting population.39   
Disparate, sometimes desperate, conditions experienced by varying groups within 
society build resentment toward privileged sects of society. The disaffected hold the 
government culpable for condoning or endorsing the status quo. These inequalities 
heighten the revolutionary potential of the populace, and tend to fall along demographic 
fault lines.40   
Demographic groups mobilize easily due to their strong sociocultural association 
and common victimization. Ted Gurr concluded in Minorities at Risk that the drivers for 
political grievances of minorities stems from communal disadvantages that lead to 
demands for an increase in political rights and economic opportunities.41    Furthermore, 
political grievances related to the social contract because of government corruption, 
illegitimate political practices, or repressive policies that incite insurrection where the 
means and opportunity exist. 
Nineteenth century theorists Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, best known for 
their Communist Manifesto (1848), highlighted that organization and classes interact to 
create a key element to revolutionary movements.42  Marx and Engels asserted that, “[the 
Communists are] the most advanced and resolute section of the working class…that 
section that pushes forward all others.”43 They alluded to how the interaction between 
economic and political conditions and depravity merge to drive a working class resistance 
to the upper class and place elites in control of the government. The Manifesto’s 
contribution to revolutionary theory is the understanding of how the economic and 
political dimensions unite to create a powerful catalyst that drives organizing the masses 
                                                 
39 Ted R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 75–86. 
40 Frances Stewart, “Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries,” British Medical 
Journal 324, no. 7333 (2002):  342–343. 
41 Ted R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, 86. 
42 Farrokh Moshiri, “Revolutionary Conflict Theory,” in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, 
eds. Jack A. Goldstone, Tedd R. Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 10. 
43 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London:  The Electric Book Company, 
1998), 27. 
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along these two lines. Although they wrote the Manifesto over 160 years ago, it still has 
relevance—notably in the developing world, and where communist ideology still surfaces 
to challenge capitalism and modernization.  
Greed can be a powerful motivator for the insurgent to support the movement 
when grievance is insufficient to garner support, or when greed fails to inspire citizens to 
engage in risky behavior. The concepts of greed and grievance are not mutually 
exclusive.44  Grievance is more likely to be paraded as the narrative of a revolution rather 
than the incentive for financial outcomes in the interest of public perception.45  Where 
greed is the primary motivation for insurgent leadership and guerillas to fight the most 
powerful and relatable grievances will be utilized for propaganda purposes.46  
Additionally, the groups that comprise an organization challenging the authority of the 
state retain multifarious motivations and cost-benefit calculus to determine when and 
when not to fight. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that groups are comprised of 
people who fight for a variety of reasons, most of which will fall under the motivational 
categories of greed or grievance.   
Paul Collier’s research found that economic agendas were central to determining 
risk factors that indicate the likelihood of civil war.47  He argues that economic 
incentives and opportunity are more likely to be the primary motivators to engage in 
violent civil conflict.48   
Greed motivation solves the free-rider dilemma.49  Free-riders remain loyal to the 
government, or occupy a position of neutrality even though they are ideologically aligned 
with the insurgency, but they seek to benefit from the rebellion without incurring the cost 
of action. McCormick and Giordano explain the primary challenge of the insurgency is to 
                                                 
44 Paul Collier, “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective,” Conference on Economic 
Agendas in Civil Wars, (London:  The World Bank, 1999), 92. 
45 Collier, “Doing Well Out of War,” 92. 
46 Collier, “Doing Well Out of War,” 92. 
47. Collier, “Doing Well Out of War,” 91. 
48 Collier, “Doing Well Out of War,” 91. 
49 Collier, “Doing Well Out of War,” 98–99. 
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gain enough recruitment to attract membership. Furthermore, they propose that the 
mobilization paradox, as it were, can be overcome through the use of symbolic violence 
or the use of side payments.50   
Civil wars create financial opportunities during times of conflict, which 
encourage the motivation to fight as part of the insurgency. The creation of financial 
opportunity is especially prominent in populations with high unemployment and a youth 
bulge.51  The discovery of new markets and illicit activities for funding may help to 
perpetuate the war against the state.52  Greed has strong empirical validation attesting to 
the role that it plays in recruiting insurgents. 
Disequilibrium creates revolutionary potential in a society and is responsible for 
the greed and grievance that motivates the recruitment and sympathetic support for social 
movements. It is the dynamic interplay between motivation and conditions that generate 
strategic objectives. The strategic objectives of revolutionaries seek to address the 
conditions that led to the grievances of the movement. Conversely, the state generally 
fails to identify strategic objectives that seek to rectify the revolutionaries’ grievances. 
The antithetic viewpoints lead to war when the revolution can overcome the mobilization 
paradox.   
Finally, since the primary objectives sought by insurgencies of the twentieth 
century aim to overthrow or modify the government, seek territorial secession to resolve 
sociocultural (religious fundamentalism, identity, ethnicity) issues, evoke the withdrawal 
of an occupying or foreign power, or to force modernization and economic reform, there 
will continue to be revolution as long as nation states fall out of equilibrium with their 
societies.53  The perpetual nature of this cycle demonstrates that an evolving society must 
have a flexible government to adapt to the changing needs of its people, failing flexibility 
governments will ultimately fall. Population mapping gives democracies the flexibility 
                                                 
50 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
Guerrilla Mobilisation,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007):  306, 311. 
51 Collier, “Doing Well Out of War,” 110. 
52 Collier, “Doing Well Out of War,” 110.  
53 Chuck Crossett, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. 
Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), vii. 
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they need to meet the ever changing needs of society without appearing weak, simply 
because the government can anticipate movement and reform when appropriate to 
maintain a healthy amount of natural control, which is the exemplar of good governance.  
2. Third-party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts 
In Regan’s study of third-party intervention, he typifies intrastate conflict as 
ethnic, religious, or ideologically based, with emphasis on three options for intervention 
categorized as military, economic, or a combination of the two.54  There are two options 
available to an intervening party, to support either the central government or the insurgent 
opposition.55 These two options typify conjunction theory. Namely, the intervening 
party’s decision is based largely upon the structural environment of the conflict (i.e. 
Which side best serves U.S. and international interests?) and the specific power brokers 
that can influence the fervor within the population.  
The optimal, and most likely goal of the interventionist, is to bring about the 
cessation of hostilities to achieve one or more of the following objectives: protecting the 
intervener’s national interests (security, economic, political, etc.); defending human 
rights; support of a common ideology; territorial acquisition; or regional stability.56  A 
successful third-party intervention strategy aims to modify the cost-benefit analysis of the 
belligerents by making the rewards for cooperation, compromise, and cessation of 
hostilities attractive or the cost of continuing the conflict prohibitively high.57    
Intervening actors who address the fundamental grievances of intrastate conflict by 
influencing fervor successfully deescalate the conflict without undue violence. The most 
successful interventions are those that are multifaceted providing military and economic 
aid to the government of the state.58  The implications of Regan’s research of third-party  
 
                                                 
54 Patrick M. Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 2 (1996), 336–359. 
55 Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” 340. 
56 Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” 341. 
57 Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” 341. 
58 Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” 345. 
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intervention suggests that the most important factor predicting the probability of 
successful conflict resolution or a cease fire is dependent upon the interventionist strategy 
implemented.59  
D. ISSUES IN SOCIETY 
The use of historical vignettes and theoretical analysis define the model’s inputs, 
known as ideology and fervor. Hitler’s rise to power in Germany during the interwar 
period provides the reader with a vibrant understanding of how a relatively small number 
of power brokers can influence fervor. Warfare in the information age is not purely a 
military struggle. Military leaders must understand statesmanship and be able to work as 
effectively in the political environment as they can wield the elements of military 
firepower. Likewise, political leaders and diplomats must see the strategic map 
differently than during previous epochs, and their vision must align with military 
leaders’. Political and diplomatic maneuver in combat zones, which falls on the shoulders 
of both military and civilian decision makers, is paramount to success.60 
1. Ideology 
This work uses ideology to describe how one associates with a given issue. On 
any issue, one can back, oppose, or hold a moderate position. 
Take, for example, the issue of a free market economy. Over the last century, the 
constituents of modern and developing nations have had strong opinions regarding a free 
market economy. At the extreme end of the spectrum, some people put complete trust 
into Adam Smith’s invisible hand, assuming that the forces of the marketplace will 
always produce superior outcomes to the plans devised by the figures of authority.61  On  
 
 
                                                 
59 Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” 349. 
60 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action:  The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare, 147. 
61 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (East Rutherford:  Viking Penguin, 1776). Smith defines the 
invisible hand in his quintessential work. Note that we do not argue that Smith would prefer an entirely 
unregulated economy. 
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the other extreme, some people oppose the free market, preferring command driven 
solutions. The overwhelming majority of people prefer an outcome somewhere in 
between. 
To demonstrate ideology, first consider an arbitrary scale ranging from negative 
one to one. The scale becomes the objective rating for an individual issue. Those holding 
the position of one fully support the issue, while those holding the position of negative 
one completely oppose it. Respondents holding the position of zero are indifferent. For 
example, people who support an entirely unregulated economy identify with the free 
market issue intimately. Hence, they rate a one. Conversely, a person diametrically 
opposed scores at negative one. Those who believe the government plays a limited role 
are more likely to be around zero.  
Two important points bear mentioning. First, the scale allows a spectrum of 
answers. For instance, consider Alice and Bob. Alice largely supports a free market 
economy with a few caveats and reservations. She rates her ideology with the issue at 0.8. 
If Bob rates his ideology greater than 0.8, his support is definitively stronger than Alice’s.   
If Bob rates his ideology at 0.4, he identifies with the issue half as much as Alice. If Bob 
rates his ideology as -0.8, then he ideologically opposes a free market economy as much 
as Alice supports one.   
Second, Alice may identify completely with two separate issues, yet still prefer 
one over the other. For instance, consider a more trivial issue like receiving one hundred 
U.S. dollars. Alice rates her ideology for receiving the money at one. Similarly, she 
would rate receiving one hundred Mexican pesos at one as well.    Alice independently 
supports both initiatives. However, she does not care about each issue the same. In this 
example, Alice prefers to receive U.S. dollars over pesos. The implication, when Alice 
faces a choice of one money (issue) over the other, is that she has greater passion for one; 
namely,   her actual preferences require an assessment of her ideology with an issue and 
her fervency for the issue. Alice is passionate about accepting the dollars over the pesos. 
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2. Fervor 
Fervor is a fleeting phenomenon. Fervor measures the passion a given person or 
coalition feels for one or more issues. As noted earlier, changing the ideology is not only 
difficult and time consuming, but nearly impossible in the short term without cataclysmic 
activity. Fervor is easier to affect, because it evokes an emotional response from the 
population in a two dimensional manner. 
Positive fervor and negative fervor are the two aspects population mapping uses 
to depict a society’s emotional response to issues. The two aspects seek the same result, 
but utilize different approaches. Positive fervor seeks to fuel ardor toward issues. 
Negative fervor seeks to agitate wroth towards selected issues. Positive and negative 
fervor are paramount to bringing issues to prominence, but in a complex society, they are 
not always enough. As in the many games of Game Theory, power brokers or coalitions 
seeking to change a Nash Equilibrium make threats or promises to draw coalitions into 
participation on an issue.62  The physical manifestation of threat and promise is 
obedience, a component of artificial control.   
Religions the world over instill love for their deity to amass a following. This 
work categorizes affectionate responses to an issue as positive fervor. Christianity, Islam, 
and Judaism demonstrate their love and commitment to God by daily worship. The use of 
ancient ceremony and sacred acts provide religious leaders with a congregation that 
follows the teachings of historic and present day leaders. A practitioner’s devotion and 
sacrifice to his or her creator, prophets, and modern day leaders depicts how positive 
fervor is a powerful rallying force. Leaders and media affect fervor when their messages 
depict an existential threat to a particular population group’s ideology. Jews throughout 
the world support Israel in the conflict over land between them and Palestine. Likewise, 
Muslims rally behind Palestine in the conflict. When outsiders threaten the founding 
principles of coalitions, positive fervor rises quickly for the cause, while negative fervor 
rises quickly against the adversary. 
                                                 
62 Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically (New York:  W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1991), 76.  “Nash Equilibrium is a combination of strategies in which each player’s action is the 
best response to that of the other. Given what the other is doing, neither wants to change his own move.” 
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Positive fervor discloses itself daily in secular and non-secular societies when 
social and economic issues raise the devotion of people to a cause. Hitler was adept at 
raising social issues to levels of contention that allowed positive and negative fervor to 
become relevant within the population. In 1935, Hitler used a powerful message to unite 
workers in Germany under his camp.63  Hitler whipped the rhetoric in an oratory style 
that precluded the need for conscious thought, and raised the hackles on the 
disenfranchised and relatively depraved. In Nuremberg on September 12, 1936, Hitler 
spoke mainly with positive fervor to strengthen his position:   
There was sometimes advanced as an excuse for Russia that she had been 
through war and through revolution. Well, we stood against twenty-six 
States in the war and we had a revolution, but I have taken as my 
fundamental law not to destroy anything. Had I done so there would have 
been an excuse for rebuilding during another eighteen years. 
But that was not our plan. We wanted additional work for our unemployed 
and the use of the volume of their increased production to increase every 
man’s share in consumption. Wages are not based on production; 
production itself is the wage. 
If I had wished I could have substituted officials for employers, but nature 
and reality select best. We do not wish bureaucratic economics as in 
Russia, nor do we wish to establish economic democracy here. 
Yet that does not mean either that we wish to let things drift as they 
please. Our fundamental economic principles are, first, to unite all the 
forces existing, and secondly, to educate our people better in their use. 
This Labor Front is the greatest element in such education. You are 
servants of the nation, but you alone are nothing. As part of the organic 
whole you are everything... 
It is hard to build up a new life out of your poverty, but I am not 
complaining. On the contrary, I find it wonderful to face difficult 
problems.64 
                                                 
63 Adolf Hitler, Nuremberg, Labor Front Speech September 12, 1936, Hitler Historical Museum, (© 
1996–2012), accessed February 15, 2013, http://www.hitler.org/  
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 22 
Notice how he rallies various classes of citizen to a unifying cause. The positive 
fervor garnered for his coalition speaks to the plight felt by many during that turbulent 
time. Hitler’s strategic oratory style depicted him as the standard-bearer for an aggrieved 
polity. 
Fear or hatred for another sect of society, leader, or movement (among other 
entities) is a polarizing power for differing coalitions within a society. This work 
classifies negative fervor as a derivation of agitation to generate animosity for an issue.   
Rather than rallying members of populations to a unifying issue, negative fervor 
fractures a population by agitating coalition members against an issue. The effects are 
different from positive fervor. While positive fervor rallies or pulls together disparate 
groups around a unifying entity, negative fervor seeks to polarize coalitions against one 
another. This divisive effect has a distinct purpose:  weakening a population by an issue 
with agitating rhetoric to manifest negative fervor is the fastest, but least enduring 
method of garnering support for the greater cause. Used in conjunction, the two aspects 
of fervor act in concert. On the one hand, negative fervor fractures an otherwise unified 
populace, while on the other hand positive fervor unifies the factions under a new banner 
with positive fervor for emerging power brokers. 
An increase in fervor does not automatically mean a change in preference. The 
high school shooting that occurred on April 19, 1999 in Columbine Colorado incited a 
fierce gun control debate throughout the country.65  Fervor is an interesting bedfellow. 
Within a week of the shooting, then President Bill Clinton introduced legislation banning 
private weapons sales at gun shows. Initially the senate rejected the bill, but after a 
weeklong debate in the public media, they passed the law. Fervor caused action, but since 
the senate ceded to a portion of the debate in the short term, long-term fervor fizzled. 
Consequently, the gun-show loophole legislation ultimately failed, and has never become 
an effective law.   
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The bureaucratic nature of politics has two natural remedies for combatting 
contentious issues. Political concessions diffuse contentious, negative fervor for issues by 
assuaging perceived wrongs. While slow political processes release the pressure created 
by acute events and allow negative fervor to dissipate over time. The gun control debate 
following the Columbine shooting raged through the media and in homes immediately 
following the massacre, but legislation, which is inherently slow and not always 
effective, was largely able to resist the spike in fervor and prevent radical changes to the 
U.S. and state constitutions.66 
Swift changes in fervor can force changes in preference, though not on the scale 
of complete reform. Preference changes occur incrementally and usually when drastic 
events cause a spike in fervor for a particular issue. Preference changes are not complete 
shifts in the short term; rather, fervor spikes that incrementally pull the constituency in a 
certain direction cause ideological drift, which is the evolutionary means that change 
societies preferences. 
In the early half of the 20th century Germany underwent ideological drift on a 
national scale. Hitler and his close following were rallying point for Germany’s 
ideological drift. The structural situation in Germany already existed; Hitler’s adept use 
of positive and negative fervor was the vanguard to worldwide conflict.    
In order to shape outcomes an actor identifies the goal of his or her organization. 
Understanding the political landscape is often a combination of multiple opinions shared 
amongst a collection of individuals seeking to affect the landscape. Hitler and his 
supporters in the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartie—NSDAP) utilized their collective influence to raise Hitler’s 
standing and ultimately seized his dictatorial supremacy by utilizing their knowledge of 
the population.67   
                                                 
66 David Olinger, “Massacre energized gun debate—but not lawmakers,” The Denver Post, April 19, 
2000, accessed on February 16, 2013, http://extras.denverpost.com/news/col0419g.htm 
67 Fest, Joachim C., Hitler, translation by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Inc., 1974), 123–147. 
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A figurehead that garners positive fervor to the first, second, and third standard 
deviations from a coalition center raises extends the natural control. The figurehead 
anthropomorphizes the issue. However, the figurehead rises to power on the backs of 
many supporters. Hitler was the figurehead for the NSDAP because of his apparent 
ubiquity with the working class and the machinations of the bourgeoisie society members 
seeking the supremacy of the NSDAP.68   
Positive fervor is coupled with negative fervor to co-opt the remainder of people 
that do not fall under the banner of positive fervor for an issue. Rhetoric about an issue 
brings unaffiliated factions under the natural control of the coalition by allying the fears 
and hatred of one faction against another.   
Hitler leveraged the opposing party members of the NDSAP against his own 
rising support.69  His political acumen prevailed, placing the NDSAP opposition party 
members in a position that forced their capitulation to Hitler demands for dictatorial 
power.70  Once aligned under a common figurehead, a certain degree of solidarity begins 
to coalesce thereby establishing the social movement. The dynamics between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie of German society in the 1920’s exemplified the need for 
a figurehead. Furthermore, the factionalized nature of Germany saw a dynamic play out 
between two sects of German society: those hungry for authoritarian rule joined the 
NSDAP—the rising fascist dictatorship of the Nazi party—and supporters of the post-
World War II camp that largely followed communist thought.71  Hitler’s own words shed 
light on the factions and unified them under one precept:  “For a class-conscious worker 
there is no room in the NSDAP, any more than there is for a status-conscious 
bourgeois.”72  
How can insights from Hitler’s use of population influence help democratic 
nations strategically implement population influence for good?  Utilizing this work’s 
                                                 
68 Fest, Hitler, 148. 
69 Fest, Hitler, 148. 
70 Fest, Hitler, 148. 
71 Fest, Hitler, 148. 
72 Fest, Hitler, 148. 
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model, the United States can portray populations in a manner that identifies revolutionary 
potential in geographic space and curtails manifestations of violence and disorder by 
linking social, economic, political, and cultural grievances to instability. Finally, by 
acknowledging and understanding precursors to violence and disorder, the United States 
can effectively and positively influence population groups by addressing the root causes 
of revolutionary potential within a country. 
E. SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
1. Changing Ideology 
This research suggests that personal ideology changes over time, but it takes 
many decades because it evolves as a person matures. Ideology works on a generational 
scale, rather than monthly, weekly, or annually.   
Studies allude to changes in ideology by investigating the roots of normative 
changes in society. From an anthropological point of view, Fredrik Barth has detailed the 
generational process through which norms and values might change in society.73  His 
work describes the boundaries imposed by a functioning society. Society’s boundaries 
clearly delineate acceptable values from forbidden desires. In the present, structural 
limitations are inflexible since a departure from the norm ruptures the fabric of the 
society imposing the value. As the society evolves through generations and epochs, so 
evolve the norms. It is a slow and careful process. As we consider ideology, one can 
think of subcultures within a society in order to apply Barth’s model.   
Contemporary society has found room for a variety of social ideologies to coexist. 
Yet, the development of ideology relies upon the same boundaries and expectations as 
described by Barth within partitions of society. Whether in the Third World or the First, 
individuals have families, friends, cliques, and institutions that set the boundaries and 
expectations for their ideology. Thus, political persuasions and ideology stem directly 
                                                 
73 Barth, Fredrik, “Boundaries and connections:  Signifying identities,” Anthropological Perspectives 
on Boundaries and Contested Values (2000), 17–36. 
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from environmental considerations.74  Globalization begs the question: is the old 
paradigm still relevant?  In other words, are people still ideologically bound in a world 
where digital networks span the remote corners of the earth?  The answer is yes. In fact, 
several studies indicate that the flourish of digital technology has only added to isolation 
within society.75  People of a given persuasion tend to use the vast array of 
communications networks to confirm their worldview. Digitally isolated circles serve to 
set new boundaries for acceptable ideology, much like societies in Barth’s analysis. 
Simply put, once an individual forms an ideology, one should not expect it to change 
quickly or easily. 
In Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics, and 
Psychology, Till Grüne-Yanoff and Sven Ove Hansson compile the leading contemporary 
theories on preference change, which correlates to our definition of ideology. Implicit in 
their title, Grüne-Yanoff and Hansson consider a variety of disciplines from which to 
evaluate the phenomenon.76   
This work, as an analysis of preference change, echoes two important points. 
First, preferences change slowly regarding the population at large. An individual may 
change his or her mind on a given issue due to errors in judgment. However, such events 
occur on the margin, implying that for every reformed socialist, one expects to find a 
repatriated capitalist. Second, it takes a significant investment to change an individual’s 
preference. This makes sense, as one considers that ideologies evolve over a lifetime. 
However, when considered from a macro-level, Grüne-Yanoff’s and Hansson’s 
comprehensive analysis suggests that ideologies remain static. 
Theories of slow ideological change mean nothing if the empirical record paints a 
different story. Perhaps World War II offers the best example for radically evolving 
                                                 
74 Jennifer Glass, Vern L. Bengtson, and Charlotte Chorn Dunham, “Attitude Similarity in Three-
Generation Families: Socialization, Status Inheritance, or Reciprocal Influence?” American Sociological 
Review 51 (October, 1986):  685–698. 
75 M. McPherson, L. Smith-Lovin, and M.E. Brashears, “Social Isolation in America: Changes in Core 
Discussion Networks Over Two Decades,” American Sociological Review 71, no. 3 (2006):  353–375. 
76 Till Grüne-Yanoff and Sven Ove Hansson, Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, 
Economics, and Psychology (New York:  Springer, 2009), 2–22. 
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preference on the macro-level. The discovery of the Nazi concentration camps changed 
the heart of nations, especially among a population guilt-ridden over the idolatry of its 
Führer. Barth describes this phenomenon in his anthropological study. While ideology 
generally remains static, acts of cataclysmic violence can revolutionize societies from 
within or without.77  This work argues that the United States ought to prefer that 
preferences change slowly for the good of all. 
2. Changing Fervor   
Unlike ideology, fervor can change overnight. On April 8, 1865, the Confederate 
and Union soldiers engaged each other in mortal combat on the fields surrounding 
Appomattox Courthouse. On April 9, they laid down their arms and reunited as 
countrymen based on an afternoon shared by Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant and 
General Robert E. Lee. Perhaps Grant captured the instantaneous de-escalation best when 
he ordered his men to stop cheering the defeat of their Confederate adversaries. Writing 
about the incident, Grant recalls, “I at once sent word…to have it stopped. The 
Confederates were now our countrymen, and we did not want to exult over their 
downfall.”78   
The meeting between Grant and Lee transformed a battle, where thousands of 
men would have fought one another, into a parade field. The relative peace can be 
attributed to fervor; both sides blood was up prior to the accord, but immediately 
following widespread exultation was felt over the end of hostilities.   
An interesting point of fact contrasts ideology and fervor. The Confederate 
soldiers did not cease to celebrate and extol their Southern ideology. On the contrary, the 
longevity of the Confederate flag as a contemporary symbol of Southern pride confirms 
that many of the ideologies that existed prior to the Civil War continue to exist today. 
While ideology persists, the fervor changed with the simple act of putting ink to a 
document.  
                                                 
77 Barth, “Boundaries and connections:  Signifying identities,” 59–71. 
78 Jay Winik, April 1865: The Month That Saved America (Harper Collins, New York, 2006), 191. 
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F. CONCLUSION  
Objectively depicting populations in a topographical fashion requires a new way 
of defining how passionate people feel on issues and how they personally identify with 
particular subjects. This chapter has explained that ideology is the way people at the 
micro level identify with social issues at the macro level. The passion people feel at the 
micro level translates into fervor at the macro level. Ideology and fervor provide are the 
two critical components necessary to characterize a society as either stable or unstable. 
Though ideology and fervor provide the necessary components to develop a preference 
surface that depicts the location of coalitions relative to one another, they are not 
existentially sufficient to determine stability. Integrating the level of natural and artificial 
control into the surface is a critical step to determining how disequilibriated a society 
remains. The next chapter explains the development of mapping societies. 
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II. THE MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Much as a geographic map offers a discrete and objective representation of 
physical terrain, a population map offers quantifiable insight into human terrain. The 
ideas and definitions from Chapter II provide the foundation for mathematically 
modeling the values of a constituency. For simplicity, this work uses hypothetical 
characters, ‘Alice’, and ‘Paul’. Alice is from country ‘A’ and Paul is a pollster. Two 
additional countries, ‘B’ and ‘C,’ aid in describing the model and the process to the 
reader. The hypothetical population map offers a discreet look at the inner dynamics of a 
state. It analyzes constituents’ values regarding issues with revolutionary potential in 
order to illustrate the dynamics of competing coalitions in times of war and peace. 
The chapter uses the two aspects of population mapping, ideology (the shape of 
the preference curve) and fervor (the scale of the preference curve), in the context of the 
model. We explain how the model is an intuitive method of building the map in, “An 
Issue in One Dimension.” Then, we explain how coalitions with similar ideologies 
naturally align in, “Span of Control.” The next section introduces the concept of, 
“Assisted Preference,” and how to co-opt coalitions that fall outside the natural span of 
control. Finally, we explain how, “Extending the Model,” provides users with modeling 
capabilities in multiple dimensions. 
We start by considering a hypothetical issue within a population that exists in one 
dimension. Assuming that we have data describing the issue through the use of survey 
data, subjective analysis, or a number of other tools, the hypothetical scenarios infer how 
the population feels about the issue under consideration. The hypothetical data produces a 
preference curve of the population based upon the constituents’ ideology and fervor. 
Issues drive coalitions within populations and coalitions rely upon the support of people.   
The model assumes that people will tend to support a coalition with which they 
agree. According to the population map, these constituents lay ‘close’ to the coalition. 
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This concept generalizes from a single issue (or dimension) to multiple issues (and hence, 
multiple dimensions with each issue yielding a new dimension on the population map). 
A society may have dozens of issues that matter. Consider the United States, 
where many issues quickly emerge as relevant—free market economics, individual 
responsibility, foreign military intervention, abortion rights, separation of church and 
state, and so forth. Even though each of these issues presents its own possible dimension 
within the American constituency, they simplify into one dimension on the spectrum 
ranging from liberal to conservative.79  In the United States, political science and decades 
of polling data has well established this reduction of the political space. For a general 
population, our population map uses linear algebra to simplify the issues that matter in a 
society without exhaustive subjective analysis and decades of data. 
B. AN ISSUE MODELED IN ONE DIMENSION 
The issues within a society provide the cornerstone of the population map. The 
map depicts the degree to which the norms of a society agree.80  Therefore, one must 
consider each of the issues that exist within a constituency. Tracing this process through 
one hypothetical issue illustrates the process. 
Using the definition of issue from Chapter II, consider the citizens of fictional 
country ‘A’. The country of A suffers bitter debate over embracing a free market 
economy within the society. Assume there are two extreme constituencies within A. One 
extreme seeks an entirely unregulated economy. The proponents of an unregulated 
economy believe the forces of the market will achieve optimal outcomes. The other 
extreme distrusts market forces and corporate greed. This group seeks to place the reigns 
of the economy entirely within the control of the government. Next, assume the camp 
opposing capitalism lays at negative one on the issue spectrum and the camp supporting it 
                                                 
79 A tradeoff clearly exists between accuracy and simplicity. For instance, many Americans hold 
socially liberal values and economically conservative (e.g., libertarians). This voting bloc does not fit 
nicely along a one dimensional spectrum. Fortunately, the mathematical methods give an objective measure 
of the error due to simplification for a population. See Appendix A for greater detail. 
80 Johnson, Revolutionary Change. For the purposes of this work, the concept of ‘agreement’ most 
closely resembles Johnson’s equilibrium within government and society and between government and 
society. See chapter 4 for greater detail. 
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lays at positive one on the spectrum. A polling company now samples the society by 
inquiring about the constituents’ feelings on the economic system. Polling companies in 
countries B and C conduct similar surveys. Compiling the results, they end up with 
density distributions of their populations—or at least estimates according to the accuracy 
of their sampling methods. Figure 2.1 depicts some hypothetical results from the process. 
 
Figure 2.1 Three possible results from a population’s preference 
survey according to its feelings on the issue “support for a capitalist 
economy.” 
The graphs depict three hypothetical results. Country A shows two distinct camps 
with little middle ground. Most people either hate the free market or they love it. The 
center graph in Figure 2.1 represents Country B, which depicts a typical response; 
namely the population in country B resembles a normal curve where the majority of the 
population holds a moderate value position. On the right of Figure 2.1, country C depicts 
a society with a nearly random distribution for its economic preference. In country C, no 
dominant position emerges.81 
A strong postulate is that country B yields the most stable intrastate system, as 
long as the state positions itself over the population median. In other words, a 
government holding a neutral value (i.e., zero) along the spectrum easily enjoys the  
 
 
                                                 
81 Note that since these curves represent population densities, the area beneath each of the curves is 
equal to one, representing 100% of the population. 
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majority of the population’s natural support. However, the population’s ideology 
regarding an issue only yields the shape of the curve and the shape explains one side of 
the issue. 
The other side requires the pollster to ask his respondents how fervent they feel 
about the issue in question. In the example above, consider a respondent, Alice, who 
opposes capitalism. Her view against capitalism falls near negative one on the spectrum 
of ideology. Simultaneously, she cares very little about the issue, and hence rates her 
personal fervor as zero. Due to her lack of fervor, Alice accepts a capitalist government 
that holds a position closer to one on the spectrum of ideology. In this scenario, Alice and 
the government maximize their structural distance from one another. However, the 
emotional distance is negligible and the issue does not preclude Alice from offering her 
natural support. On the contrary, if Alice feels extremely passionate about the issue of 
economics and rates her passion at ten, then the government holding a position of one on 
the spectrum of preference remains distant to Alice and her emotions drive her actions—
so much so that she might consider violent rebellion as an acceptable course of action. 
Alice alone does not determine the scale of the fervor. Instead, the mean of the 
entire population determines the scale. Returning to Figure 2.1, consider two populations 
that hold the preference of the population at left in country A. One of the populations has 
an extremely high level of fervor and scores an average of ten. The other population has 
very little fervor for the issue of capitalism and scores an average of two. Both 
populations share identical shapes the preference curve (i.e., they have the same ideology 
for the issue), but differences in fervor affect scale significantly. Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
concept. Both populations have the same ideology for the economic system, yet the left 
population (Figure 2.2 A) has more fervor. This changes the scale for the horizontal axis. 
It also implies that a coalition within the left population (Figure 2.2 A) will have a harder 
time recruiting broad-based support than a coalition within the right population (Figure 
2.2 B).  
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Figure 2.2: Two populations with the same ideology for the issue 
‘support for a capitalist economy’. The population on the left has high 
fervor while the population on the right has low fervor. 
The methodology for mapping a population according to the issues within the 
society requires a quick defense for scaling fervor according to the population’s mean 
fervor. Assume that Alice still prefers the command-driven economy (she scores near 
negative one on her ideology) and she has absolutely no fervor for the issue. If she lives 
among a fervent population (Figure 2.2 A), she regrettably finds herself among a society 
wrapped in a bitter—and potentially violent—contest over the free market al.ice prefers 
to live in a population less inclined to fight over such issues, such as the placated 
population (Figure 2.2 B). Denied this luxury, Alice must choose a coalition to support. 
Naturally, she chooses the coalition that most closely mirrors her ideology. Simply stated, 
individuals only choose the issues they support. The passion of the masses determines the 
scale of the issue.  
The process of mapping an issue in one dimension yields a scaled preference 
curve of the population. The ideology regarding the issue determines the shape of the 
curve while the fervor determines the scale of the horizontal axis. Working with a single 
issue (or to put a fine point on it, a population map in one dimension), a conclusion 
regarding intrastate stability quickly emerges. The linear distance from a constituent to a 
coalition directly relates to the propensity of the constituent to support the coalition. 
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C. THE SPAN OF CONTROL 
Constituents yield natural control to governments that reflect and support the 
issues that matter to the constituency. Therefore, one can think of a government as having 
a position on the population map according to the issues that it supports. Constituents 
close to the governmental coalition support the coalition while those far from the 
coalition oppose it. The scale to which a constituent supports or opposes the state 
depends upon the distance between the two on the population map.82  To generalize this 
concept, the population map model requires a few conventions. 
First, if a coalition plants its flag at a position upon the population map, it enjoys 
the natural control of the population within a specific distance from its position.83  For 
illustrative purposes, call the distance the, “span of control. Initially, assume that the span 
of control equals one. Returning to the hypothetical population map for country A, with 
its preference distribution for capitalism, envision a coalition that holds the ideological 
position of negative one-half (i.e., the coalition generally opposes capitalism). Using the 
same shape of the preference curve (i.e., the same ideology), as in previous examples and 
a span of control of one, Figure 2.3 displays the control that a coalition with this position 
can expect in a fervent society (2.3 a) and a placid society (2.3 b). The shaded region 
depicts a span of one from each side of the coalition’s position (i.e., the span of control 
for the coalition holding the position of the flag). The fervent society has a mean fervor 
of ten, which scales the society’s ideology and gives the coalition a position of negative 
five (negative one-half times ten) on the preference curve. Similarly, the placid society 
has a fervor of two, which gives the coalition a position of negative one (negative one-
half times two). In the fervent society, the coalition enjoys the support of less than 35% 
of the population. The same coalition, in a society that holds low fervor for economics,  
 
                                                 
82 Guillermo Owen, and Bernard Grofman, “Two-Stage Electoral Competition in Two-Party Contests:  
Persistent Divergence of Party Positions,” SOC Choice Welfare, 26 (2006):  547–569. 
83 In reality, it makes more sense to assume that each individual constituent will cede a proportion of 
their full support to the government based upon the distance between the individual and the government on 
the population map. Appendix A deals with this complication, but it offers little to the general 
understanding of the population map and hence it receives no discussion within the body of this work. 
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can control most of the population. Logically, it follows that coalitions will struggle to 
maintain broad-based support from constituents in fervent societies. Yet, support does not 
come exclusively from pure preference.   
 
Figure 2.3 The span of control for the same coalition in a fervent and a 
placid society. 
D. ASSISTED PREFERENCE 
Coalitions should prefer support from pure preference as it comes at no cost, but 
when pure preference eludes a coalition, it can always resort to obtaining assisted 
preference. A coalition can pursue assisted preference through a variety of methods.84  
Essentially, attempts to recruit support through assisted preference seek to manipulate the 
expected utility of constituents.85 The population map provides insight into how the 
process works. 
                                                 
84 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., “Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts” Report Prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Santa Monica, CA: February 
1970, 11–16. 
85 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” This work uses the utility calculations described by 
McCormick in order to demonstrate a constituent’s decision to support a coalition. 























High Fervor Population Distribution























Low Fervor Population Distribution
 36 
First, consider the process by which an individual evaluates the utility in 
supporting a coalition. Gordon McCormick provides a straightforward model for the 
dynamics at play using expected values. 
 E(𝑋) = PB(𝑋)B(𝑋) − PC(𝑋)C(𝑋)  
In McCormick’s equation, the expected utility in supporting coalition X equals the 
benefits of supporting X times the probability of receiving these benefits minus the costs 
of supporting X times the probability of incurring these costs.86  Combining the utility 
equation to the population map carries implications for a coalition attempting to recruit 
assisted preference. 
Clearly, individuals who hold positions close to the coalition on the population 
map benefit from supporting the coalition since they can expect it to promote their 
agenda.87  Constituents who are positioned away from the coalition on the population 
map enjoy decreasing benefits and suffer increasing costs by supporting the coalition. For 
the current discussion, assume a 100% probability of incurring a cost or receiving a 
benefit and a linear relationship between distance in the population map and incentive 
(i.e., benefits and costs).88  With these conventions, Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship 
between distance from a coalition’s position and the utility in supporting the coalition. At 
a distance of one (point B), the costs of supporting the coalition equal the benefits, so the 
net utility equals zero. Increasing distance beyond one results in a negative utility. The 
relationship suggests a cost to recruiting assisted preference from constituents outside of 
the coalition’s span of control.  
                                                 
86 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.”  McCormick gives a detailed explanation of the 
dynamics at play in a population where two coalitions compete for control (i.e., the state and the insurgent). 
This work will presently focus on how the utility equation relates to the considerations of a single coalition 
attempting to recruit maximal control. 
87 Owen and Grofman, “Two-Stage Electoral Competition in Two-Party Contests:  Persistent 
Divergence of Party Positions.” 
88 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.”  In this sense, one can think of the probabilities in 
delivering benefits and exacting costs as strategic characteristics of the coalition in question (decisions 
made internal to a coalition). The current implementation of the population map focuses on structural 
characteristics of the environment (factors outside the coalition’s immediate control). Thus, in the current 
discussion, assuming probabilities of one facilitates understanding of the population map. 
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Figure 2.4 The relationship between utility for supporting a coalition 
and distance from the coalition on the population map. 
Next, consider the coalition may employ resources to attempt to change the 
benefits and costs to supporting constituents. An efficient coalition expends resources to 
the point that the recruited population has a net positive utility. In Figure 2.4, this implies 
that constituents at a distance less than one offer the coalition natural support while 
constituents beyond one cost the coalition resources to recruit through assisted 
preference.89  Logically, it now follows that the span of control is equal to one in this 
society.90  While constituents prefer a coalition collocated with their position on the 
population map (point A), they will support any coalition that yields a net benefit 
(between point A and point B). Therefore, the span of control reaches the point where the 
utility of supporting a coalition equals zero. 
                                                 
89 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.”. This assumes a simple contest between a coalition and 
constituents. In a case where competing coalitions exist (e.g., the state versus the insurgent), both coalitions 
may present a constituent with a positive utility. In this case, one would have to consider opportunity costs 
and the potential that some constituents may hedge their bets by supporting multiple coalitions. 
90 Note that this does not imply that the span of control is equal to one for all societies. The actual 
value for δ will depend upon the society. Furthermore, Chapter 4 will discuss ways in which a coalition 
might seek to alter this parameter. 





















Figure 2.4 illustrates another important concept in yielding support to coalitions. 
One can easily appreciate that conflict bears a price in any society.91  If a coalition should 
choose to operate outside the realm of normal politics and resort to violent revolt and 
insurrection, it can expect hefty operating costs for financing this conflict. The horizontal 
line at negative four denotes the cost of conflict in this society (point C). Now, the net 
utility curve intersects the cost of conflict at a distance of 1.8 (the vertical line denoted on 
Figure 2.4). It follows that a rational citizen would consider resorting to conflict to 
oppose any coalition further than 1.8 from his or her position. On this population’s map, 
the range of normal politics is 1.8. Beyond this distance, coalitions will resort to tactics 
outside the realm of the state’s sanctioned political system. 
E. EXTENDING THE MODEL 
Thus, far, the discussion of the population map has used one-dimensional 
illustrations. In most societies, multiple issues lead to the fissures within the social fabric 
that inspire the formulation of competing coalitions. The population map can 
accommodate any number of values in the same manner it handles one value. The 
appendices deal with the rigorous mathematics behind the model, yet anecdotal 
observations of American politics suffice to illustrate concepts without an understanding 
of the higher level math. 
Consider Paul, a pollster attempting to capture the issues that divide America. He 
may pontificate about an expeditionary military, deficit spending, gun control, 
immigration law, and a countless litany of other issues that scroll across the ticker of the 
cable news shows on a daily basis. Paul wants to capture the essence of the American 
political space, and so he starts surveying the identity and the fervor of the American 
constituency according to each of these issues. 
Initially, Paul surveys two issues, support for a woman’s right to choose 
concerning abortion and support for amnesty in the immigration debate. He uses a survey 
                                                 
91 James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War” International Organization, 49, no. 3 (1995):  
379–384. This work borrows heavily from Fearon’s concept of the cost of conflict, yet it simultaneously 
departs from his theories on the rationality of conflict. This work assumes that rational actors may elect to 
fight when the costs of submission exceeds the cost of conflict. 
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asking respondents to rate their ideology and fervor. Figure 2.5 displays Paul’s responses 
on both issues. A woman’s right to choose scores fervor of five, and marriage equality 
scores fervor of two. Notice that the graphs on the left depict a two dimensional response 
for a single issue, exactly like the graphs presented in Figure 2.2. These graphs show the 
preference densities for the two issues. The graph on the right presents a two-dimensional 
scatter plot of the two issues together, or the preference surface. For any given position 
on choice (the horizontal axis) and any given position on amnesty (the vertical axis), the 
population map depicts the density of the population supporting the given combination of 
the two views (high points—depicted in darker colors—represents higher concentrations 
of density, or peaks).  
 
Figure 2.5 Preference curves for two issues in a society as well as a 
Preference Interaction plot, contour plot, of the interaction of the two 
issues. 
Delving deeper into the American political psyche, Paul surveys another 14 
issues. Now, he struggles to find an appropriate graphical representation of the shape of 
the preference surface in this 16-dimensional space.92  As Paul analyzes the data, 
                                                 
92 In a single dimension, one considers a preference curve. The issue of capitalism, as presented in this 
chapter, presents an illustration of a preference curve. As the model extends to multiple dimensions, one 
considers a preference surface. 
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searching for ways in which to depict the American polity, he begins to notice a trend:  
the same Americans who support strict gun control also tend to care less about deficit 
spending in lieu of economic investment. The same Americans who espouse immigration 
reform that offers amnesty generally favor limited military intervention abroad. After 
weeks of analysis, Paul realizes a single spectrum overwhelmingly captures the American 
constituency. Now, he can show the density of the American populace along a single 
axis—liberal to conservative. While Paul relied on observation and intuition to arrive at a 
subjective depiction of Americans as ranging from liberal to conservative, this work 
captures the same information on a population map using objective and quantifiable 
assessments.   
Paul’s research illustrates a common phenomenon in the politics of all societies. 
Myriad issues span a broad spectrum and tend to simplify into categories of ideology. For 
instance, a citizen who identifies as a social conservative tends to oppose amnesty for 
illegal immigrants, oppose legalized drugs, and support blending Judeo-Christian values 
into the public sector. A thorough examination of the American constituency will 
certainly find deviations from this trend, but generalizing a host of issues into the 
spectrum of social ideology captures the essence of the system with great accuracy. Paul 
spent many months collecting and analyzing survey data to prove what political scientists 
and decades of polling have already established in America. For less studied states, 
mathematical methods can use survey data to arrive at a similar—though culturally 
specific—conclusion without an army of analysts and decades of polling. 
Formatting the survey data into a matrix allows linear algebra to simplify the data 
in a meaningful and expeditious manner. For instance, Paul takes each of his 16 issues as 
the columns in his data matrix, and the rows represent the individuals polled. Now, 
assume Paul surveyed 200 people. His data matrix has 200 rows and 16 columns. If Alice 
were the first person that Paul polled, then each of her responses for her ideology with the 
16 issues would appear in the first row of the survey matrix. For instance, assume that 
Paul first asked about ideology regarding a free market economy and Alice rated her 
response as negative one (i.e., she completely opposes a free market on the original scale 
of -1 to 1). If the society’s fervor for the issue were six, then Paul would place a negative 
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six in the first row of the first column, corresponding to Alice’s scaled response, or her 
preference (again, preference equals an individual’s ideological position multiplied by the 
society’s mean fervor). Paul would repeat this process for every issue and every 
respondent. 
Next, using principal component analysis (a technique of linear algebra), Paul 
dissects the data matrix into its principal components. In the American political spectrum, 
one imagines the space breaking down into two simplified axes, one spectrum of socially 
liberal to conservative people and one spectrum of economically liberal to conservative 
people. Again, because the American system has received so much scrutiny, these 
reductions come as no surprise. In a dynamic political system, in a remote corner of the 
earth, the linear algebra can solve this reduction with the right survey data. This work 
will break a polity down into the two primary spectrums of division based on the survey 
matrix in order to produce a topographical contour map, or our population map. 
Reducing a multi-dimensional map serves a few purposes. First, a reduction to 
one or two dimensions allows a visual display, which enhances understanding. For 
instance, by simplifying 16 issues into the American political space into camps of liberal 
to conservative, Paul captures the driving factors in the political space without going into 
exhaustive detail on each of the 16 issues that he has surveyed. In this case, the 
simplification provides an accurate snapshot that one would miss in attempting to digest 
the data in its entirety.  
Second, the reduction illustrates how changing the fervor or ideology for a single 
issue can manipulate the political space. If Paul employs his survey system in a poorly 
understood polity, he struggles to label the axes of the principal components (e.g., liberal 
to conservative). The method reduces any population into its most influential camps 
according to survey responses, but it does not explicitly define the nature of the camps. 
Fortunately, Paul’s model provides insight into the primary divisions within the studied 
society by displaying the projection of an issue onto the population map. For instance, 
using the example of American politics again Paul analyzes gun control, and discovers its 
projection onto the population map. Figure 2.6 displays Paul’s projection. Implicitly, a 
change in fervor or ideology regarding gun control moves the population along the 
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direction that the issue appears on the population map. Therefore, the model takes as 
many dimensions as one cares to survey and simplifies them in order to depict a terrain 
map where the relief depicts the density of populations that subscribe to the position of 
the primary polarizing spectrum of issues (or the first principal component) and the 
secondary polarizing spectrum of issues (or the second principal component). It then 
depicts the effect that a change in any single issue will have on the overall structure of the 
population.  
 
Figure 2.6 The projection of the issue of gun control 
onto the U.S. population map. 
 Chapter III uses this model in our hypothetical example to display its relevance in 
intrastate conflict. For now, consider a hypothetical example of the American 
constituency map depicted in Figure 2.6. The map depicts all of Paul’s 16 issues on the 
right. Again, the arrows depict the direction in which the issues impact the map. The 
length of the weighted line and the number beneath each issue projection correspond to 
the effect that the issue has upon the map. A one would indicate that the issue completely 
dictates the distribution of the population along the population map in the direction 
depicted by the arrow. Conversely, a zero would indicate that the issue has no impact 
whatsoever upon the map. In Figure 2.6, two primary camps emerge. Notice, the 























































Size of Republican Coalition = 23.01%
Size of Democratic Coalition = 24.69%











Democratic Party dominates the ‘high ground’ denoting the maximal population density 
around the peak on the right (denoted with a D). Meanwhile, the Republican Party seizes 
the peak on the left (denoted by the R). In this situation, the span of control—as 
determined by the utility curves depicted in Figure 2.4—assumes a value of two.93  
Therefore, the population residing within a distance of two from either party offers its 
natural political support to the adjacent coalition. Next, assume a value of seven for the 
range of normal politics (i.e., the cost of violent conflict is high in American society, so 
the population must face an extremely negative net utility before resorting to 
insurrection). Some other potential coalitions exist within the polity. The Blue Dog 
Democrats (denoted by the B) tend to hold liberal positions on economic issues and 
conservative values on social issues. The Libertarians (denoted by the L) are the exact 
inverse of the Blue Dog Democrats. Finally, the Tea Party (denoted by the T) holds 
extremely conservative values on all issues. 
Given the span of control and the nature of the populations depicted, strategies 
emerge for both parties. For instance, the Democrats have a tighter distribution than the 
Republicans do, as denoted by the tight and tall peak around their platform. The 
Democrat’s density distribution runs from generally northwest to southeast (i.e., the ridge 
along the hilltop generally runs in this direction). Party discipline can benefit the 
Democrats if they use issues that polarize the constituency around about the northeasterly 
running axis since they have unity in this direction. Conversely, they do not want to 
stretch the map in the northwesterly direction, since increasing fervor for issues that 
impact the map in this direction (as determined by the issue projections) could push the 
Blue Dog Democrats out of the Democrats span of natural control. 
Finally, Figure 2.6 shows the proportion of the population that naturally supports 
each coalition given a span of control of two. The Republicans start with 23 percent of 
the population and the Democrats start with 24.7 percent. 
                                                 
93
 Note that this span of control differs from the assumed value of one given in Figure 2.4. One should 
note that the span of control will be different for each society depending upon the utility curve of the 
society under question.   
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Notice that the issue of support for the Second Amendment impacts the map 
along the northwesterly direction. As discussed, stretching the map in this direction 
(which occurs by increasing fervor for issues that fall along this axis) could hurt the 
Democrats because their ridgeline runs in this direction. Conversely, the Republicans—
though they have a more distributed base of support—have a northeasterly running 
ridgeline. Therefore, they can benefit from increasing fervor for the issue of the Second 
Amendment. Figure 2.7 depicts the same American polity with the exact same ideologies 
and exact same fervor for every issue except for the Second Amendment. When fervor 
increases from 0.4 to 4.4, the Blue Dog Democrats start rallying for their Second 
Amendment rights.94  As a result, they get pushed outside the span of natural control of 
the Democrats. Stretching the map in this direction also moves some people out of the 
Republican span of control, but it hurts the Democrats worse due to the structural 
ideologies of the American population. Whereas the Democrats had a margin of 1.7 
percent of the population prior to the increased in concerns over guns, they now only 
have a margin of 1.3 percent after losing support from some Blue Dog Democrats. 
  
                                                 
94
 We use Blue Dog Democrat to refer to the United States’ constituents who are economically liberal 
and socially conservative. Blue collar workers are frequently thought of as Blue Dog Democrats, such as 
West Virginia coal miners. 
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Figure 2.7 The U.S. population map with Republican and Democratic 
span of control indicated before and after an increase in fervor over the 
issue of gun control. 
The Democrats have a clear counter to the Republicans’ windfall gain in relative 
support. If they can increase fervor for issues that impact the map in a northeasterly 
direction, then they can fissure the Republican camp by isolating Libertarians and the Tea 
Party. Similarly, they should attempt to decrease fervor for issues that fall along the 
northwesterly direction in order to bring the Blue Dog Democrats back into their camp. 
Figure 2.8 depicts the American population map after fervor decreases for Second 
Amendment while increasing for social medicine. Here, they recoup support from the 
Blue Dog Democrats while splitting the Republican. Based on the ideologies driving the 
map, most members of the Republican camp enjoy benefits such as Medicare. However, 
the Tea Party and the Libertarians strongly oppose these programs, so increasing fervor 
for this issue leads to increased distance between these camps on the population map. 























































Size of Republican Coalition = 18.32%
Size of Democratic Coalition = 19.58%












Figure 2.8 The U.S. population map with Republican and Democratic 
span of control for Phase 2 of gun control 
In summary, the model is able to represent varied dimensions limited only by the 
analyst’s or pollster’s ability. Furthermore, it simplifies the dimensions in order to depict 
our population amp similar to a terrain map. The contour map depicts population density 
for the given, polarizing issues (or the first principal component). Concurrently, the map 
depicts the secondary polarizing spectrum of issues (or the second principal component). 
Finally, the population relief map depicts the effects that changes in any single issue have 
on the overall structure of the population. This population map offers insight into how to 
form and break coalitions through preferences and fervor. Moreover, it says a great deal 
about the stability or fragility of a state. For the nation engaged in a counterinsurgency 
fight, this model has significant implications for successful strategies when considering 
intrastate conflict as we shall illustrate in Chapter III. 























































Size of Republican Coalition = 13.45%
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III. THE WORKING MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we explain the working dynamics of the model by following a 
chain of events that lead to a hypothetical government losing control over its population. 
Additionally, we explain how to use the model to develop strategy in order for the 
government to achieve Johnsonian equilibrium with the society and maintain its 
legitimate role as the governing body.95  Specifically, we utilize three scenes that depict a 
hypothetical situation where a third party ultimately intervenes in a rebel’s bid to gain 
control over its society after the ruling oligarchy has failed to quell rebellion and prevent 
revolution.   
The three scenes describe one way rebellion evolves into of civil war. In the first 
two scenes incipient rebellion and revolution gain international visibility and demonstrate 
the evolution of society as fervor spikes for different issues. In scene three, the third party 
intervention scenario explains the application of the model to demonstrate how the 
United States can develop unique strategies for complex problems utilizing the 
population mapping tool. The chapter uses the terminology developed in Chapter I to 
shape the scenes. The model maps the population according to the methodology 
described in Chapter II. Beginning in Section B, the chapter describes a hypothetical 
country named Doulah. Tracing the evolution of Doulah’s situation, the vignette explains 
the historic causes that lead to civil war from the context of the population map. With the 
background established, Section C develops the situation in Doulah as the situation 
devolves from a functioning government through the stages of intrastate conflict and 
culminates with a third party intervention. Finally, Section D contains results and 
conclusions from the vignette. 
Each scene is a unique paradigm that explains the various elements of the 
population using the population map. Throughout each scene described in Section C, the 
fervor for issues changes within the society leading to the dissolution and forging of 
                                                 
95 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 32& 72. 
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coalitions. As the passions for issues change, the ideologies of the constituents remain 
static. Therefore, all changes to the population map come only from changes in fervor. 
The scenes depict how actions within the polity manipulate fervor to the benefit of some 
coalitions and the detriment of others. Since all of the variables in the model, except 
fervor, are assumed to be static, the Doulah vignette acts as an archetype for population 
maps of real countries that are more dynamic systems. The relative simplicity of this 
prototype model enables the reader to understand the complex concepts by tracing the 
evolving population map in Doulah. Finally, to fully appreciate the dynamics of intrastate 
conflict and the difference between winning strategies and catastrophic follies with 
regard to population mapping, the reader should understand the preferences for the 
scenario are assumed based upon the personal and professional experiences of the 
authors. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. History of Doulah 
Doulah is a former French colony in the Middle East. The French granted it 
independence in the mid twentieth century, leaving a loyalist authoritarian regime 
composed of the Aqleah minority ethnicity. Under French colonial rule, vast oil reserves 
served French economic interests, which accounted for 40 percent of Doulah’s gross 
national product. Following liberation, a brief period of private entrepreneurship led to 
elite business interests gaining control of the oil industry. The autocratic government 
acted quickly to nationalize the oil infrastructure in an attempt to maintain revenue. Over 
the last few decades, the government has failed to diversify the economy. The state has 
also developed a reputation for nepotism and corruption, which has discouraged foreign 
investment. The combination of these actions has led to a stagnating economy and a lack 
of development. 
Doulah’s population of 20 million has 34 percent Aqleahs and 66 percent 
Aghlabeahs, the two ethnicities in the country. It has a burgeoning youth bulge 
accounting for 37 percent of the population. The country’s citizens are frustrated with the  
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18 percent unemployment rate. The average citizen has a high-school level education, 
and 35 percent of the population has some higher education. Such conditions make the 
government’s position tenuous. 
Doulah’s state controlled media is losing clout in the information age. The private 
sector owns and controls communications architecture, but the state mandates limited 
access to foreign Internet sites and monitors domestic and international communications. 
The primary news outlet, al Khibra, is semi-autonomous, but habitually echoes the 
message of the Doulah government. 
The military is a cross section of the Doulah society, yet the Aqleahs 
overwhelmingly dominate the officer corps, which remains loyal to the government. The 
military presents a strong regional power modeled after the Soviets. It accounts for 
approximately three percent of the population, yielding a combined force of 600,000. An 
internal security force, Shorta Khasa, is responsible for rooting out political opposition to 
the government. This force is extremely loyal to the regime and reportedly uses forceful 
and coercive measures to enforce compliance.96 
Growing economic ties to Asia have led to close relations with China and Russia. 
As a result, Doulah has grown increasingly independent of Western allies, to the point of 
intransigence on several key issues. 
                                                 
96 Shorta Khasa fills a vital, though ultimately paradoxical role in Doulah. On the one hand, the secret 
police element forces those individuals and coalitions that would otherwise be outside the realm of normal 
politics back under government obedience. On the other hand, once the threshold of governmental violence 
is crossed and the secret police begin to instill fear in the population, Shorta Khasa and Doulah are well on 
their way to revolution.   
Agencies like Shorta Khasa prevent collective action by instilling fear throughout the population. The 
fear mechanism instills obedience, but it comes at a price; as the government continues the use of 
sanctioned violence against its people, the degree of disequilibrium increases. Ultimately, once the 
government crosses the threshold into civil violence against the populace, a vicious cycle begins that leads 
to revolution and civil war. Herein lays the paradox. The government cannot bring coalitions that are 
outside the realm of normal politics back into the spectrum of obedience without significant reform or by 
exercising violence upon said coalitions. However, when they inflict violence upon the same the vicious 
cycle results in revolution. 
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2. Issues Facing Doulah 
A polling company surveyed the population, and its initial findings revealed the 
five most relevant issues in the society:  ethnic identity, equal protection, political 
representation, free market reform, and constitutional freedoms. Still, inherent 
inequalities exist within Doulah along social, economic, and political lines. The 
Aghlabeahs hold the ideological position that liberal reforms are necessary in order to 
increase social justice, economic opportunity, and access to the political system. These 
issues have not led to conflict because the Aqleahs have minimized the fervor of the 
society by promising reforms, which inevitably are ineffective due to corruption and 
mismanagement. 
a. Ethnic Identity 
On the issue of ethnicity, respondents rate their identification with the 
Aghlabeah majority. Since only two ethnicities exist in Doulah (the Aqleahs and the 
Aghlabeahs) as shown in Table 3.1, the population map requires only one issue to 
measure ethnicity. Implicitly, if one identifies with the Aghlabeah majority, then they do 
not identify with the Aqleah minority and vice-versa. 
 
Ethnicity Percent of the Population Social Status 
Aqleah 34% Ruling ethnicity 
Aghlabeah 66% Subjected ethnicity 
Table 3.1 The ruling ethnicity in the country is the minority. 
b. Equal Protection  
All citizens having commensurate legal rights under the law defines the 
equal protection issue. Those opposed to the issue of equal protection believe that a 
functioning society relies upon a protected class. 
Most of the population desires equal protection, but the oligarchy and 
minority elite retain control over the justice system. With no incentive for change, radical 
reform for equal protection has not occurred within Doulah. As the Arab Spring begins to  
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gain momentum, many of the disaffected youth, minority elite, and majority elites—
powerful forces affected by the turbulence of regional instability—begin to find the 
oligarchy weak.   
Even now, before the defining moments of Doulah’s unstable future has 
transpired, disaffected sentiments within the populace begin to gain momentum. Recent 
court rulings have not helped the government, and stand as a stark demonstration of 
corruption. The outrageous rulings have created martyrs out of incarcerated majority 
elites. Other majority elites, aided by minority elite contacts, have fled into exile where 
their messages remain potent. The flight of the exiles has provided the blogosphere with 
ample content. Though Internet infrastructure is primitive and strict censorship of the 
media have historically aided the government, underground movements are slowly 
beginning to form. The anonymous social media and hacker movements are bringing 
uncensored Internet to the masses through a digital underground, challenging the 
government’s monopoly of information. These situations have effectively sown the seeds 
of a fractured society. 
c. Political Representation  
Political representation denotes the degree to which Doulahs believe that 
every citizen should have equal access to the government. Public discourse identifies 
political representation as a right to access such as voting, eligibility to serve in 
government, and the ability to participate in the political process. Those opposed to 
Political Representation believe that the functions of government are the prerogative of 
the elite and the qualified. 
Political Representation has led to fissures within the society. The Aqleah 
minority was loyal to French colonial rule and therefore received the benefits of Western 
education, upward social mobility, and positions of authority within the bilateral 
governing body. As the global French colonial power collapsed, the society of Doulah 
moved towards independence. The French supported a peaceful transition of authority to 
the Aqleahs who had served alongside their colonial rulers, motivated by the French 
desire to maintain critical access to Doulah’s oil supplies. Soon after independence, the 
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government nationalized the oil industry to pay for infrastructure, government programs, 
and military expenditures previously managed by colonial rule. Since its inception, the 
Aqleahs have controlled the established oligarchy. Yet, access to government has 
transcended ethnic divides, and led to a fissure of the haves and the have-nots. After two 
decades of rule, tension has risen within the disaffected section of society. Those without 
access seek representation and demand positions within the government. 
d. Free Market 
Constituents rate their support for a free market based on their belief that 
the government ought to relinquish control of the economy to the forces of the global 
marketplace. Those favoring a free market seek private ownership of land and the means 
of production, access to markets, and market-based pricing. Those opposed to a free 
market favor government control and centralized planning in all aspects of the economy. 
Economically, the ruling elite manage the oil industry within the country, 
giving the government exclusive access to the overwhelming profits generated by the 
country’s primary export. While the country has a rising educated class of professionals, 
it has not diversified its economy or infrastructure. These inadequacies led to a deficiency 
in occupational options. Consequently, an excess of educated youth are seeking 
employment. The social and economic structure has caused a deficit in professional and 
technical jobs for the frustrated youth bulge. Finally, the lack of infrastructure 
development has forced Doulah to export crude oil and rely upon refined petroleum 
imports from other countries. These issues have caused frustration within the majority of 
the society who favor free market reforms. 
e. Constitutional Freedom  
Constitutional freedom refers to a citizen’s right to free speech, religion, 
and assembly. It also restricts censorship. Those opposed to constitutional freedom fear 
the impact that those freedoms would have on society. 
Constitutional freedoms have gained traction within Doulah as the world 
globalizes and the constituents increasingly have access to information sources outside 
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the state controlled media. Overwhelmingly, the youth and the liberal elite wish for 
constitutional protection for rights, such as the freedom of speech, religion, and 
association. Opposing reform, the conservatives and government sympathizers within the 
country fear the impacts that such protections would have upon the society. Yet, the 
government realizes that the momentum belongs to the youth and the elites, so it has 
made promises of progressive amendments to the constitution. The rhetoric has quelled 
both sides of the debate without driving meaningful change. 
3. The Coalitions within the Population 
a. Hardcore Regime Supporters 
Five percent of the population represents the hardcore regime supporters. 
This group identifies entirely with the government’s conservative ideology because their 
livelihoods depend upon the success of the current oligarchy. The Aqleahs 
overwhelmingly make up this bloc.97 
b. Hardcore Opposition 
Three percent of the population makes up the hardcore opposition. This 
group represents the ideological opposite of the hardcore support. Ethnically Aghlabeah, 
they hold extremely liberal positions. 
c. Minority Sympathizers 
Twelve percent of the population makes up the minority sympathizers. 
Ethnically Aqleahs, they support the government’s ideology, but hold more temperate 
views because they do not have direct ties and access to the oligarchy. 
 
 
                                                 
97 McCormick, “Things Come Together,” 
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d. Majority Sympathizers 
Eleven percent of the population represents the majority sympathizers. 
The majority sympathizers are comprised of Aghlabeahs, and are happy with the status 
quo. While they hold more moderate positions than the government, they still tend to 
relate with its ideology. 
e. Minority Liberal Elite 
Three percent of the population represents the minority liberal elite. 
Ethnically Aqleahs, they have positions of power and influence within the society, but 
they do not have direct connections to the government. The minority liberal elite 
generally have higher education—to include degrees from Western colleges and 
universities—and they ideologically differ from the government on all issues except 
ethnicity. 
f. Majority Liberal Elite 
Seven percent of the population makes up the majority liberal elite. They 
hold positions similar to their minority counterparts, with the exception that they tend to 
hold more radically liberal ideologies—a product of their upbringing in the 
disenfranchised majority status. 
g. Minority Frustrated Youth 
Thirteen percent of the population represents the minority frustrated youth. 
Although ethnically Aqleahs, they tend to diverge from the ideology of the older 
generation of power. Not only does the minority frustrated youth care less about 
ethnicity, they also seek a new path for the country. A product of a broken national 
economy in a globalizing world, they differ in their strong desire for constitutional 
freedoms and free market economics. Despite their reformist ideology on all issues, the 
minority frustrated youth have greater diversity of opinions than a typical voting bloc 
does. 
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h. Majority Frustrated Youth 
Twenty-four percent of the population composes the majority frustrated 
youth. Like their minority counterparts, the majority frustrated youth are a loosely aligned 
constituency. They also hold liberal positions on all issues and tend to be more radical 
than the minority frustrated youth. Although Aghlabeahs, ethnicity does not drive their 
ideological positions. 
i. Opposition Minority 
One percent of the population represents the opposition minority. 
Ethnically Alqeahs, they have moderately liberal ideologies. The opposition minority 
does not have the ideological purity of the liberal elite or consensus, but they take 
opposing positions to the government. 
j. Opposition Majority 
Twenty-one percent of the population makes up the opposition majority. 
They care significantly about their Aghlabeah ethnicity, but hold moderately liberal 
views on all other issues. Like their minority counterparts, their positions are not uniform 
in alignment. 
4. Fervor 
A country in equilibrium has low fervor for issues with revolutionary potential.98  
Doulah is initially in equilibrium, which is a product of both natural and artificial control 
over the population.99  Despite the diversity of ideologies in Doulah’s population, the 
people have little fervor across-the-board. Several decades under the current government 
have established social mores that oblige the populace to accept conditions. Regardless, 
the country is not thriving.   
Doulah’s lack of prosperity is due to the constructs of society that limit upward 
mobility and foster discrimination. Hardworking families can obtain sustenance, but there 
                                                 
98 Johnson, Revolutionary Change. 
99 McCormick, “Things Come Together.” 
 56 
is little hope they or the next generation will progress beyond their current station. The 
government propagates a pro-regime message by controlling the media and censoring 
communications, even though their heavy handed approach to Internet censorship has 
created the proliferation of underground Internet access and online forums for revolution. 
In spite of the controversial and discriminatory techniques of Shorta Khasa, the society 
has moderate fervor for the equal protection issue; a condition that is only obtainable in 
Doulah through harsh artificial control measures. Finally, the stagnant economy and the 
impact of the global economic crisis have caused frustration on economic issues that lead 
to an increase in fervor for the free market issue. 
5. The Population Map 
a. Polling and Histograms 
Polling the society provides data that the population map uses to depict the 
human terrain. A polling company compiled its results on the ideological positions and 
the fervor for each of the five issues previously described in Doulah. For simplicity and 
clarity, the Doulah example first presents one issue in detail—Political Representation. 
The poll drew a 20,000 person sample of the 20 million citizens from Doulah, and the 
data was added to the model. Using the model to make an analysis, one makes inferences 
about the distributions and positions of the population at large.   
Understanding how to read the polling data, and the graphs it generates, is 
critical for reading the political map. Explaining the components of the graphs is the first 
aspect of describing how to interpret the polling data. The following paragraphs in this 
section explain how to interpret the differing values of fervor between graphs.    
The graphs in Figure 3.1 are standard histograms that collectively depict 
three aspects of a single preference. Figure 3.1-A depicts, ‘Ideology – Political 
Representation,’ the basic data allocated to explain the ideology of the society for a single 
issue. Next, Figure 3.1-B depicts, ‘Preference – Political Representation with Low 
Fervor,’ the same data captured in 3.1-A. The exception between the graphs is the 
preference. Rather than the ideology, which has no fervor depicted, the preference 
accounts for a low degree of fervor for the issue. Finally, in Figure 3.1-C, the ‘Preference 
 57 
– Political Representation with High Fervor,’ depicts the same ideological stance on the 
issue, except that the society manifests high fervor for the issue. Notice the obvious 
change in scale between the three figures. 
 
Figure 3.1 Histograms for Ideology and both low and moderate fevor 
Preference 
The histogram bins along the x-axis, which appear as vertical bars in the 
graph, represent the compiled polling data. In Figure 3.1-A the scale of the ‘Ideology 
Position’ is negative one to one, which holds true for all ideology histograms in this 
thesis. In this example, the negative one end of the spectrum depicts those who believe 
that Political Representation is the privilege of a select few; conversely, one represents 
those who believe Political Representation is a right equal and common to all in the 
society.100  Like the ideology position histogram, the compiled bins in Figure 3.1-B 
represent the same compiled polling data. However, unlike the graph depicting ideology, 
the preference graphs now include the fervor component of the model. The degree to 
                                                 
100 It is the polling official’s responsibility to survey this issue correctly. An ideological position of 
‘one’ would indicate a radical position compared to a typical Western democracy. For instance, a position 
of ‘one’ corresponds to a person who believes in a completely representative form of government, where 
every act of the government follows from referendum and no distinction exists between a government 
official and a constituent. A negative one is anarchy. 
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which the scale of the ideology positions change demonstrates the fervor for the issue. 
The y-axis provides the percentage of the population that exists in each bin, known as a 
density.   
The value of y does not change as the fervor increases. Rather, as the 
fervor increases, the scale of the x-axis changes, making the graph look either stretched 
or compressed. Preference is a product of both the ideology and the fervor. Notice the 
difference between Figures 3.1-A, 3.1-B, and 3.1-C. Between them, the shape of the 
histograms remains the same, but since the scale has changed, 3.1-B appears compressed 
and 3.1–C appears stretched. Furthermore, the scaling of fervor is always a positive 
value, but when the fervor for an issue drops below one, the preference position appears 
compressed when compared to an ideological position for the same issue. Notice the 
opposite effect when scaling the same ideological preference with the higher fervor of 
five depicted in Figure 3.1-C. The increased fervor exhibits an expanded scale, which 
depicts the preference histogram on a larger scale than the original ideological graph. 
In all of the graphs, the area within the bins equals one, representing 100 
percent of the population. As such, one can estimate the proportion of the population 
around any ideological or preference position, by taking the desired distance along the 
horizontal axis multiplied by the average value of the curve along the vertical axis. 
For example, to estimate the proportion of the population including bins 
from 0.25 to 0.5 on the issue of Political Representation, one multiplies the value of the 
included bins. In other words, taking approximately 0.2 (the average value of the curve 
between 0.25 and 0.75) times 0.5 (the distance along the horizontal axis) yields 0.10 or 
that 10 percent of the population is within a distance of 0.25 from the position of 0.5 
regarding their preference for free market economics. 
Figure 3.2 depicts the full ideology and preference positions for all of the 
issues polled in Doulah. The polling institute found the fervor for the issues as follows—




economics 2.61, and constitutional freedoms 0.57. The preference graphs below the 
ideology graphs preserve the shape of the curves and scale them according to the 
population’s fervor. 
 
Figure 3.2 Histograms for all issues facing Doulah 
These preference curves weave together in the five-dimensional model 
(i.e., the dimensions represent the issues in the country) to create a hyper surface, which 
this work defines as a preference surface.101  The preference surface provides the key to 
determining the proportion of the population that a coalition with a given ideology can 
recruit through natural control. Similarly, it gives insight into the cost of recruiting a 
population through artificial control.102  In order to determine these values, the polling 
company determined the net utility curve of the constituents of Doulah. 
b. Utility Curve 
Figure 3.3 displays the utility curve for “Alice,” a citizen of Doulah who 
is being measured against the governing coalition. The utility curve represents the cost-
                                                 
101 See the math appendix for an explanation of a hyper space. 
102 We provide a brief review of the process as it applies specifically to Doulah, but see Chapter 2 for a 
robust explanation. 
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benefit analysis that she engages in to determine whether or not to support the coalition. 
Alice seeks to maximize her benefits while maintaining her ideological stance on an 
issue.103  The x-axis at zero depicts the ideological position of the government coalition 
across the spectrum in Doulah. The utility curve, illustrated by the diagonal line, explains 
Alice’s perception of her ideological position in relation to the government. Her position 
in relation to the government coalition at any given point along the curve can be 
measured along the x-axis as distance. For simplicity Alice’s utility is labeled at points 
(a), (b), and (c) in Figure 3.3. These three points depict valuable positions that explain the 
maximum utility of supporting the government (a), how natural control impacts the utility 
curve, (b), and the intersection of the cost of conflict with the range of normal politics (c).   
 
Figure 3.3 Alice’s utility curve 
Notice the expected utility of Alice at position zero on the x-axis. At zero 
she is ideologically aligned with the coalition. At point (a), Alice perceives a net utility 
(benefit minus cost) of three, in this case her maximum utility. As Alice moves along the 
x-axis to point (b) her utility value decreases in direct relation to her distance from the 
coalition.   
                                                 
103 Owen and Grofman, “Two-Stage Electoral Competition in Two-Party Contests:  Persistent 
Divergence of Party Positions.,”  
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Increasing the distance between Alice and the government along the 
preference surface decreases the benefits she can expect from supporting the coalition. In 
other words, the further her preferences are from the government’s preferences, the less 
benefit she will receive from supporting the government’s coalition. At (b), Alice is a 
distance of three away from the government and expects a net utility of zero. A net utility 
of zero demarcates the government’s span of natural control. At any point between 
Alice’s utility being three and zero she benefits from affiliating with the government and 
therefore falls within the coalition’s span of natural control. At a distance greater than 
three on the x-axis, Alice expects a negative utility from supporting the coalition. Any 
value of three or greater encourages Alice to seek alternative coalitions to support due to 
the imposition of costs that outweigh perceived benefits. Alice’s utility curve also depicts 
the intersection of the cost of conflict with the range of normal politics (c).   
In Doulah the autocratic regime uses strict control measures applied by Al 
Shorta Khasa to impose hefty costs to those who contest its authority. In economic terms, 
it imposes an expected cost of nine, or a negative utility, to those who would resort to 
rebellion. As Alice moves to the right along the preference surface her net utility 
continues to decrease. At point (c) Alice reaches the intersection of the cost of conflict 
and the range of normal politics. The cost of conflict is a net utility of negative nine, and 
is located on the y-axis. The range of normal politics is a distance of twelve from the 
government, and is located on the x-axis. When Alice is at any distance between 3 and 12 
she participates in the normal political process. At a distance of twelve, the negative 
utility in supporting the government’s coalition equals the cost of conflict. This demarks 
the point at which a rational constituent considers violence and rebellion against the 
distant coalition. Any constituent further than twelve from the coalition finds the costs of 
participating in the normal political process worse than fighting.  
The utility curve in Figure 3.3 denotes one additional facet of Doulah’s 
populace—the cost of recruiting artificial control. Assume a constituent holds ideological 




the population map. Her net utility from supporting the government is negative three. If 
the government is efficient, it can offer a side payment of at least three dollars to raise her 
perceived utility into the positive range.   
Since Alice represent her constituency in this hypothetical situation, it 
follows that the government does best to attempt to elicit artificial control (beyond the 
span of natural control) among those constituents who lay closest to the government 
coalition on the population map. However, the value of artificial control is up to the 
government’s discretion based upon the amount of money it can disburse and the 
perceived strategic benefit it gains. The maximum threshold for artificial control is 
reached when the government reaches a point of diminishing returns from implementing 
artificial control. As an arbitrary value, artificial control’s maximum threshold is largely 
determined by the resources available to the coalition and their perceived requirement to 
expand the coalition.   
c. Doulah’s Incipient Insurgency Population Map 
With the polling results and the utility curve for Doulah thus defined, the 
population map produces the model depicted in Figure 3.4. As described in Chapter II, 
the population map takes the preferences of the polity for the various issues in the society 
and reduces them into the two most significant spectrums of division (such as liberal to 
conservative on the economic and social scales in the U.S. system). The map uses linear 
algebra to accomplish this reduction from five dimensions (issues) to two dimensions 
(issues). 
Note that Figure 3.5 does not explicitly label the horizontal and vertical 
axes, but it does portray the projection of the issues onto the population map. The 
mapping system is strictly an objective tool and labeling the axes (such as liberal to 
conservative) is a subjective assessment. The map does provide intuition for how to label 
the axes by portraying the effects of each issue. 
Figure 3.4 is an expanded view of the legend icon for the ethnicity issue. 
The structure of the icons has two primary components. The first component (A) is the 
vector of the issue, signified by a line that extends the diameter of the icon. The top issue, 
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ethnicity, generally impacts the map in a southwest to northeast direction. Implicitly, if 
one increases the fervor for ethnicity, then the map will stretch in this direction. 
Conversely, if one decreases the fervor for ethnicity, then the map will compress in this 
direction. The second component (B) is the strength of each issue acting on the 
population map. The strength of the issue is denoted by the number under the image (C) 
and the length of the thick black line.   
 
Figure 3.4 Ethnicity Issue 
Referring back to Figure 3.5, notice that equal protection has a relative 
strength of about 0.96. Meanwhile, ethnicity has a relative strength of only about 0.18. 
This implies that equal protection has a much greater impact on the population map than 
ethnicity does. Expanding on the polling results from the histogram in Figure 3.1 the 
thesis turns its attention to two issues affecting the country, equal protection and free 
markets as shown in Figure 3.5. This is because the values are so great as compared to 
the other issues (0.9638 and 0.98395, respectively). 
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Figure 3.5 Population map of Doulah at incipient stage 
In Figure 3.5 two coalitions are evident. The graph depicts the 
government’s coalition on the left, and the mainstream position of society on the right. 
The government’s preference for issues, denoted by the black ‘+’, is surrounded by two 
concentric circles. The smaller concentric circle displays the span of natural control in 
Doulah. The government coalition maintains control of 32.3 percent of the population 
through natural control. Notice, the majority of the constituency lies outside the 
government’s natural span of control. The autocratic regime compensates for the lack of 
control by recruiting assisted preference and establishing artificial control. The larger 
concentric circle represents the government’s span of artificial control reaching out to a 
distance of five. Because Doulah has relatively low fervor for most issues, this captures 
an additional 62.0 percent of the population under the control of the autocratic regime. 
Based on the utility curve of Figure 3.3, this will cost the regime a minimum of $12.8 
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million. The government cannot afford to skip these payments, as it depends on 
substantial control in order to maintain its rule in a single-party system. Between natural 
and artificial control, the government recruits 94.3 percent (i.e., 32.3 percent natural 
control plus 62.0 percent artificial control) of the population achieving relative 
equilibrium. 
The map suggests a large coalition might oppose the ruling body if not for 
the artificial control that the regime enacts. Namely, the large proportion of the 
population located to the right of the map has the potential to form a substantial 
opposition coalition. In an autocratic system, this would almost certainly lead to conflict. 
Based on the map, increasing fervor for issues with projections in the east-west direction 
would lead to rapid governmental power deflation in Doulah, since it would push the 
majority of the population outside the range of the regime’s artificial control. Note that 
increasing fervor on any issue would stretch the map and hence decrease the control of 
the regime, but the east-west issues would have the most significant impact. This map 
sets the stage for the first phase of the rising insurgency in Doulah. The government has 
an ideologically divided constituency, but it keeps fervor low enough to permit the 
recruitment of artificial control at an affordable price to the oil rich regime. Yet, because 
fervor is dynamic, artificial control can vanish in an instant. 
C. A CIVIL WAR IN DOULAH 
1. Scene 1—Incipient Rebellion 
On December 18, 2010 in the town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, Mohammed Bouazizi 
conducted a heinous act of self-immolation, which immediately became a harbinger of 
things to come throughout the Middle East. Doulah, like Tunisia, has a precarious grip on 
its populace. The status quo, which many tolerated for years, quickly becomes a point of 
contention as thoughts of rebellion spread like a contagion. Public demonstrations across 
North Africa and the Middle East encourage the citizens of Doulah that change is afoot 




common sentiments of relative deprivation and oppression emerge to inspire public 
outcry for change and the courage to take action.104  Long tempered frustration boils to 
the surface of Doulah society.   
The spirit of the Arab Spring has an immediate impact upon the frustrated youth’s 
fervency regarding constitutional freedoms  As protestors take to the streets, the 
government responds by employing both the military and Al Shorta Khasa in an attempt 
to quell the brewing rebellion. Tempers flare, as the indignant protestors grow 
increasingly fervent about their pre-existing positions on freedoms. In response, those 
who believe that a closed and controlled society better serves the interests of the public 
good become increasingly entrenched upon their position. In the population map, 
Doulah’s ideology for constitutional freedoms remains the same, yet the increased fervor 
has increased the distance between the two camps on the preference distribution. With an 
initial value of 0.57, the fervor starts very low in Doulah. The Arab Spring has caused it 
to rise to 1.58, which approximately triples the perceived distance between the populace 
as it relates to the issue of constitutional freedoms. Figure 3.6 displays the results of the 
static ideology and how it scales into preference in the low fervor society before the Arab 
Spring versus the increased fervor society during the Arab Spring. 
 
Figure 3.6 Histograms of static ideology and  pre and post preferences 
during Arab Spring 
                                                 
104
 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel:  Fortieth Anniversary Paperback Edition (Boulder:  Paradigm 
Publishers, 2011). 
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The movement that commenced with the frustrated youth starts to embolden the 
regime’s silent opposition and the liberal elite. They have always held ideologies that 
differ from the government’s positions, but low fervor kept them from acting on their 
beliefs. Now these groups engage in public discourse and deplore the state of the 
economy. They demand immediate economic reforms and access to the political process 
previously denied. Prior to the events of the Arab Spring the populace accepted the state 
of these affairs as norms. The fervor for these issues increases as a surge in protests gain 
momentum in Marbah Square. What the movement lacks in organization it makes up for 
in numbers. Associated Press reports indicate that tens of thousands have joined the 
demonstrations and even the government controlled Al Khibra news organization 
acknowledges the discontentment. 
On the map, Figure 3.7, the passion of the protestors correlates directly to an 
increase in fervor for the issues of free markets and political representation. The issue of 
Free Markets increases from 2.62 to 3.11 in fervor. Similarly, the issue of political 
representation increases from 0.79 to 1.79. Note that these increases in fervor do not 
appear directly on the map. Instead, the change the political landscape and hence alter the 
contour of the map. An increase in fervor influences the perceived distance between 
constituents and the government, causing the map to stretch. This stretching has 
enormous consequences for a government that relies upon artificial control in order to 
maintain its power. 
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Figure 3.7 Polulation Map of Doulah during Arab Spring 
Figure 3.7 displays the impacts of the increased fervor for the issues fomented by 
the Arab Spring. A stark contrast exists between this map and the map depicted in Figure 
3.5, which displayed the map prior to the protests. Prior to the Arab Spring, the 
government controlled 32.3 percent of the population through natural control, but the 
rising fervor pushes constituents away from the government leaving only 20.5 percent 
who perceive a net benefit from continuing to support the coalition. Previously, the 
government spent $12.8 million to recruit the artificial support of 62 percent of the 
population. Under the new map, increased fervor diminishes the proportion of the 
population swayed by the government’s budget, and now it receives just 46.4 percent of 
the population through artificial control. Prior to the Arab Spring, the government had a 
total of 94.3 percent of the population under its control. Now, it has only 67 percent. 
While still enough to maintain a majority, this sudden drop in control naturally worries 
the regime. 
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The map displays another trend that will plague the government—an emerging 
coalition. The densest part of the population appears as the darkest spot on the map to the 
right of center marked with an ‘O.’ The O represents the greatest density of the 
population with similar ideologies. Notice how the epicenter has drifted outside of the 
government’s artificial span of control. As the plurality begins to perceive a net loss from 
supporting the government, they begin to conspire. Prior to the Arab Spring, dissenters 
existed within the constituency of Doulah. Yet, the map in Figure 3.5 demonstrates that 
at that time there was insufficient cause to rally a consensus. Furthermore, the lack of an 
effective motivator prevented an opposition coalition from forming. Now, as the map 
begins to change, a developing coalition emerges outside the realm of government 
control. Nearly one-third of the population outside the regime’s control mechanism 
organizes.  
The government responds in a fashion typical of an autocratic regime accustomed 
to rule in a one-party system; they declare martial law, impose a curfew, send out Al 
Shorta Khasa to harass and jail protestors, and increase censorship. This overreaction on 
the part of the government exacerbates the rising tensions. Fervor continues to increase as 
the government attempts to impose greater control over its populace. The indignant 
population now increases its fervor for Equal Protection to 6.18, indicating a significant 
jump. Similarly, fervor for Political Representation, Free Markets, and Constitutional 
Freedoms increases to 2.80, 3.31, and 5.08, respectively. As before, the fervor does not 
appear overtly on the map. The changes in fervor alter the preferences of the population, 
which in turn changes the contour of the map and accounts for the visible differences 
between Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8. 
The updated map in Figure3.8 demonstrates the effects of the increasing fervor. 
At this point, the government maintains the same $12.8 million budget to fund its 
artificial control programs, but it receives and abysmal 3.8 percent support. The increased 
fervor has led to a majority of the population perceiving a net cost from supporting the 
autocracy. More importantly, a significant portion of the population feels at a distance 
greater than 12 from the government, to include the budding opposition coalition denoted 
by the O on the map. Since the range of normal politics in Doulah is 12, all of these 
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constituents at a distance greater than 12 feel that the cost of continuing to support the 
government exceeds the cost of conflict. In other words, they would rather fight than 
participate in the political process.  
 
Figure 3.8 Population map of Doulah after regime change 
Figure 3.8 also displays an extreme insurgency forming at the outskirts of the 
population map, denoted by the ‘I’. Initially, these radicals blended in with the rest of the 
population. But, as the fervor stretches the map, they have appeared as a distinct element 
within society. They are ready to move beyond the incipient stage; they can no longer 
hide their intentions in a society ripe for civil war. 
After two months of relatively peaceful—though passionate—protests, things take 
a distinct turn for the worse with the spark of violence. An extremist element of the 
opposition, located near I on the population map, decides to retaliate due to the 
transgressions of the regime. Government infrastructure is tightly guarded making softer 
targets more attractive. Club Nada, a high-end nightclub in the capital’s downtown 
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district, is targeted by the extremists due to the frequent patronage of regime members 
and their affiliates. In the peak hours of the evening rush, a large parcel bomb explodes in 
the club killing dozens and wounding over a hundred. Civil war has begun in Doulah. 
2. Scene 2—Mobilization 
The night club bombing confirms the government’s worst fears—the general 
opposition has evolved into a full blown insurgency. The insurgent forces organized and 
resourced the current conflict during their incipient phase. Now, they emerge from the 
shadows to openly compete with the government for control of the populace. 
Figure 3.9 displays the relative strengths of the regime and the insurgents at the 
start of the conflict. Initially, the regime recruits 12.9 percent of the population through 
natural support while the insurgency recruits 15.0 percent. The government can account 
for this difference because it has far greater resources. With its budget of $12.8 million 
for artificial control, it garners an additional 18.4 percent of the population. The 
insurgent, strapped for resources, spends a hundred times less than the government. Still, 
its proximity to the population allows it to recruit 4 percent support for this modest 
investment. Therefore, at the start of the violence the government has a total coalition of 
about 31.8 percent and the insurgency has a total coalition of approximately 19.0 percent. 
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Figure 3.9 Population map of Doulah at start of their civil war 
Of course, in the midst of violent conflict, the population map does not remain 
static. While ideologies do not change among the populace, their passions for various 
issues do change. The Club Nada bombing may have sent a powerful message to the 
government, but it had an unintended side effect; the patrons of the club are mostly the 
ethnic Aqleahs.105  Since civilians and off-duty officials were present at the time of the 
bombing, the Aqleahs feel that the Aghlabeahs have singled them out for their ethnicity. 
In truth, the insurgents do not want an ethnic fight since they rely on Aqleah dissenters 
and frustrated youth to fill their ranks and sympathetic support. But, in the midst of 
violence, the fervor of the people can lead to unintended consequences. 
                                                 
105 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.”  McCormick contends in his seminar that in order for 
an insurgency to grow they must take action that communicates to the population they are a viable threat to 
the government. Garnering support for their insurgency through violence is one critical component of 
insurgent strategies. McCormick explains the concept academically in his work, “Thing Come Together” 
(2007). Symbolic violence, as McCormick explains, an effective method for communicating the strength of 
an insurgency. A weak insurgency is not able to conduct complex attacks with high explosives as 
frequently or effectively as a strong insurgency. 
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Figure 3.10 displays the evolution of the map. The perceived ethnic targeting in 
Doulah has increased fervor for ethnicity from 0.68 to 5.19. An almost negligible issue of 
ethnicity has become a cornerstone of the violence. As fervor rises for ethnicity, it falls 
for markets. The society maintains a high total level of fervor, but the sudden increase in 
ethnic divisions places a temporary hold on economic considerations. In this new map, 
the insurgents have lost ground to the ethnically aligned regime. The increase in ethnic 
tensions reduces both coalitions, but the ethnically diverse insurgency suffers more than 
the homogeneous regime. 
 
Figure 3.10 Population map of Doulah with growing ethnic tension 
All is not lost for the insurgency. As the violence has seized the nation of Doulah, 
the insurgency has tapped into additional financial assets—one of the three critical 
components of a growing insurgency.106  Their overt presence in the society has allowed 
                                                 
106 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.”  According to McCormick, insurgencies are either 
growing or they are shrinking. In order for an insurgency to grow it must have people, guns, and money. As 
the insurgency gains in those three aspects, they become mutually supporting components of the whole, 
which furthers the insurgent cause. 
 74 
them to expand their resources by accessing the populace. An insurgent-based shadow 
government forms in insurgent controlled territories that tax the population while the 
leadership solicits support from sympathetic governments throughout the world.107  The 
insurgents’ modest budget for recruiting artificial control increased five-fold to $640,000. 
Its proximity to the population allows them to recruit an additional 8.2 percent support 
from the population, a greater return on investment than the government can achieve with 
its growing distance from the population. The insurgency—having learned from the 
errors of the government’s decline—also makes a crucial strategic decision. The 
insurgents who initially sparked the violence realize that by moderating their preference 
platform to the position of the general opposition located at the O on the map, they can 
achieve far greater support. Note that the government could have made these 
conservative changes prior to the onset of violence by moderating its positions to meet 
the preferences of the populace.108  As an autocracy accustomed to an uncompromising 
system, it failed to make this wise strategic shift. The infant insurgency has remained far 
more flexible by sheer necessity. As such, it makes the wise shift in platform to enlarge 
its sphere of influence. Figure 3.10 displays the population map when the insurgents have 
increased resources. Figure 3.11 depicts the strategic move of the insurgent’s platform to 
coincide with the greatest density within its span of control. 
                                                 
107 Leites and Wolf, “Rebellion and Authority:  An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts.” 
108 Johnson, Revolutionary Change. 
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Figure 3.11 Population map of Doulah with increasing insurgent 
resources 
 
Figure 3.12 Population map of Doulah with insurgent shift in platform 
The regime makes a strategic decision as well. Realizing the relative benefits that 
sectarian violence brought to its side, it decides to attempt to further exacerbate ethnic 
fervor by sending Al Shorta Khasa to bomb a series of Aghlabeah markets. The ploy is 
effective and ethnic tensions soar from 5.2 to 8.6. The actions of Al Shorta Khasa cause a  
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slight increase of 0.2 in fervor for protection. As the rise in fervor for ethnicity and equal 
protection demands the full passion of the populace, fervor for constitution freedoms falls 
from 5.1 to 4.1. 
Figure 3.13 shows the current state of affairs in Doulah. As violence has 
continued to plague the country, the rising fervor has exposed weaknesses within the 
opposition’s coalition. The insurgency still maintains greater control than the 
government, but it has started to suffer from some infighting. Meanwhile, the 
ideologically homogenous government has remained a consistent, although isolated, 
coalition. Still, at this point the insurgency has gained greater support than the regime 
even though the regime still owns the tanks, airplanes, and heavy weapons in the society, 
the insurgents have started to openly contest the government in conventional 
engagements. Associated Press reports place the death toll in the tens of thousands. 
Those remaining outside the control of the insurgency or the regime create an internally 
displaced person crisis as they seek refuge from the violence. The system is rapidly 
devolving into chaos. 
 
Figure 3.13 Population map of Doulah with fractured insurgency 
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As the crisis worsens the international community begins to take an interest in the 
disintegrating situation in the oil rich nation. Regional stability is at stake. In addition to 
concerns of stability, increasing reports suggest that Al Shorta Khasa has engaged in 
ethnic cleansing. The insurgency shares some serious blame regarding the brewing 
humanitarian crisis. Reports indicate the presence of mass graves of Aghlabeahs near a 
rural town rumored to support the insurgency. An emergency UN Security Council 
meeting fails to produce a resolution, but NATO prepares to respond.  
3. Scene 3:  Alternate Endings 
Based upon the population map, we now look at three courses of action that 
NATO might pursue in its attempts to bring about reform in Doulah and to reestablish 
stability in the region. Three lines of thought dominate discussions within the NATO 
member states. Some promote a heavy-handed intervention that utilizes NATO troops to 
overthrow the oppressive regime and to transition into a peacekeeping and stability force. 
Others advocate an approach that offers only non-lethal aid to the rebels in their attempts 
to defeat the government forces. Some support a blended approach where NATO 
provides lethal and non-lethal aid including air support, but does not place overt NATO 
forces on the ground. NATO, as the principle international actor in opposition to the 
Doulah regime, offers an ultimatum demanding that the government abdicate its power 
and allow for reform. The regime remains intransigent forcing NATO to respond. 
a. A Heavy Intervention 
NATO forms an international expeditionary force of approximately fifty 
thousand troops consisting of heavy and light brigades and the logistical support to 
sustain them in theater. As the deadline for the Doulah regime to step down comes and 
goes, NATO initiates an air campaign to establish air superiority and rapidly launches its 
ground force into Doulah. The modernized NATO force quickly topples the 
government’s forces, who desert en masse and blend into the population. The government 
follows as key members go into hiding. A moment of calm follows as NATO prepares to 
transition to an interim government and follow-on elections. 
 78 
In the ensuing power vacuum, resentment grows among the people of 
Doulah on both sides of the conflict. While the rebels united under their opposition of the 
regime, their varying ideologies and the high fervor inspired by violent conflict makes it 
hard for them to unify under a single platform. NATO puts the issue to rest by selecting a 
transition government that best represents the strategic interests of the member states. 
However, this increases frustration among the rebels and loyalists alike, who begin to 
resist the foreign occupation. In misreading the tolerance for a NATO solution to a 
Doulah problem, NATO has actually created a new issue within the society. 
The shaky ceasefire quickly passes as NATO forces start to come under 
attack from non-uniformed forces. At first, it assumes that the attacks come from former 
loyalists and the Aqleah minority. However, NATO comes to realize that the rebels and 
the Aghlabeah play a prominent role in the attacks. As it pertains to the population map, 
opposition to occupation has become a new issue in the society. Unfortunately for 
NATO, the majority of Doulah citizens oppose the idea of the occupation forces and the 
NATO instantiated transitional government. Figure 3.14 shows the results. In the map, 
extremely high fervor for opposition to occupation has led to a fissure along this issue.   
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Figure 3.14 Population map of Doulah after NATO intervention 
The NATO supported government (denoted by the ‘N’ on the map) does 
not share the ideology of the majority of the constituents. Namely, it supports the foreign 
intervention while the majority of the Doulah populace rejects it. As such, it enjoys 
natural control of less than one percent of the population. Even with a generous $20 
million budget for recruiting assisted preference (or buying ‘hearts and minds’), it still 
only controls a total of 7.6 percent of the populace. In fact, some members of the original 
insurgency (denoted by the ‘I’ on the map) reside at a distance greater than 12 on the map 
from the NATO supported government. Since the utility curve of Doulah demarks 12 as 
the range of normal politics, some insurgents feel so distant from the NATO government 
that they violently oppose it. As expected, the original government coalition (denoted by 
the ‘G’ on the map) continues to resist the insurgent coalition and NATO. While NATO 
fully intended to support the rebels, its heavy injection of forces into the country has led 
to a three-way conflict that has further divided the country and done little to ease tension. 
In an effort to increase legitimacy and unite the rebel coalitions, the 
NATO forces decide to hold democratic elections. However, this well intentioned 
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initiative misses something clearly depicted by the population map. The span of the map 
is significantly greater than 12, the range of normal politics. Therefore, much of the 
populace believes that violence is a rational and economic option. The competitive nature 
of the democratic process does not fit this scenario. Based on the population map, there is 
no reason to expect that democratic elections will lead to a decrease in violence. In fact, 
the population map suggests that elections will only lead to the empowerment of agents 
opposed to NATO’s position and the further disintegration of the opposition. NATO 
certainly succeeded in defeating the armed forces of the oppressive Doulah regime, but in 
the process it has created a counterinsurgency fight that will take years to resolve. 
b. Non-Lethal Aid Only 
In the following course of action, NATO decides to respond by providing 
only non-lethal aid to the rebel forces. While the member states generally agree that the 
prevailing regime must abdicate power, weariness from a decade of persistent conflict 
and the geopolitical implications of an intervention has left NATO unwilling to commit 




Figure 3.15 Doulah after an increase in tension over ethnicity. 
The population map, Figure 3.15, depicts the results of this policy. The 
Doulah government still controls the military, to include tanks, artillery, and bombers. 
Still, the toll of the fight on the resources of the government and the economy of Doulah 
forces the regime to decrease its budget for its artificial control regime. Now, it spends 
only $5 million on recruiting support versus the $12 million that it could previously 
afford. It uses its remaining military in a full-fledged ethnic cleansing effort, which 
further escalates fervor for the issue of ethnicity. 
Meanwhile, the insurgency struggles to maintain a solid base of support as 
the legendary violence leads to increasing fervor, which leads to increased violence in a 
vicious cycle. An overwhelming majority of the populace opposes the government, yet 
the passion of the masses has prohibited the loosely ideologically aligned opposition from 
solidifying the insurgent force into a common coalition. Figure 3.15 depicts the results. 
Notice that the majority of the population outside the government’s control regime 
remains extremely distributed across the population map. The dire situation has led to an 
extremely parochial mentality where nobody trusts each other. As a result, the insurgency  
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maintains natural control of a small fraction of the population. Without the support of 
external facilitators, it cannot overcome the regime’s military might despite the fact that it 
has a relative advantage in support. 
In time, the ethnic cleansing will change the population map by either 
killing those in opposition camps or by forcing them into exile. In either case, the human 
toll will undoubtedly leave a scar upon the journals of history. Economically, the region 
will drain of foreign trade and investment and the instability born of the Doulah conflict 
will risk spreading like a contagion. 
c. Light Footprint of Lethal and Non-Lethal Aid 
In this final course of action, NATO elects to support the rebels with 
limited military aid to include arms, training, and air strikes. Following the Doulah 
regime’s failure to transition power following the mandated deadline, NATO quickly 
announces its support to the rebel cause. 
NATO establishes sanctions on the regime and enforces a no-fly zone over 
Doulah. Additionally, it uses precision air strikes to neutralize the military’s formations. 
The Doulah government can no longer rely on its superior military force to equalize the 
disparity in popular support. Moreover, the sanctions have greatly reduced its ability to 
recruit artificial control. 
The opposition welcomes the indirect support of the NATO forces in its 
attempts to overthrow the oppressive regime. However, NATO careful makes its support 
contingent upon establishing legitimacy among the populace. In other words, NATO 
appreciates that the ethnic violence will not serve the interests of the inhabitants of 
Doulah or the international community. It requires that the opposition deescalate fervor 
for ethnicity by including Aqleah membership. NATO further ties its support to 
abstaining from human rights abuses, which tends to decrease fervor for concerns of 
equal protection. Conversely, the influx of foreign cash into the military effort increases 
concerns over the economy and fervor for free markets rises. 
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Figure 3.16 Population map of Doulah with lethal and non-lethal aid 
Figure 3.16 displays the result of the new map with the decreased fervor 
for all issues except economics. The ebbing passion has allowed the insurgent coalition to 
coalesce around a common platform. Meanwhile, foreign financial aid allows the rebels 
to recruit a significant amount of assisted preference while military aid allows for the 
defeat of the regime’s forces. In fact, as the rebel group displays greater legitimacy and 
gains popular momentum, some senior leaders within the military begin to defect. 
In a few months, the NATO-supported rebels overwhelm the 
government’s regime. The process of transition requires the legitimacy of the new 
government in order to decrease fervor for the issues that led to conflict. Decreasing 
fervor eventually brings the majority of the constituents back within the range of normal 
politics. In other words, almost everyone perceives their preference position to lie within 
a distance of 12 from everyone else. Having achieved this pivotal point, the transition 
government holds democratic elections. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The situation in Doulah, though hypothetical, has many components of failed 
states from the past. The current situation in Syria, the fall into chaos that occurred in Iraq 
after the fall of the Saddam regime and the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak are just three of 
the many examples that helped shape the scenario in Doulah.   
Doulah, as a system, highlights a few key truths that should be understood from a 
strategist’s perspective. One is that determining the outcome of a conflict is not decided 
in advance, and the choices authorities make shapes the way coalitions form and act. This 
concept is supported by McCormick et al.’s main argument in “Things Fall Apart;” 
namely, that counter insurgents face a paradox that forces diminishing returns if they 
choose a heavy handed approach.109  Alternative methods are suggested by the 
population map to be more efficient when dealing with an insurgency, as depicted when 
comparing alternate endings one and three. Indeed, preventing internal wars through 
appropriate handling of coalitions is far more efficient in terms of national wealth than 
revolution.110  Scene three, alternate ending one (the heavy handed approach) validates 
McCormick et al. when they claim, “States generally pass a tipping point and enter their 
endgames and begin to decay at an accelerating rate. This is often an indicator that the 
final period of the struggle has begun.” 
Strategically, the third-party intervention in the second alternate ending was not 
quite as bad as the heavy handed approach for resolving the conflict, but it reminds one 
of the structural capabilities of a country to gain equilibrium within their own country. 
Given the third party intervention when only non-lethal aid was provided, the structure of 
Doulah was such that chaos will always ensue as long as the coalition believes that only 
an autocracy can rule over the people.   
                                                 
109 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, “Things Fall Apart:  The 
Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 The Long War:  Insurgency, 
Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States (Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 2007), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017702 accessed on April 24, 2013, 321–367. 
110 McCormick et al., “Things Fall Apart,” 
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In alternate ending two, the model demonstrates the inability of the country to 
reestablish stability with endogenous resources. The structural ideologies of the 
constituents make the country susceptible to internal violence. Once fervor drives 
competing coalitions outside the range of normal politics, a vicious spiral ensues where 
violence provokes fervor which provokes violence. In this case, a third party 
interventionist is unlikely to break the cycle with non-lethal aid alone. The country will 
eventually solve its internal problems, but the human toll and regional impacts may 
impose an unacceptable cost to foreign interests. The model suggests that a more 
comprehensive approach would offer a better outcome. 
The blending of lethal and non-lethal aid in alternate ending three gave a better 
outcome given the structure of Doulah. By avoiding an overt military presence, NATO 
avoided playing the role of the unwelcomed interloper. Yet, the contingent military 
support to the rebels allowed them to overcome the regime’s military might in an 
expeditious manner. Shortening the duration of the violence prevented the escalation of 
fervor that scene two depicted. Simultaneously, tying the support to appropriate reforms 
allowed the rebel coalition to decrease fervor along key issues that divided the society. 
As the country transitions from the old regime to a peace under a new leadership, it is 
crucial that fervor decrease for contentious issues. 
The model portrays the dynamics of the Doulah society in order to suggest why 
some strategies work while others fail. Most importantly, it characterizes the ideologies 
of the society as structural barriers. An interventionist should fully understand the 
ideological positions of the population that it seeks to influence. It can support the rise 
and fall of coalitions through careful manipulation of fervor. However, attempting to alter 
a society’s ideology directly is a futile and counterproductive task. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Throughout this thesis the authors have sought to bring the complexities of 
societal equilibrium to light in a new way. By depicting population maps based upon 
political science, polling data, and technical collection data, the model utilizes the 
precepts of artificial and natural control to depict the amount of equilibrium within the 
society. Societies in disequilibrium will appear as a highly fractured map with very little 
of the population under natural or artificial control. Countries close to revolution will 
have one or more factions outside the realm of normal politics; such coalitions are willing 
to use violence to reform the government.   
Understanding intrastate conflict was critical to this thesis in order to demonstrate 
to the reader how one could apply the model to revolutions. The map could theoretically 
be tailored for use at various levels of application; including, nesting grassroots collection 
methods into a single collective database that provides scalable population maps as a 
layer on a geospatial map for use at all levels of war. In such a manner the various 
networks that have remained dark might be illuminated with a new perspective overlaid 
upon them. 
The thesis uses the first chapter to both introduce the concepts for population 
maps and define the most important terms. In the second chapter a thorough explanation 
of the model demonstrates the working components, in preparation for the third chapter. 
Chapter II depicts the components in a way that any reader can conceptualize. In Chapter 
III, the hypothetical country of Doulah demonstrates to the reader the power of the 
model, and how a decision maker might utilize it to bring about peace in the most 
efficient manner. While conflict and revolution are messy endeavors, better solutions will 
be available than in the past if leaders utilize information to its potential in the 
Information Age. 
A. WEAKNESSES AND LIMITATIONS 
While the model gives an objective portrayal of a society’s political space, it does 
have limitations. Specifically, this work does not give consideration for the practical costs 
 88 
of implementing the model. Additionally, the work does not address ethical 
considerations for manipulating fervor within societies. Finally, the model’s use of fervor 
as a scalar that applies equally across ideology on a single spectrum may over-simplify 
real life. 
The model has three caveats with regards to practical implementation. First, 
developing the proper polling instruments and capturing the utility curve of a society is 
not a trivial task. Second, the amount of data necessary to optimize the model might be 
extremely expensive. Third, it would take a networked software implementation of the 
model to utilize it at a meaningful level. 
Considering the first point, the model has thus far assumed that a poll can 
accurately capture ideology and fervor as independent aspects of preference. Since this 
work did not examine the science of polling, it does not establish the feasibility of 
directly measuring fervor and ideology. Furthermore, an indirect measure might require a 
host of psychologists, whose results may or may not be prone to error. This work 
assumes that the model’s user can obtain this data without providing any justification. 
To the second point, the hypothetical examples in Chapter II and Chapter III 
assume a sample size of 10,000 respondents in order to give high resolution to the 
contour maps produced by the model. A survey of this magnitude would consume a great 
deal of resources in the United States. Conducting the survey in a decaying Third World 
country would be even more challenging. A survey of fewer respondents would still work 
as an input to the model, but the contour maps would not display the same level of relief. 
This work does not address the costs or feasibility of collecting this volume of data. 
The third point, and last point regarding practical concerns, relates to the actual 
operational implementation of the model. Providing a functional model to the user 
requires a networked implementation. Appendix B constructs the model in MATLAB. 
While MATLAB is capable of demonstrating the dynamics of the model, it is a poor 
choice of software for a user-end product. Instead, a development team would need to 
recreate the model in a software platform capable of sharing networked data. Ideally, 
collection resources would sample the population and write the data directly to a server, 
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which the user-end software would interpret. The feasibility and methodology for 
achieving a functioning product is not covered in this work, but possible research topics 
for development are covered more under the future research section of this chapter. 
The model is also limited in specifically explaining how to alter the population 
map by changing fervor. It suggests that changes in fervor cause the rise and fall of 
coalitions, and hence it suggests issues where a coalition might want to incite or quell 
fervor. Yet, it never addresses how to change fervor. This thesis work leaves changing 
fervor as an open question. 
Consideration of the ethical implications of the model should be considered. For 
now, the model is unverified and untested. However, if the model ultimately has 
prescriptive power, one must consider its recommendations from an ethical perspective 
before proceeding with a decision. For instance, if the model suggests that the United 
States could benefit from increasing fervor in order to destabilize an unfriendly regime, 
then it must consider the ethical implications of inciting revolution before acting. Chapter 
III demonstrates the implications of increasing fervor to bring a society closer to 
revolution; the outcome categorically involves violence. The model intends to make 
users, and thus decision makers, more aware of second and third order consequences 
associated with manipulating the human terrain. However, the model does not directly 
address the ethics of manipulating the fervor of a society. 
The model assumes that fervor impacts the political space as a uniform scalar for 
ideology. One might take objection to this simplification. For instance, the model 
assumes that an increase in fervor on the issue of deficit spending makes conservatives 
and liberals feel more distance between camps and within camps. Most would agree that 
an increase in fervor makes liberals feel more distant from conservatives. However, many 
would argue that increasing fervor causes a rallying around the party platform within a 
coalition. In other words, fervor does not scale as a linear function across the ideological 
spectrum. It makes enemies feel more distant while simultaneously rallying allies around 




However, it would increase the complexity of the model and it would require a greater 
volume of polling data. At this point, it is not clear that the benefits of complicating the 
model with non-linear scaling justify the costs. 
Verifying and validating the model could be achieved by two means:  practical 
application and academic methodology. One way to verify and validate the model is a 
comprehensive study that includes developing a fully functioning model and practical 
application, collecting data for a specific population map, and generating a working 
product. Another way is to collect historic data in an academic approach. The academic 
approach would require the researcher to collect data from a wide range of sources. 
The former method, though more accurate for practical purposes, would be highly 
resource intensive without a working prototype. The latter would server the next 
academic step, ensuring the rigors of research have tested the methodology before 
practical employment. The academic approach would require an ample amount of 
research to find objective data that could be inputted into the model, and then an equal 
amount of time determining how to appropriately place it into the model. The practical 
application’s advantages include data tailored to the map from the outset. The authors 
believe both methods will return the desired results, however resource constraints may 
prevent a working model from being built before the rigors of academic verification are 
placed against the theory. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
In order to operationalize the model two components are essential. The interface 
for the model needs to be researched and developed. Initial thoughts on the best platform 
include HTML5, due to its video graphic capabilities and interoperability across the 
global Internet. Since HTML5 is relatively new, it should endure long enough to make 
the initial versions of the model viable. The model’s interface should allow the analysts 
to filter for specific issues and generate simulated outcomes based upon information 
inputs. For instance, if the fervor for gun control is currently high, then the analyst could 
run simulations that provide the optimal outcome for his or her agenda based upon the  
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spiking of the other relevant issues in the society. Other tools need to be developed as 
needs arise; so, the operationalized model needs to be adaptive enough to accommodate 
plugins, add-ons, and upgrades. 
While the focus of the work has been primarily on the working model, the 
importance of how the information is collected has not been wasted on the authors. 
Collecting, inputting, and categorizing the data from a real country or polity could be as 
large (more accurate) or small (less accurate) as the analyst desires. 
Future research on data collection should include methods of collection. In order 
to properly tailor the data to the population, the data collection manager needs to 
scrutinize primary sources of information flow within the society. For example, a 
flourishing first world country theoretically needs a more robust collection matrix than a 
deteriorating third world country.   
Collection efforts in the first world country may include, but are not limited to, 
Internet scraping, door to door polling, phone polling, text polling, and other efforts that 
seek to capture the demographics of the area.   
A third world country may only have limited Internet access, thus Internet 
scraping may only yield pertinent international issues, rather than intrastate issues. 
Furthermore, if only the youth of the nation have phones, then door to door polling may 
be much more effective than text or phone polling. Tailoring the collection effort to the 
culture is unique to the model. Demonstrating its robust nature, the model is highly 
adaptive to cultures, while still maintaining its objectiveness.   
One particularly unique area of study would be the integration of local and 
national narratives being written by academics throughout the country and the influence 
those messages have on the population at large. The research line would include 
transferring the narrative into an objective value that could be used universally across 
cultures to determine the numerical input into the model. For example, a leading national 
scholar believes that readily available electricity for every citizen is essential to making 
the disparate more socially equally to the affluent. While the model does not currently 
have a way to objectify the narrative, the message certainly has value for which the 
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model should account. A dedicated research line to narratives for input into the model 
would find fertile ground for thought and prose. Other collection efforts include 
information from the intelligence community, local and national news outlets, expatriated 
citizens living abroad and their fervor for issues, to name a few. 
Inputting the data would be a tiresome endeavor without automated software for 
Internet collection. Therefore, the data collection manager should have a comprehensive 
plan to develop the software necessary to synchronize the model and data input. 
Accordingly, electronic collection devices should replace the old methods of collecting 
door to door polling with analog ledgers.111  The transition allows polling officials to 
collect and input data simultaneously.   
When the software for the model is developed, the method of input is possibly the 
most vulnerable to poor planning and execution. Earlier, the future research section 
discussed the means of operationalizing the model. The data input should have zero 
personal input that requires a paper transmission to digits. In the Information Age, 
redundancy leads to time loss and a higher incidence of mistakes. The data input 
methodology should be as autonomic as possible, with the exception of the required 
bodies to run software, knock on doors, and make phone calls. 
Categorizing the data, similar to inputting the data, should also be nearly 
autonomic. Statistical programs based upon sound polling techniques and science lay the 
foundation for the categorization of the data. This work has not focused its efforts on 
collecting the data; however, the methods must account for statistical spreads with 
appropriate mathematical principles in order to achieve accurate results and error 
estimates. Programs and applications must integrate into the collection, and the 
operationalized model needs to automatically filter, detect, and categorize the data for 
near-real-time results. 
As this work has shown, the elements of fervor and ideology interact in powerful 
ways that impact the stability of a nation-state. The model implies that observers gain an 
                                                 
111 Note that this statement does not argue against door-to-door polling. Instead, it suggests that the 
pollster ought to collect the data in a usable electronic form. 
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understanding of the relative coalition unity or disjointedness for ideological issues. That, 
in and of itself, provides the situational awareness that key leaders demand for making 
well-informed choices, but ultimately falls short of the model’s potential.   
An equally important aspect of the model is the domestic communication process. 
The process is necessary to reach the targeted population for two reasons; one, to inform 
them of the issues, and two to incite or deescalate fervor. The population map depicts the 
strategic effects caused by the rise and fall of fervor for ideological positions in the form 
of coalition distance; however, to leverage the power of the model in a proactive manner, 
the end user must have a firm understanding for trusted and available means of 
messaging that penetrates to the targeted populace. The modeler uses indigenous lines of 
communication to employ his strategies. The careful application of strategic moves 
controls the political space by adjusting fervor to influence ideology and thereby change 
the preferences of coalitions. 
The indigenous communication infrastructure must be examined to maximize 
messaging contact with greatest number of citizens. The means by which the society 
receives, accepts, and transmits information within a nation-state is crucial knowledge to 
the user. Ideological positions may be partially inherited through individual and 
community identities, but the introduction of competing ideology remains an option. All 
nations have established forms of communication that pass along information of 
importance and influence across the fabric of society. It is through the unique national 
communications platforms and methods that the citizens receive their information. 
Utilizing the established media outlets directly influences the society’s ideological 
positions and fervor for issues greater than the introduction of an untrusted platform.   
Future research topics should seek to answer questions surrounding the 
indigenous communication aspect of the model. Is there generally a point at which 
frequency of messaging or communication reception sustains fervor?  Will too much 
frequency desensitize the receiver?  Or, will it enhance or diminish fervor?  Assumptions 
should not be made but rather tested to establish some basic norms about what is required 
to effectively manipulate levels of fervor through a comprehensive communication 
design to best capitalize on the model.   
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Frequency of contact plays a part in manipulating fervor and informing the 
constituency about the ideological issues of the day. The impact that frequency of contact 
has on the level of societal fervor is an area of future research. Its effects need to be 
determined to determine the efficacy of messaging to adjust the population map. Current 
software, like Lighthouse112, could be an excellent source of data. The next academic line 
of research for population maps should include a software model for mapping that can 
easily communicate with Lighthouse and other data collection software platforms. The 
use of mobile platforms as the main mode of mapping should be considered, since data 
collection and projection are likely to have the most success over the Internet due to the 
vast amounts of data that can be collected. 
C. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MODEL 
Mathematically modeling social equilibrium contributes to social movement 
theories. The model serves defense analysis in two important ways. First, it advances 
current theories by providing an objective model of the waning and waxing of coalitions. 
The methodology explained provides a foundation for testing and applying the precepts 
proposed by other experts of intrastate conflict. Second, the model introduces the 
concepts of preference, as a function of ideology and fervor, and the range of normal 
politics into the discussion of social movement. 
The population mapping model makes a distinction between ideology and fervor 
as unique, yet related, aspects of preference. Doing so gives insight into how societies 
mobilize behind coalitions. The model suggests that strategies should consider ideology 
as rigid structural constraints. Based upon the theoretical components of this model, 
attempts to mobilize societies by altering ideology are likely to fail or prove prohibitively 
                                                 
112 “Lighthouse is a software application created by the Common Operational Research Environment 
(CORE) Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  The application they created allows users 
to enter socio-cultural information into a smart phone or tablet.  Lighthouse takes pages of code and 
provides a user-friendly interface for collecting data in the field.  It then exports the data into analytical 
software packages that visually depict relationships between individuals, revealing social networks.  
Lighthouse facilitates the visualization of a complex operational environment for either a commander or an 
operator on the ground.”  The application has been tested by U.S. Army Special Forces units operating in 
Afghanistan.  Kenneth Stewart, “NPS’ CORE Lab Rethinks Traditional Intelligence Analysis,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, September 13, 2012, http://www.nps.edu/About/News/NPS-CORE-Lab-Rethinks-
Traditional-Intelligence-Analysis.html (accessed May 16, 2013). 
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costly. Instead, a strategist can achieve the desired effect by manipulating the fervor of 
the society. To do so successfully, one must first understand the human dynamics of the 
population. The population map gives a cartographic view of the human terrain so that 
the strategist can quickly understand how to influence the political space through 
fervor—a dynamic force that is easily influenced by targeted messaging. 
This methodology introduces the possibility of objectively testing many theories 
revolving around the human domain of conflict. Most of the current models, provided by 
experts on intrastate conflict, rely on subjective assessments. Therefore, it is difficult to 
test the validity of their models until after conflicts are over. This work has built other’s 
work into a discrete mathematical model, which offers insight into the validity of 
previous theories. 
Newly introduced, the range of normal politics is a domain past artificial control. 
This work makes a meaningful distinction between the two. Artificial control, as used by 
this work, denotes support that a coalition purchases through side payments. The process 
of acquiring artificial control is a strategic decision made on the part of a coalition. The 
range of normal politics differs in that constituents outside the reach of control (both 
natural and artificial) but within the range of normal politics will oppose the ruling 
coalition, but only through sanctioned methods as defined by the laws of the state. A 
ruling coalition can alter the range of normal politics in two ways. First, it can increase 
the cost of conflict (e.g., using secret police to punish descent). Second, it can amend the 
law to allow greater opportunities for sanctioned dissent. This course of action changes 
the utility curve by decreasing the costs of supporting a coalition. 
D. CLOSING 
As it stands, this model presents an untested paradigm for quantifying the human 
aspect of conflict in the form of a population map. Anecdotally, it displays the dynamics 
of the formation and dissolution of coalitions well by starting with a trivial truism: 
coalitions enter into conflicts within a state as a consequence of divergent preferences. 
This tautology begs the question: what makes up the preferences of a constituency?  The 
model of the population map suggests that ideology and fervor are the components of 
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preference. It then investigates how to achieve strategic objectives by eliciting the rise 
and fall of coalitions through changes in fervor as opposed to ideology. 
In an era of persistent conflict where the United States’ Department of Defense 
must do more with less, this tool hopes to offer insight into efficient strategies for 
achieving objectives. Perhaps more importantly, it suggests the counterproductive nature 
of employing strategies contingent upon changing ideologies through direct intervention. 
Whether applied to Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Stability 
Operations, or a host of other issues germane to the warfighter, understanding the human 
terrain is paramount to success. This thesis seeks to increase the warfighter’s situational 
awareness by providing a population map. 
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APPENDIX A: THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
The following appendix gives a rigorous mathematical explanation of our model. 
It explains the model in two steps. First, it uses survey data in the form of ideology and 
fervor matrices to generate a preference matrix for a constituency. Second, it uses the 
preference matrix to analyze the strength of coalitions within the constituency given the 
ideological platform of the coalition, the coalition’s budget for artificial control, and the 
utility function for the constituency. 
 
 
We justify the logic driving the equations and relationships in Chapter II. This 
appendix will remind the reader of Chapter II’s conclusions without offering a thorough 
justification. It will trace the logic of the model from the start to finish. In doing so, it will 
jump from describing the theoretical math to the practical implementation. 
Our implementation of the model occurs in MATLAB. Appendix B includes all 
of the code to run simulations, generate hypothetical survey data, and produce the figures 
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contained in this work. The model lends itself to numerical methods since it uses discrete 
survey data. Whenever possible, we generalize the model to accept continuous data as 
well. 
A. GENERATING THE PREFERENCE MATRIX 
In order to generate the preference matrix, P, the model uses the survey data in 
the form of two n x m matrices where n is the number of respondents polled and m is the 
number of issues polled. In other words, each respondent represents a row of the matrix 
and each column represents an issue. One matrix contains the survey results for the 
ideology of the respondents while the other contains the fervor. We will call these 
matrices I and F, respectively. Each value in I ranges from -1 to 1, corresponding to 
complete opposition for the ideology in question to complete support for the ideology in 
question. Each value in F is simply greater than or equal to zero, corresponding to the 
passion or fervor that the respondent feels for the issue. A zero denotes complete 
indifference for the ideological position (e.g., given a trivial issue, one has an ideological 
position, but no fervor for promoting or defending the position). A high number (as 
determined by the limits of the poll) denotes fanatical devotion for the ideological 
position (e.g., a religious zealot might be willing to kill those who do not share their 
religious ideology). 
𝑭 =  �𝒇𝟏𝟏 … 𝒇𝟏𝒎⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒇𝒏𝟏 … 𝒇𝒏𝒎�  | 𝒇𝒂𝒃 ∈ ℝ ≥ 𝟎
𝑰 =  �𝒊𝟏𝟏 … 𝒊𝟏𝒎⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒊𝒏𝟏 … 𝒊𝒏𝒎�  | 𝒊𝒂𝒃 ∈ [−𝟏,𝟏]
 
Now, our preference matrix, P, is a function of I and F. As justified in Chapter II, 
we use the mean fervor of the population for each issue to scale I in order to arrive at P. 
Simply put, P is I scaled by the column means of F. To scale the ideologies, we first 
generate 𝐟,̅ the column means of F. 
𝒇� ∈ ℝ𝟏𝒙𝒎 ≥ 𝟎 | 𝒇𝒂��� = ∑ 𝒇𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒃=𝟏𝒏  
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With 𝐟 ̅thus defined, we can generate P as follows. 
𝑷 = �𝒑𝟏𝟏 … 𝒑𝟏𝒎⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒑𝒏𝟏 … 𝒑𝒏𝒎�  | 𝒑𝒂𝒃 = 𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒇𝒃��� 
Now, we have our preference matrix, P, which is an n x m matrix corresponding 
to the preferences for each respondent for each issue (again, respondents correspond to 
the rows and issues correspond to the columns). We assume a great deal about the fidelity 
of the poll as we move onto the next step where we use P to display the inner dynamics 
of coalitions in a contest for power.113  At the most basic level, we assume that n ⋙ m. 
Therefore, as we consider the rank of P, we are most interested in strongly correlated 
issues and we can assume that m bounds the rank of P.114 
B. USING THE PREFERENCE MATRIX AS A POPULATION MAP 
The next step in the model gives the user some options for how to employ P, the 
preference matrix. By itself, the preference matrix can simply give a distribution of the 
population’s preferences for any given issue or any combination of issues. Furthermore, 
principal component analysis gives insight into how correlated issues actually shape the 
political space of the constituency by reducing multiple issues onto a contour map.    In 
this map, elevation represents the density of issue-aligned constituents. This serves as a 
paradigm for the second component of the model, which gives proportions of artificial 
and natural control for a coalition given its ideology, budget, and the society’s utility 
curve. 
1. A Density Curve for an Issue 
The preference matrix in itself can yield the density of the population supporting a 
given issue. The figures in Chapter II illustrate the concept in one dimension where the  
 
                                                 
113 We do not intend to suggest how to conduct a proper poll. However, the poll must ensure that the 
scale of fervor correctly corresponds to the utility function and that ideology for issues maps as a linear 
relationship from -1 to 1. At a more basic level, the poll must sample far more people than issues in order to 
draw any meaningful conclusions about a constituency’s preference for any given issue. 
114 We are interested in the rank of P because we expect that many issues have strong correlation to 
other issues. 
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horizontal axis denotes the preference position and the vertical axis denotes the 
proportion of the population supporting that preference position. Getting this distribution 
from P requires a little work. 
P has only the scaled survey data. To generate a distribution from P, we start with 
a discrete vector for the issue in question. Call this vector i_curve since it will store the 
ideology curve for the issue. Obviously, we must decide upon the dimensions of i_curve, 
which will affect the resolution, res, of the curve. We use res to determine the interval for 
which to group respondents of similar ideologies. In other words, as we take the polling 
data and build a curve from individual responses, we need to decide upon the range of 
responses that we consider identical. This allows us to group similar responses into 
identical bins. In general, 2res -1 should be much less than n, the number of poll 
respondents, 2res -1 ∈ ℤ, and res should be greater than or equal to the resolution of the 
ideology responses polled. For instance, if the poll rates ideology from negative one to 
one in intervals of one-tenth, then res must be one-tenth or greater. 
Now, we wish to map the ideological responses from [-1, 1] to [1, 2res -1 + 1]. If 
res equals the resolution of the ideology responses of the poll, this is a direct mapping 
without losing any fidelity in data. For instance, consider that i_pos is the ideological 
position of the respondents ranging from -1 to 1 in intervals of res and we seek to map 
these responses to i_rank ∈ [1, 2res -1 + 1].    
𝑖_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑖_𝑝𝑜𝑠 + 1
𝑟𝑒𝑠
+ 1 
To generalize this equation to cases where res is greater than the resolution of the 
poll, we simply round the first term on the right hand side of the equation down to the 
next integer. 
𝑖_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 = �𝑖_𝑝𝑜𝑠 + 1
𝑟𝑒𝑠




Now, we can generate i_curve by assigning an i_rank to each respondent’s i_pos 
and incrementing the corresponding index of i_curve by 1/n. This gives a distribution of 
the population according to ideology. We best illustrate the methodology to generate 
i_curve by using pseudo-code. 
for i=1:(2/res+1) 
 for j=1:n 
 if (i==⌊(i_pos[j]+1)/res⌋+1) 
  i_curve[i]=i_curve[i]+1/n 
 end if 
 end for 
end for 
To get the preference curve (p_curve) from i_curve, we simply take the vector-
scalar product of the ideology curve times the mean fervor for the given ideology. 
𝒑_𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒗𝒆 = 𝒇�(𝒊_𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒗𝒆) 
Generalizing this process for each issue in the survey data yields a preference 
density matrix of dimensions 2res -1 + 1 by m. Call this matrix P_Curve. At the most 
basic level, we can use P_Curve to give some graphical interpretations of the survey 
results. However, we can get much more meaningful data from analyzing the raw data in 
P before compiling it into density curves. 
2. Issue Interactions 
In one dimension, we obtained a density curve by mapping the ideologies of 
constituents into an array index for the ideology curve. We then multiplied by fervor to 
get the preference curve. Following a similar process gives issue interaction plots for two 
issues. This yields a preference surface where the two minor axes represents the 
preference positions for the issues and the major axis represents the proportion of the 
population supporting that combination of preference positions. 
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The methodology follows the logic delineated above for generating the preference 
curve. This time, we must sum across both indices. We illustrate the process using I, the 
ideology matrix. Assume that we want to look at the interaction of issues a and b, where 
a, b ∈ ℤ+ and correspond to the index of the issue that we wish to consider. The following 
pseudo-code produces P_Int, a 2res -1 + 1 by 2res -1 + 1 matrix containing the density 
surface for the population supporting a given interaction of issues a and b. 
for p=1:n 
 for i=1:(2/res+1) 
 for j=1:(2/res+1) 
  if (i == ⌊(I[i,a]+1)/res⌋+1) && 
                  (j == ⌊(I[i,b]+1)/res⌋+1) 
  P_Int[a,b]=P_Int[a,b]+1/n 
  end if 
 end for 
 end for 
end for 
As it stands, P_Int actually contains ideology interactions. To get the preference 
interactions we scale by the fervor.115 
Plotting P_Int onto a contour graph will give issue a along one minor axis, issue 
b along the other minor axis, and the proportion of the population supporting the given 
population of the combination of issue a and b on the major axis (displayed as the 
contour on the graph). We use this methodology to look at the interaction of two issues 
                                                 
115 We choose to group by ideology first and then scale by fervor (as opposed to grouping by 
preference, which is already scaled) due to error and computational considerations associated with 
discretization. Whereas we know that our ideology scales from -1 to 1 and that res-1 ∈ ℤ, we cannot say the 
same about 2 max|𝑝| 𝑟𝑒𝑠−1. Therefore, it is easier to group by ideology first. See the MATLAB code for 
more information. 
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throughout this work. Yet, the idea generalizes further to look at more than two issues 
with the help of linear algebra and principal component analysis. 
3. Principal Component Analysis 
Principal component analysis (PCA) gives the model great analytical power. 
Chapter II describes how many issues break down into liberal versus conservative 
ideologies in the American political system. If a person holds a strongly conservative 
ideology on one issue, then one would expect them to have conservative ideologies on 
other issues as well. From a statistical standpoint, we would say that these issues have 
strong correlation. In other words, the variation of responses to one issue greatly explains 
the variation of responses to the other issue.116  As a result, if we want to understand the 
American political space, we do not have to ask an exhaustive list of questions. We can 
focus on a few key issues that divide respondents into camps of conservatives and liberals 
across a narrow range of spectrums (e.g., economic and social). For less understood 
political systems, we can rely on linear algebra to reduce correlated issues into a single 
spectrum in the same manner. 
We work with PCA to reduce the dimensionality of P from m, the number of 
issued polled, to two. This allows us to plot the best approximation of the population’s 
preference distribution onto a two dimensional map. Conceptually, we can revisit the 
American political system and imagine a pollster asking a thousand questions. As he 
aggregates the data, he cannot graphically depict a thousand issues on one plot. Breaking 
the data down into its first two components might separate the spectrum into two axes: 
economic liberals to conservatives and social liberals to conservatives. The benefit of the 
new map is that it plots onto a single graph, allowing one to quickly conceptualize the 
American political space. The cost of the graph is fidelity of the data. The map loses 
some information in reducing the dimensionality of the political space from m equals one 
thousand to m equals two. However, as we will investigate, this loss in information is 
acceptable for our purposes. 
                                                 
116 Dennis D. Wackerly, William Mendenhall III, and Richard L. Scheaffer, Mathematical Statistics 
with Applications, 7th edition (Belmont: Thomson, 2008), 264–5. 
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To illustrate the concept, consider Figure A.1. Here, we start with only two issues 
(issue A and issue B). The graph in the upper right depicts a scatter plot of fifty 
respondents in Figure A.1.A. One can quickly see that correlation exists between the 
issues. Those who tend to support A also support B. Even though two issues exist, most 
of the variation in response occurs along the first principal component (or PC1 in the 
graph). Once we measure variations along PC1, we can explain the remaining variation 
along PC2. Note that PC2 is orthogonal to PC1. This is always the case in PCA. In fact, 
PCA creates an orthogonal basis for the column space of the data matrix.   
 
Figure A.1 Graphical example of PCA to reduce two dimensions to 
one 
Following Figure A.1, we now rotate the data to place the components as the axes 
instead of the issues in Figure A.1.B. A careful inspection of the scatter plot will reveal 
that the top right plot (Figure A.1.B) is simply a rotated image of the graph on the top left 
(Figure A.1.A). Note that we started with m = 2. That is, we had only issues A and B. 
Therefore, when we look at these two issues on the components, we have an exact copy 
of our original data. This is not the case when m > 2. To illustrate this concept, we 
consider the bottom two graphs of Figure A.1. 
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To reduce a data matrix from m dimensions to two dimensions, we must project 
the m-dimensional data onto component one and two of our PCA. This is extremely 
difficult to conceptualize for data sets when m > 3 since we have trouble visualizing data 
in greater than three dimensions. Figure A.1 displays a reduction from two dimensions to 
one dimension in order to offer insight into the process. Note that the bottom left graph 
(Figure A.1.C) is an exact copy of the top right graph. In other words, it is a scatter plot 
of the respondents’ preferences for issue A and B rotated according to the first and 
second components of PCA. However, in the bottom left graph (Figure A.1.C), we 
project each point from two-dimensional space onto the one-dimensional PC1. We can 
see that we project a point from the two-dimensional PC1 and PC2 onto one-dimensional 
PC1 by drawing a line through the data point orthogonal to PC1. Now, we have an 
approximation of our two dimensional data in one dimension (Figure A.1.D). PCA 
ensures that our simplification maintains as much data as possible. In other words, we 
lose the ability to discriminate along PC2 when we project our data onto PC1. Yet, no 
other projection would preserve as much of the original data as the projection we chose 
according to PCA. The bottom right graph (Figure A.1.D) depicts this reduced map. We 
preserve as much information from the original data matrix as possible, but have reduced 
the dimensionality of our data set from two to one. Our map takes any number of issues 
and reduces the dimensional space from m to two in order to graphically depict political 
space. Moreover, although the projection loses some fidelity of the data set, it offers the 
best possible simplification of a multi-dimensional P matrix into two dimensions. 
The first step of PCA is to center the data. In other words, we simply subtract the 
column means from P so that our expected value for any preference position is zero.117  
This benefits the generic interpretation of the data. For instance, consider an issue that 
most people support, like free speech in the United States. If we took a poll of the 
ideological positions for supporting free speech, we would probably find that most 
Americans rate their position closer to positive one (i.e., they ideologically support free  
 
                                                 
117 Herve Abdi and Lynne J. Williams, “Principal component analysis,” WIREs Comp Stat 2, no. 4 
(2010), 433–459. 
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speech). Subtracting the mean ideology from each response centers the data so that those 
who relatively oppose free speech appear left of center, with zero representing the 
center’s ideological position. 
Many implementations of PCA then normalize the column data by dividing by its 
standard deviation. This standardizes the data so that differences in the scale of 
measurement do not artificially weight one data column over another. As an example, if 
our survey asked people to rate their fervor on a scale of one to ten on one issue and then 
rate their fervor on a scale of one to one hundred on another issue, a moderate population 
would rate the first at five and the second at fifty. The PCA would weigh the issue with 
the larger scale as more important even though the population shares moderate fervor for 
both issues.118  In our case, we do not want to standardize our data because we presume 
that the method of sampling has used a consistent scale. Therefore, if one issue has larger 
variance than another issue within P, it is because the issue is more divisive. Hence, we 
want PCA to weight this issue more heavily. 
Once we subtract the column means from P so that the expected value of each 
column is zero, we have a centered the preference matrix. With P centered, we next 
conduct a Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of our centered data matrix in order to 
arrive at the principal components. Let X equal the centered matrix P. SVD seeks to 
solve the problem X = UΣV*, where X ∈ ℝn x m, U ∈ ℝn x n, Σ ∈ ℝn x m, and V ∈ ℝm x m. In 
this case, V* is the conjugate transpose of V. Both U and V are unitary (i.e., their columns 
are orthogonal to each other).119   
To solve this, we note that X* = (UΣV*)* = VΣ*U*. Now, XX* = UΣV*VΣ*U*. 
Since V and U are unitary, we get the identity matrix when we multiply them by their 
complex conjugate. Hence, we are left with XX* = UΣΣ*U*. We note that this is the exact 
form of an eigenvalue decomposition of XX*. Since Σ is diagonal, Σ = Σ*. Hence, ΣΣ* = 
                                                 
118 Julian J. Faraway, Linear Models with R (New York: Chapman & Hall, 2005), 134. 
119 Lloyd N. Trefethen and David Bau III, Numerical Linear Algebra (Philadelphia: SIAM, 1997), 25–
30. 
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Σ2, which is also a diagonal matrix.120  Furthermore, since XX* is a symmetric matrix, its 
eigenvalues are all real and positive.121  The column space of U now corresponds to the 
eigenvectors of X and the diagonal of Σ corresponds to the eigenvalues. Therefore, 
simple eigenvalue decomposition gives us U and Σ. To get V, we solve for AV = UΣ.122 
As a convention, we place our largest eigenvalue in Σ1, 1 and then fill the diagonal 
with descending values. The result ensures that v1, the first column vector of V, is the 
right singular vector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of X*X.123  Now, v1 is equal 
to the first component of PCA. Similarly, v2 is equal to the second component. For the 
purposes of our population map, we only need the first two components in order to 
reduce P from m dimensions to two dimensions. 
Let R be the reduced two dimensional image of P. Note that R ∈ ℝn x 2. We can 
build R using P and V as follows. Let r equal a row vector of R and let p equal a row 
vector of P. Note that r ∈ ℝm, p ∈ ℝm, and v ∈ ℝm. To solve for r, we project p onto the 
first two columns of V (components one and two), which we will call v1 and v2 ∈ ℝm. 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = projpi𝑣𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑣𝑗�𝑣𝑗�   
Now, R holds our reduced preference matrix, which we can display in a 
cartographic map. To do this, we use the methodology described in plotting an issue 
interaction. We use R as the matrix from which to plot the interactions and the result is 
the best possible representation of an m dimensional population that we can fit onto two 
dimension and plot on a flat piece of paper. 
4. Accuracy of the Reduction 
As discussed, reducing m issues in a population to two issues allows a 
cartographic depiction of the population’s preference density. Hence, it gives the user a 
                                                 
120 Francis Giraldo, “Singular Value Decomposition,” class notes for MA3045, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Fall 2011. 
121 Steven J. Leon, Linear Algebra with Applications, 8th edition (Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2010), 
359–360. 
122 Giraldo, “Singular Value Decomposition.” 
123 Trefethen & Bau, Numerical Linear Algebra, 26. 
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snapshot of the political space of the country. However, this reduction through PCA 
comes at a cost of fidelity. Inspecting the eigenvalues of X gives insight into the loss of 
information.   
We can make a subjective assessment of the error in our approximation by using 
the scale of the eigenvalues. The Σ matrix contains the eigenvalues of X along the 
diagonal in descending order. Plotting the square root of the eigenvalues as a function of 
their diagonal index provides a quick methodology for gauging the loss in information 
due to projecting an m dimensional space onto two dimensions.124  In general, if the 
eigenvalues corresponding to the third component is much smaller than the eigenvalue 
corresponding to the second component, then we can assume that we have captured most 
of our information. In other words, if λa ⋘ λ2 for a > 2, we can empirically accept our 
two dimensional projection as a good representation of the true m dimensional data. In 
our plot, this would appear as an ‘elbow’ at an index of two or three (i.e., the line 
dramatically decreases from one through three and then levels off at the ‘bend’ to a value 
much less than the value for the first two indices). The elbow in the plot indicates that all 
subsequent eigenvalues correspond to components that explain little of the variance in the 
dataset. Hence, we can capture the main dynamics without considering components for 
small eigenvalues.125 
We can also quantify the error. For example, we can use the singular value 
decomposition to reconstruct X (i.e., the centered P matrix). Let Y equal our 
approximation of X and note that Y = UΣV* where V and U now only correspond to our 
first two rows of V and our first two columns of U. Clearly, Σ ∈ ℝ2 x 2. Y should 
approximate X, but to objectively quantify how well it approximates X, we use the 
Frobenius matrix norm to solve for error in the equation below.126 
                                                 
124 We do not have to use the square root; we could instead simply plot the eigenvalues against their 
indices. However, using the square root tends to exaggerate the bend in the elbow, making a subjective 
assessment easier. 
125 Faraway, Linear Models with R, 137–138. 
126 Giraldo, “Singular Value Decomposition.”  
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 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = ‖𝑋 − 𝑌‖𝑓𝑟𝑜
‖𝑋‖𝑓𝑟𝑜
 
Figure A.2 displays error for the population map of the United States (used in 
Chapter II) and the population map of Doulah (used in Chapter III).127  The line plots the 
strictly decreasing square root of the eigenvalues against their diagonal indices in Σ. As 
described above, we look for the elbow in this plot to ascertain how many eigenvalues we 
need to capture most of the data. In the United States map, we do not see a characteristic 
elbow. Moreover, we see that the eigenvalues for indices greater than two are not orders 
of magnitude smaller than the values for λ1 and λ2. It follows that this projection has a 
large error (i.e., 57.3 percent) as calculated by the Frobenius norm. The plot for the 
projection of the Doulah population shows an elbow at three. We expect lower error than 
we found for the United States projection. The objective result of 25.3 percent error 
confirms this.  
 
Figure A.2 Plots of eigenvalues of various population maps 
We should note that error is not a major concern for the population map model. In 
the example above, both populations exhibit significant error in simplifying the data set 
down to two dimensions. Typical cartographers face the same challenge in finding the 
best projection as they attempt to map a three dimensional globe onto a two dimensional 
sheet of paper. Like the cartographer’s map, our map is only a model from which to 
develop a quick understanding of the population’s dynamics. Using PCA, we obtain the 
                                                 
127 These error calculations are for the initial data sets (i.e., before any changes in fervor). 















































best simplification possible so that a human can view the political space of a 
constituency. Yet, the methodology for finding a coalition’s control based on the 
population data maintains the full fidelity of the m dimensional data. Hence, even large 
errors in projections will not impact the results of the strategies suggested by this model. 
The model uses the concept of natural and artificial control to suggest strategies. 
C. FINDING CONTROL 
The methods described thus far only give us a graphical display of objective 
survey data. However, we can infer greater information from the map by incorporating 
the utility curve for the society. This utility curve maps perceived distance to utility for 
the aggregate of the society. We will call this one dimensional function u(x) where x 
denotes the Euclidean distance and u(x) denotes utility. As a convention, we refer to 
dollars per month as the unit of measure for utility.128 
1. The Utility Curve 
The general concept assumes that a constituent’s expected utility for supporting a 
coalition decreases as he or she moves further from the coalition’s ideological position 
along the preference surface. In other words, if Alice is a constituent and she considers 
supporting coalition B, she will evaluate her expected utility as a function of the distance 
between her ideological position and the ideological position of the coalition scaled by 
the fervor of the society. For instance, consider that only two issues dominate the political 
space. The figure below categorizes Alice’s ideology, coalition B’s ideology, the fervor 
of society for each issue, and the resulting preference positions of Alice and coalition B.  
                                                 
128 We assume that the utility is a recurring phenomenon. In other words, by supporting a coalition, one 
does not expect a ‘lump sum’ payment. Instead, one expects to enjoy recurring benefits or costs. 
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Figure A.3 Alice’s and Coalition B’s utility values 
The two preference distances will determine the perceived distance, x, between 
Alice and coalition B. Again, note that we derive the preference position of Alice and 
coalition B by multiplying their ideological positions by the mean fervor of the society. 
For instance, Alice and coalition B have an ideological distance of 0.3 on issue one. 
However, because the fervor for the issue is seven, the preference distance between the 
two actors is 2.1. On issue two, Alice and coalition B are ideologically further apart than 
on issue one. They have a spread of 0.7. Yet, because this issue is a low fervor issue, 
Alice does not feel as distant from the coalition on this particular issue. The fervor scales 
the distance from 0.7 to 1.4. To find the total distance between Alice and coalition B, we 
simply take the Euclidean distance between Alice’s preference position and coalition B’s 
preference position. The result is a perceived distance of 2.52. Figure A.4 shows a 
graphical depiction of the process. Note that we easily generalize this concept into more 
than two dimensions. One should note that we can get Alice’s preference position directly 
from her corresponding row in P. To get coalition B’s preference position, we simply 
scale their ideological positions by the society’s fervor for each issue. 
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Figure A.4 Graphical depiction of preference difference between Alice 
and Coalition B. 
Now, we have an objective measure of distance as a scalar value for any society 
with any number of m issues. Next, we need to know how to relate distance to perceived 
utility to get u. For our examples in both Chapters II and III, we assume a linear 
relationship. For instance, in Doulah, we use u(x) = 3 – x. We leave the science of finding 
the utility curve for a given society to economists and statisticians. However, we require a 
few constraints on u for our model to work properly. First, u must represent the aggregate 
utility for the entire society. Much like a demand curve represents aggregate demand—
and hence does not claim to predict how Alice specifically will respond to changes in 
price—our utility curve captures the tendency of the society at large. Therefore, an 
attempt to quantify u should focus on a large sample. Second, a relationship exists 
between the scale of u and the scale of fervor. This will become more evident as we 
discuss the span of natural control and the range of normal politics. For now, one must 
understand that u is closely interrelated to fervor in society. Finally, u must be a non-
increasing function on the domain of x ∈ [0, ∞) with the co-domain u(x) ∈ (-∞, ∞). This 
ensures that the span of natural control and the range of normal politics are well-defined 
in a continuous domain. 
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2. Natural Control 
With u thus defined, we can use it with P to determine the proportion of a 
population that we expect to support any given ideological position. Within the map, we 
expect that all constituents will support a coalition close enough to their preference 
position to offer a positive net utility. Therefore, we call the span of natural control the 
value of x for which u(x) = 0. Or, to be more rigorous, we consider the supremum of the 
subset of u(x) for which u(x) is greater than or equal to zero. This allows for the 
contingency that a continuous range of x values equal zero. With the span of control now 
defined by the utility curve, we can take any coalition with an ideological position scaled 
by the fervor of the society. We will call this m dimensional vector c. We can now solve 
for the natural control of c, c_ctrl, using the following pseudo code. 
c_ctrl = 0; 
for i=1:n 
 if (norm(P(i,:) – c) <= span_ctrl) 
 c_ctrl = c_ctrl + 1/n; 
 end if 
end for 
This block of code will result with c_ctrl equaling the proportion of the 
population (from zero to one) who will offer their natural support to a coalition with the 
scaled ideological position c. 
The utility curve gives us more than natural control. One can infer that an 
efficient coalition could alter the calculus of constituents who reside beyond its span of 
natural control with side payments. For instance, if Alice lives in Doulah where u(x) = 3 
– x, if she is at a distance of 3.5 from coalition B, then she expects a net utility of 
negative one-half from supporting coalition B. She will not naturally support coalition B, 
given this incentive. Yet, the coalition might buy her support with a side payment of at 
least one-half. We call this artificial control. Now, we can use the utility curve to find 
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artificial control given a budget of bdgt and a total population of pop.129  To do so, we 
have to make some assumptions. First, we assume that the coalition is efficient in that it 
needs to spend only the deficit in utility in order to recruit artificial control. In our case of 
Alice, this implies that the coalition can buy her support for 0.5 dollars. Second, we 
assume that the coalition makes the strategic decision to spend their money recruiting 
constituents close to their position. In other words, they will spend their budget in order 
to recruit the greatest proportion of the population possible. 
3. Artificial Control 
To solve for artificial control, we use a two-step process. First, we find the range 
of artificial control that one can achieve for a given budget. Then, we determine the 
proportion of the population that resides between the span of natural control and the span 
of artificial control. The following pseudo code illustrates the process where tol is our 
tolerance for our numerical solution. This method uses an iterative method to efficiently 
locate the range of artificial control. 
First, we must define a function to get the cost of recruiting support from a radius 
of r1 to r2 given a coalition at the scaled position c and the utility function u.  
function cost=getcost(c, r1, r2) 
 cost = 0; 
 for i = 1:n 
 d = norm(c – P(i,:)); 
 if (d > r1 && d <= r2) 
  cost = cost - u(d); 
 end if 
                                                 
129 We need to know the total population to find out the proportion of the total population that we have 
represented by n. For instance, if Alice needs a side payment of one-half to support coalition B and our 
survey included 1,000 people in a country with a population of twenty million then we expect to find 
20,000 (i.e., 20,000,000 / 1,000 = 20,000) other people that we have not surveyed for every Alice that we 
find. Therefore, we can assume that it actually costs 0.5 * 20,000 = 10,000 to recruit Alice under artificial 
control. 
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 end for 
 cost = cost*pop/n; 
end 
Now, we can solve for artificial control using the two step process described 
above. First, we will use an iterative search algorithm to find the radius of artificial 
control that we can achieve with a budget of bdgt.130 
loop = 1; 
a = span_ctrl; 
d = a; 
while loop 
 if (getcost(c, d) < b) 
 a = d; 
 d = d*2; 
 else 
 loop = 0; 
 end if 
end while 
loop = 1; 
b = d; 
while loop 
 d = a + (b – a)/2; 
 t = getcost(c, d) – bdgt; 
 if (abs(t) < tol) 
                                                 
130 Richard L. Burden and J. Douglas Faires, Numerical Analysis, 8th edition (Belmont: Thomson, 
2005), 45–50. 
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 loop = 0; 
 else if (t<0) 
 a = d; 
 else 
 b = d; 
 end if 
end while 
At the end of this code, d is equal to the distance of artificial control that a 
coalition located at c can expect with a budget of bdgt. The second step is to find the 
amount of control that this has purchased for the coalition. We can do this by the 
following pseudo code. Note that a_ctrl is equal to artificial control and d is the distance 
that we calculated above. 
a_ctrl = 0; 
for i=1:n 
 t = norm(c – P(i,:)); 
 if (t > span_ctrl && t < d) 
 a_ctrl = a_ctrl + 1/n; 
 end if 
end for 
Therefore, with u we can find the proportion of natural and artificial control for a 
coalition with a given ideological position and budget for recruiting support.   
D. THE RANGE OF NORMAL POLITICS 
Using the utility curve, we can also ascertain the point at which a constituency 
will devolve into violence over political rifts. Game theory has established a cost of 
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conflict incurred by belligerents who decide to settle disputes through violence.131  We 
generalize this idea in considering that a rational individual will incur a cost in opposing 
the government. Therefore, if Alice perceives a net cost (i.e., a negative utility) in 
supporting coalition B, she will only rebel against the coalition if the costs of supporting 
the coalition exceed the cost of conflict.   
On the utility curve, we can define the range of normal politics by solving for x 
such that u(x) equals the cost of conflict (we assign a negative utility value to a cost). If 
we further restrict u to be strictly decreasing (as opposed to non-increasing), we can use a 
Golden Search algorithm to solve for the range of normal politics. 
Figure A.5 displays an example of a non-linear utility curve in country C. In this 
case, we use the logistics equation below to find utility. 
𝑢(𝑥) = 41 ∙ 40𝑒−0.5𝑥41 + 40(𝑒−0.5𝑥 − 1) − 30 
 We assume a cost of conflict in this society of -25. Now, we can find the span of 
natural control by solving for u(x) = 0. Here, we find that x = 5.39 gives u(x) = 0. Thus, 
our span of natural control is 5.39. To find the range of normal politics, we solve for u(x) 
+ 25 = 0. Similarly, we find that x = 11.34 is the range of normal politics. We expect that 
any constituent with a preference position within 5.39 of an adjacent coalition will offer 
his or her natural support to that coalition. Constituents between 5.39 and 11.34 from the 
coalition will not actively support the coalition, but they will also not break the law to 
oppose it. In other words, they will work for political change through legal means. 
However, constituents at a distance greater than 11.34 from a coalition will willfully 
break laws to oppose the coalition. To them, the cost of submission is greater than the 
cost of conflict. 
                                                 




Figure A.5 The span of control and range of normal politics on a non-
linear utility curve 
E. CONCLUSION 
Using PCA, we can reduce a society in which m issues drive political divides into 
a two-dimensional contour map. This map serves as a tool for visualizing the potential 
coalitions in a society and the ways in which the issues build and break consensus. With 
the preferences of a society for the issues and the utility curve for the society, we can also 
ascertain the natural control that a coalition with a given ideology can expect to receive. 
Similarly, we can establish the proportion of artificial control that an efficient coalition 
can recruit for a given budget. 


















APPENDIX B: MATLAB CODE 
A. PMAP 
classdef pmap 
    %Use this class to handle a population map 
     
    properties 
         
        %Basic parameters for storing survey data 
        n;      %Number of respondents 
        m;      %Number of issues 
        imat;   %Identification matrix 
        fmat;   %Fervor matrix 
        smat;   %Scaled matrix 
        fervor; %Fervor for each issue 
        cspan;  %Span of control for society 
        pop;    %Actual size of the population 
        inames; %Issue names 
         
        %Optional parameters for PCA 
        pc1;    %Principal component 1 
        pc2;    %Principal component 2 
        sc1;    %Scale of response on pc1 
        sc2;    %Scale of response on pc2 
        pmat;   %smat projected onto pc1 and pc2 
        dmat;   %Density matrix for pcs 
         
        %Parameters for visualization options 
        cres;   %Resolution to plot contour plots 
        pres;   %Resolution for preference plots 
        eqax;   %Axis equal boolean 
        autol;  %Auto label graphs boolean 
  
    end 
     
    methods 
         
        %Initialize a population map class object 
        function pm=pmap(n,m) 
            if nargin<2 
                m=1; 
            end 
            if nargin<1 
                n=1; 
            end 
            pm.n=n; 
            pm.m=m; 
            pm.imat=zeros(n,m); 
            pm.fmat=zeros(n,m); 
            pm.smat=zeros(n,m); 
            pm.fervor=zeros(1,m); 
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            pm.cspan=3; 
            pm.pop=20000000; 
            pm.pmat=zeros(n,2); 
            pm.cres=15; 
            pm.pres=10; 
            pm.eqax=1; 
            pm.autol=0; 
            pm.dmat=zeros(2*pm.cres+1); 
            pm.pc1=zeros(m,1); 
            pm.pc2=zeros(m,1); 
            pm.sc1=0; 
            pm.sc2=0; 
            td=[‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘;... 
                ‘                                              ‘]; 
            pm.inames=cellstr(td); 
            for i=1:pm.m 
                pm.inames(i)=strcat({‘Issue ‘},num2str(i)); 
            end 
        end 
                 
        %Load a map from survey results (identity and fervor) 
        function pm=loaddat(pm,idat,fdat) 
            pm.imat=idat; 
            pm.fmat=fdat; 
            pm=pm.update; 
        end 
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        %Update smat based on imat and fmat 
        function pm=update(pm) 
            [pm.n,pm.m]=size(pm.imat); 
            for i=1:pm.m 
                pm.fervor(i)=mean(pm.fmat(:,i)); 
            end 
            for i=1:pm.m 
                pm.smat(:,i)=pm.imat(:,i)*pm.fervor(i); 
            end 
            pm=pm.pca; 
        end 
         
        %Change fervor by f=f+N(mew,sig) 
        function pm=changef(pm,iss,mew,sig) 
            pm.fmat(:,iss)=pm.fmat(:,iss)+sig*randn(pm.n,1)+mew; 
            pm.fmat(:,iss)=pm.fmat(:,iss).*(pm.fmat(:,iss)>=0); 
            pm=pm.update; 
        end 
         
        %Generate principle components 
        function pm=pca(pm) 
            pc=princomp(pm.smat); 
            pm.pc1=pc(:,1); 
            pm.pc2=pc(:,2); 
             
            %Create matrix of projections 
            n1=norm(pm.pc1); 
            n2=norm(pm.pc2); 
            for i=1:pm.n 
                pm.pmat(i,1)=pm.smat(i,:)*pm.pc1/n1; 
                pm.pmat(i,2)=pm.smat(i,:)*pm.pc2/n2; 
            end 
                        
            %Get the scale of the projections 
            pm.sc1=ceil(max(abs(pm.pmat(:,1)))); 
            pm.sc2=ceil(max(abs(pm.pmat(:,2)))); 
             
            %Normalize pmat to range from -1 to 1 
            pm.pmat(:,1)=pm.pmat(:,1)/pm.sc1; 
            pm.pmat(:,2)=pm.pmat(:,2)/pm.sc2; 
             
            %Create matrix for densities 
            pm.dmat=zeros(2*pm.cres+1); 
            for i=1:pm.n 
                p1=round((pm.pmat(i,1)+1)*pm.cres)+1; % 
                p2=round((pm.pmat(i,2)+1)*pm.cres)+1; % 
                pm.dmat(p2,p1)=pm.dmat(p2,p1)+1/pm.n; 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Return the size of a coalition with position c and control r 
        function s=getsize(pm,c,r) 
            if nargin<3 
                r=pm.cspan; 
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            end 
            s=0; 
            for i=1:pm.n 
                if (norm(c-pm.smat(i,:))<=r) 
                    s=s+1/pm.n; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Find the distance of artifical control for a given price 
        function d=getdist(pm,c,p,tol) 
            if nargin<4 
                tol=10000; 
            end 
            loop=1; 
            a=pm.cspan; 
            d=a; 
            while loop 
                if pm.getcost(c,d)<p 
                    a=d; 
                    d=d*2; 
                else 
                    loop=0; 
                end 
            end 
            loop=1; 
            b=d; 
            while loop 
                d=a+(b-a)/2; 
                t=pm.getcost(c,d)-p; 
                if abs(t)<tol 
                    loop=0; 
                elseif t<0 
                    a=d; 
                else 
                    b=d; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Return cost of recruiting support from position c between a 
        %and b 
        function cost=getcost(pm,c,b,a) 
            if nargin<4 
                a=pm.cspan; 
            end 
            cost=0; 
            for i=1:pm.n 
                d=norm(c-pm.smat(i,:)); 
                if (d>a&&d<=b) 
                   cost=cost+d-a; 
                end 
            end 
            cost=cost*pm.pop/pm.n; 
        end 
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        %Plot principle component plot 
        function pm=plotpc(pm) 
            if sum(sum(pm.dmat))==0 
                pm=pm.pca; 
            end 
            xint=-pm.sc1:pm.sc1/pm.cres:pm.sc1; 
            yint=-pm.sc2:pm.sc2/pm.cres:pm.sc2; 
            contourf(xint,yint,pm.dmat,pm.cres); 
            if pm.autol 
                xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 
                ylabel(‘Secondary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 
                title(‘Population Map’,’fontsize’,24); 
            end 
            if pm.eqax 
                axis equal; 
            end 
            colormap(‘gray’); 
            colormap(flipud(colormap)); 
            set(gca,’color’,[1,1,1]); 
        end 
         
        %Plot the preference interactions of two issues 
        function plotpint2(pm,i1,i2) 
            pm.cres=pm.pres-1; 
            tmat=zeros(2*pm.cres+1); 
            for i=1:pm.n 
                x=round((pm.imat(i,i1)+1)*pm.cres)+1; % 
                y=round((pm.imat(i,i2)+1)*pm.cres)+1; % 
                tmat(y,x)=tmat(y,x)+1/pm.n; 
            end 
            xint=-pm.fervor(i1):pm.fervor(i1)/pm.cres:pm.fervor(i1); 
            yint=-pm.fervor(i2):pm.fervor(i2)/pm.cres:pm.fervor(i2); 
            contourf(xint,yint,tmat,pm.cres); 
            if pm.autol 
                xlabel(pm.inames(i1),’fontsize’,18); 
                ylabel(pm.inames(i2),’fontsize’,18); 
                title(‘Preference Interaction Plot’,’fontsize’,24); 
            end 
            if pm.eqax 
                axis equal; 
            end 
            colormap(‘gray’); 
            colormap(flipud(colormap)); 
            set(gca,’Color’,[1,1,1]); 
        end 
         
        %Plot the preference interations of several issues 
        function plotpintf(pm,iss) 
            if nargin<2 
                iss=1:pm.m; 
            end 
            t=pm.autol; 
            pm.autol=0; 
            x=length(iss); 
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            ix=1; 
            for i=iss 
                jx=1;             
                for j=iss 
                    if i==j 
                        subplot(x,x,(ix-1)*x+jx); 
                        pm.plotpbar(i); 
                        if t 
                            if ix==length(iss) 
                                xlabel(pm.inames(j),’fontsize’,14); 
                            end 
                            if jx==1 
                                ylabel(pm.inames(i),’fontsize’,14); 
                            end 
                        end 
                    else 
                        subplot(x,x,(ix-1)*x+jx); 
                        pm.plotpint2(j,i); 
                        if t 
                            if ix==length(iss) 
                                xlabel(pm.inames(j),’fontsize’,14); 
                            end 
                            if jx==1 
                                ylabel(pm.inames(i),’fontsize’,14); 
                            end 
                        end 
                    end 
                    jx=jx+1; 
                end 
                ix=ix+1; 
            end 
        end                 
         
        %Plot the ideology interactions of two issues 
        function plotiint2(pm,i1,i2) 
            pm.cres=pm.pres-1; 
            tmat=zeros(2*pm.cres+1); 
            for i=1:pm.n 
                x=round((pm.imat(i,i1)+1)*pm.cres)+1; 
                y=round((pm.imat(i,i2)+1)*pm.cres)+1; 
                tmat(y,x)=tmat(y,x)+1/pm.n; 
            end 
            xint=-1:1/pm.cres:1; 
            yint=-1:1/pm.cres:1; 
            contourf(xint,yint,tmat,pm.cres); 
            if pm.autol 
                xlabel(pm.inames(i1),’fontsize’,18); 
                ylabel(pm.inames(i2),’fontsize’,18); 
                title(‘Ideology Interaction Plot’,’fontsize’,24); 
            end 
            if pm.eqax 
                axis equal; 
            end 
            colormap(‘gray’); 
            colormap(flipud(colormap)); 
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            set(gca,’Color’,[1,1,1]); 
        end 
         
        %Plot the ideology interations of several issues 
        function plotiintf(pm,iss) 
            if nargin<2 
                iss=1:pm.m; 
            end 
            t=pm.autol; 
            pm.autol=0; 
            x=length(iss); 
            ix=1; 
            for i=iss 
                jx=1;             
                for j=iss 
                    if i==j 
                        subplot(x,x,(ix-1)*x+jx); 
                        pm.plotibar(i); 
                        if t 
                            if ix==length(iss) 
                                xlabel(pm.inames(j),’fontsize’,14); 
                            end 
                            if jx==1 
                                ylabel(pm.inames(i),’fontsize’,14); 
                            end 
                        end 
                    else 
                        subplot(x,x,(ix-1)*x+jx); 
                        pm.plotiint2(j,i); 
                        if t 
                            if ix==length(iss) 
                                xlabel(pm.inames(j),’fontsize’,14); 
                            end 
                            if jx==1 
                                ylabel(pm.inames(i),’fontsize’,14); 
                            end 
                        end 
                    end 
                    jx=jx+1; 
                end 
                ix=ix+1; 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Plot a preference curve for one issue 
        function plotpden(pm,i) 
            t=zeros(2*pm.pres+1,1); 
            for j=1:pm.n 
                x=round((pm.imat(j,i)+1)*pm.pres)+1; % 
                t(x)=t(x)+1/pm.n; 
            end 
            t=t*pm.pres/pm.fervor(i); 
            xint=-pm.fervor(i):pm.fervor(i)/pm.pres:pm.fervor(i); 
            plot(xint,t,’-k’); 
            if pm.autol 
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                xlabel(‘Preference Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
                ylabel(‘Population Density’,’fontsize’,18); 
                title(strcat({‘Preference - ‘},pm.inames(i)),... 
                    ‘fontsize’,24); 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Plot a preference curve as a bar graph 
        function plotpbar(pm,i) 
            t=zeros(2*pm.pres+1,1); 
            for j=1:pm.n 
                x=round((pm.imat(j,i)+1)*pm.pres)+1; % 
                t(x)=t(x)+1/pm.n; 
            end 
            xint=-pm.fervor(i):pm.fervor(i)/pm.pres:pm.fervor(i); 
            t=t*100; 
            bar(xint,t,’facecolor’,[.5,.5,.5]); 
            if pm.autol 
                xlabel(‘Preference Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
                ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
                title(strcat({‘Preference - ‘},pm.inames(i)),... 
                    ‘fontsize’,24); 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Plot a ideology curve for one issue 
        function plotiden(pm,i) 
            t=zeros(2*pm.pres+1,1); 
            for j=1:pm.n 
                x=round((pm.imat(j,i)+1)*pm.pres)+1; % 
                t(x)=t(x)+1/pm.n; 
            end 
            t=t*pm.pres; 
            plot([-1:1/pm.pres:1],t,’-k’); 
            if pm.autol 
                xlabel(‘Ideology Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
                ylabel(‘Population Density’,’fontsize’,18); 
                title(strcat({‘Ideology - ‘},pm.inames(i)),... 
                    ‘fontsize’,24); 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Plot a ideology curve for one issue 
        function plotibar(pm,i) 
            t=zeros(2*pm.pres+1,1); 
            for j=1:pm.n 
                x=round((pm.imat(j,i)+1)*pm.pres)+1; % 
                t(x)=t(x)+1/pm.n; 
            end 
            t=t*100; 
            bar([-1:1/pm.pres:1],t,’facecolor’,[.5,.5,.5]); 
            if pm.autol 
                xlabel(‘Ideology Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
                ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
                title(strcat({‘Ideology - ‘},pm.inames(i)),... 
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                    ‘fontsize’,24); 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Draw a coalition’s span of natural control 
        function plotc(pm,c,r,col) 
            if nargin<4 
                col=[0,0,0]; 
            end 
            if nargin<3 
                r=pm.cspan; 
            end 
            x=c*pm.pc1; 
            y=c*pm.pc2; 
            a=0:pi/50:2*pi; 
            xp=r*cos(a); 
            yp=r*sin(a); 
            if pm.autol 
                scatter(x,y,55,col,’+’); 
            end 
            plot(x+xp,y+yp,’color’,col,’linewidth’,2); 
        end 
         
        %Draw a restricted circle 
        function plotcr(pm,c,ax,r,col) 
            if nargin<5 
                col=[0,0,0]; 
            end 
            if nargin<4 
                r=pm.cspan; 
            end 
            x=c*pm.pc1; 
            y=c*pm.pc2; 
            a=0:pi/50:2*pi; 
            xp=r*cos(a); 
            yp=r*sin(a); 
            if pm.autol 
                scatter(x,y,55,col,’+’); 
            end 
            x1=xp(1); 
            y1=yp(1); 
            for i=2:length(a) 
                xt=x1+x; 
                yt=y1+y; 
                xs=xp(i)+x; 
                ys=yp(i)+y; 
                if (xt>ax(1)&&xt<ax(2)&&yt>ax(3)&&yt<ax(4)&&... 
                        xs>ax(1)&&xs<ax(2)&&ys>ax(3)&&ys<ax(4)) 
                    line([xt,xs],[yt,ys],’color’,col,... 
                        ‘linewidth’,2); 
                end 
                x1=xp(i); 
                y1=yp(i); 
            end 
        end 
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        %Draw a coalition’s label 
        function plotl(pm,c,lbl,sz,col) 
            if nargin<5 
                col=[0,0,0]; 
            end 
            if nargin<4 
                sz=14; 
            end 
            if nargin<3 
                lbl=‘+’; 
            end 
            x=c*pm.pc1; 
            y=c*pm.pc2; 
            text(x,y,lbl,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
                ‘color’,col,’fontsize’,sz); 
        end 
         
        %Plot an issue 
        function ploti(pm,i,x,y,r) 
            if nargin<5 
                r=.5; 
            end 
            if nargin<4 
                x=0; 
                y=0; 
            end 
            a=0:pi/50:2*pi; 
            xp=r*cos(a); 
            yp=r*sin(a); 
            plot(x+xp,y+yp,’color’,[0,0,0],’linewidth’,1); 
            l=norm([pm.pc1(i),pm.pc2(i)]); 
            line([x-pm.pc1(i)/l*r,x+pm.pc1(i)/l*r],... 
                [y-pm.pc2(i)/l*r,y+pm.pc2(i)/l*r],... 
                ‘color’,[0,0,0],’linestyle’,’-’,’linewidth’,2); 
            xy=[.65*pm.pc1(i)/l*r;.65*pm.pc2(i)/l*r]; 
            a1=[cosd( 25),-sind( 25);sind( 25),cosd( 25)]*xy; 
            a2=[cosd(-25),-sind(-25);sind(-25),cosd(-25)]*xy; 
            
line([x+a1(1),x+pm.pc1(i)/l*r],[y+a1(2),y+pm.pc2(i)/l*r],... 
                ‘color’,[0,0,0],’linestyle’,’-’,’linewidth’,2); 
            
line([x+a2(1),x+pm.pc1(i)/l*r],[y+a2(2),y+pm.pc2(i)/l*r],... 
                ‘color’,[0,0,0],’linestyle’,’-’,’linewidth’,2);                 
            line([x-pm.pc1(i)*r,x+pm.pc1(i)*r],... 
                [y-pm.pc2(i)*r,y+pm.pc2(i)*r],... 
                ‘color’,[0,0,0],’linewidth’,5); 
            text(x,y-1.3*r,num2str(l),’horizontalalignment’,’center’); 
            if pm.autol 
                text(x+1.2*r,y,pm.inames(i),’fontsize’,14); 
            end 
        end 
         
    end 
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    methods(Static) 
         
        %Set a random seed 
        function setseed(sd) 
            s=RandStream(‘mcg16807’,’Seed’,sd); 
            RandStream.setGlobalStream(s); 
        end 
         
    end 




    %this class creates a stack to push and pop numeric values. 
    %the function ‘pushq’ serves as a queue, placing the data at the  
    %end of the data. 
     
    properties 
        len; 
        next; 
        data; 
    end 
     
    methods 
        function s=numstack(n,d,i) 
            geti=false; 
            if nargin<3 
                geti=true; 
                i=0; 
            end 
            if nargin<2 
                d=NaN; 
            end 
            if nargin<1 
                n=16; 
            end 
            s.len=n; 
            s.data=zeros(n,1)*NaN; 
            s.data(1:length(d))=d; 
            s.next=i; 
            if geti 
                s.next=length(d)+1–1*isnan(d); 
            end 
        end 
         
        function s=push(s,d) 
            if s.next>s.len 
                s=numstack(s.len*2,s.data,s.next); 
            end 
            s.data(2:s.next)=s.data(1:s.next-1); 
            s.data(1)=d; 
            s.next=s.next+1; 
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        end 
         
        function s=pushq(s,d) 
            if s.next>s.len 
                s=numstack(s.len*2,s.data,s.next); 
            end 
            s.data(s.next)=d; 
            s.next=s.next+1; 
        end 
         
        function [r,s]=pop(s) 
            r=s.data(1); 
            s.next=s.next-1; 
            s.data(1:s.next-1)=s.data(2:s.next); 
            s.data(s.next)=NaN;             
        end 
         
        function b=notempty(s) 
            if s.next>1 
                b=true; 
            else 
                b=false; 
            end 
        end 
             
    end 
     
end  
C.  CHAPTER II EXAMPLES 
% Chapter II, U.S. Example 
  
%16 Issues  
%1:  Pro Choice 
%2:  Pro Marriage Equality 
%3:  Pro 2nd Ammendment 
%4:  Pro Free Market 
%5:  Pro Social Welfare 
%6:  Pro Social Medicine 
%7:  Pro Federal System 
%8:  Pro Union 
%9:  Pro Military Intervention 
%10: Pro Balanced Budget 
%11: Pro Death Penalty 
%12: Pro Environmental Protection 
%13: Pro Nuclear Power 
%14: Pro Defense 
%15: Pro Legalized Drugs 
%16: Pro Amnesty 
  










%Set span of natural control 
amap.cspan=3.5; 
  
%Issues         1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9   10   11   
12   13   14   15 
  
%Type  1, 30%, Republican 
types( 1,:,:)=[-.50,-.25, .58, .63,-.48,-.03, .08,-.45, .41, .56, .64,-
.12, .52, .78,-.25,-.50;... %mean position 
                .32, .46, .31, .21, .54, .62, .45, .19, .50, .22, .44, 
.56, .18, .13, .55, .32];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type  2, 30%, Democrat 
types( 2,:,:)=[ .41, .65,-.54, .22, .51, .68,-.13, .59,-.58,-.21,-.45, 
.62,-.12, .11, .25, .41;... %mean position 
                .28, .34, .30, .36, .52, .24, .55, .20, .54, .32, .31, 
.48, .38, .43, .45, .28];   %standard deviation 
             
%Type  3, 10%, Libertarian 
types( 3,:,:)=[ .40, .72, .47, .65,-.63,-.38, .41,-.45,-.43, .61, .03, 
.21, .72, .16, .63, .40;... %mean position 
                .42, .31, .48, .31, .41, .42, .15, .23, .25, .33, .84, 
.57, .13, .53, .21, .42];   %standard deviation 
  
%Type  4, 15%, Blue Dog Democrats 
types( 4,:,:)=[ .03,-.13, .47, .33, .41, .55, .04, .48, .38,-.13, .58,-
.32, .41, .69,-.34, .03;... %mean position 
                .55, .48, .42, .30, .49, .28, .55, .23, .53, .32, .39, 
.47, .38, .33, .47, .55];   %standard deviation 
             
%Type  5,  7%, Tea Party 
types( 5,:,:)=[-.65,-.37, .71, .70,-.57,-.43, .58,-.51, .36, .67, .66,-
.15, .56, .57,-.36,-.65;... %mean position 
                .21, .38, .29, .31, .51, .51, .26, .29, .53, .27, .34, 
.36, .35, .43, .62, .21];   %standard deviation 
  
%Type  1,  8%, Moderate Independent 
types( 6,:,:)=[   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   
0,   0,   0,   0,   0;... %mean position 
                .25, .25, .25, .25, .25, .25, .25, .25, .25, .25, .25, 
.25, .25, .25, .25, .25];   %standard deviation 
             
%Percentage breakdowns for types 
ptype=[.30,.30,.10,.15,.07,.08]; 
  





    btype(i)=btype(i-1)+ptype(i); 
end 
  
%Get positions for each group 
pos=zeros(tn,m); 
for i=1:tn; 
    for j=1:m; 
        pos(i,j)=types(i,1,j); 
    end 
end 
  
%Set the seed 
amap.setseed(0); 
  
%Generate identity/ideology matrix 
for i=1:n 
     
    %Find out what type of person to generate 
    r=rand; 
    loopc=1; 
    type=1; 
    while loopc 
        if r<=btype(type) 
            loopc=0; 
        else 
            type=type+1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    %Generate imat based on this person 
    for j=1:m-1 
        loopc=1; 
        while loopc 
            t=types(type,2,j)*randn+types(type,1,j); 
            if abs(t)<=1 
                loopc=0; 
            end 
        end 
        amap.imat(i,j)=roundn(t,-2); 
    end 
     
    %Generate 16th issue with strong correlation to first 
    loopc=1; 
    while loopc 
        amap.imat(i,16)=amap.imat(i,1)+.4*(1-
abs(amap.imat(i,1)))*randn; 
        if abs(amap.imat(i,16))<=1 
            loopc=0; 
        end 
    end 





amap.inames( 1)={‘Pro Choice’}; 
amap.inames( 2)={‘Pro Marriage Equality’}; 
amap.inames( 3)={‘Pro 2nd Ammendment’}; 
amap.inames( 4)={‘Pro Free Market’}; 
amap.inames( 5)={‘Pro Social Welfare’}; 
amap.inames( 6)={‘Pro Social Medicine’}; 
amap.inames( 7)={‘Pro Federal System’}; 
amap.inames( 8)={‘Pro Union’}; 
amap.inames( 9)={‘Pro Military Intervention’}; 
amap.inames(10)={‘Pro Balanced Budget’}; 
amap.inames(11)={‘Pro Death Penalty’}; 
amap.inames(12)={‘Pro Environmental Protection’}; 
amap.inames(13)={‘Pro Nuclear Power’}; 
amap.inames(14)={‘Pro Defense’}; 
amap.inames(15)={‘Pro Legalized Drugs’}; 
amap.inames(16)={‘Pro Amnesty’}; 
  

























%Save an image of the map 
save USPopMap 
  





















































    t=round(((p(i)+s)/s)*res)+1; 
    y(t)=y(t)+1/n; 
end 
bar(x,y*100,’facecolor’,[.5,.5,.5]); 
xlabel(‘Conservative                     Liberal’,’fontsize’,18); 
ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,18); 












xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 
ylabel(‘Secondary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 










    amap.plotl(pos(i,:).*amap.fervor,lbls(i),26,[1,1,1]); 
end 
text(-5,-4,strcat({‘Size of Republican Coalition = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(100*amap.getsize(pos(1,:).*amap.fervor),-2)),... 
    ‘%’),’fontsize’,20); 
text(-5,-4.7,strcat({‘Size of Democratic Coalition = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(100*amap.getsize(pos(2,:).*amap.fervor),-2)),... 
































xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 
ylabel(‘Secondary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 










    col=[0,0,0]; 
    if i==2 
        col=[1,1,1]; 
    end 
    amap.plotl(pos(i,:).*amap.fervor,lbls(i),14,col); 
end 
text(-5,-4,strcat({‘Size of Republican Coalition = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(100*amap.getsize(pos(1,:).*amap.fervor),-2)),... 
    ‘%’),’fontsize’,16); 
text(-5,-4.7,strcat({‘Size of Democratic Coalition = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(100*amap.getsize(pos(2,:).*amap.fervor),-2)),... 

































xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 
ylabel(‘Secondary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 










    col=[0,0,0]; 
    if i==2 
        col=[1,1,1]; 
    end 
    amap.plotl(pos(i,:).*amap.fervor,lbls(i),14,col); 
end 
text(-5,-5.5,strcat({‘Size of Republican Coalition = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(100*amap.getsize(pos(1,:).*amap.fervor),-2)),... 
    ‘%’),’fontsize’,16); 
text(-5,-6.2,strcat({‘Size of Democratic Coalition = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(100*amap.getsize(pos(2,:).*amap.fervor),-2)),... 
    ‘%’),’fontsize’,16); 
clear; 
D.  CHAPTER III EXAMPLES 
% Chapter III 
  
%Six Issues in country Harbahlea 
%1: Ethnic Identity, Low Fervor 
%2: Equal Protection, Low Fervor 
%3: Political Representation, Low Fervor 
%4: Free Market, Med Fervor 
%5: Constitutional Freedoms, Med Fervor 
%6: Opposition to Occupation, No Fervor 
  





%Generate fervor and ideologies for these six issues based on a 
%hypothetical population based on 9 different types of people. The code 
%below lists the mean position and the standard deviation for each of 
these 
%types of people and the comments give their proporition of the society 
and 
%a brief description of their coalition. 
  





%Issues         1    2    3    4    5    6 
  
%Type  1, 5%, hardcore supporters (ethnic minority)  
types( 1,:,:)=[-.75,-.81,-.90,-.30,-.72, .80;... %mean position 
                .11, .12, .04, .16, .12, .25];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type  2, 3%, hardcore opposition (ethnic majority) 
types( 2,:,:)=[ .85, .91, .93, .91, .95,-.95;... %mean position 
                .11, .09, .04, .12, .11, .45];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type  3, 12%, government smypathiser (ethnic minority) 
types( 3,:,:)=[-.77,-.60,-.69,-.20,-.78, .91;... %mean position 
                .28, .32, .28, .37, .19, .18];   %standard deviation 
  
%Type  4, 11%, government sympathiser (ethnic majority) 
types( 4,:,:)=[ .58, .30,-.05,-.05,-.20, .68;... %mean position 
                .31, .32, .28, .43, .53, .35];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type  5, 3%, liberal elite (ethnic minority) 
types( 5,:,:)=[-.52, .51, .30, .34, .60, .14;... %mean position 
                .45, .63, .51, .41, .36, .74];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type  6, 7%, liberal elite (ethnic majority) 
types( 6,:,:)=[ .62, .71, .42, .47, .93,-.67;... %mean position 
                .35, .39, .49, .29, .34, .51];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type  7, 13%, frustrated youth (ethnic minority) 
types( 7,:,:)=[-.20, .41, .55, .77, .52, .84;... %mean position 
                .28, .32, .41, .34, .32, .30];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type  8, 24%, frustrated youth (ethnic majority) 
types( 8,:,:)=[ .28, .61, .60, .81, .61, .48;... %mean position 
                .29, .26, .39, .17, .29, .33];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type  9, 1%, opposition (ethnic minority) 
types( 9,:,:)=[-.52, .21, .18, .37, .11, .48;... %mean position 
                .45, .39, .47, .35, .39, .61];   %standard deviation 
            
%Type 10, 21%, opposition (ethnic majority) 
types(10,:,:)=[ .90, .25, .32, .49, .18,-.37;... %mean position 
                .32, .52, .40, .41, .36, .67];   %standard deviation 
  
%Percentage breakdowns for types 
ptype=[.05,.03,.12,.11,.03,.07,.13,.24,.01,.21]; 
  








%Get positions for each group 
pos=zeros(tn,m); 
for i=1:tn; 
    for j=1:m; 
        pos(i,j)=types(i,1,j); 
    end 
end 
  
%Set the seed 
dmap.setseed(0); 
  
%Generate identity/ideology matrix 
for i=1:n 
     
    %Find out what type of person to generate 
    r=rand; 
    l=1; 
    type=1; 
    while l 
        if r<=btype(type) 
            l=0; 
        else 
            type=type+1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    %Generate imat based on this person 
    l=1; 
    while l 
        i1=types(type,2,1)*randn+types(type,1,2); 
        i2=types(type,2,2)*randn+types(type,1,2); 
        i3=types(type,2,3)*randn+types(type,1,3); 
        i4=types(type,2,4)*randn+types(type,1,4); 
        i5=types(type,2,5)*randn+types(type,1,5); 
        i6=types(type,2,6)*randn+types(type,1,6); 
        if (abs(i1)<=1&&abs(i2)<=1&&abs(i3)<=1&&abs(i4)<=1&&... 
                abs(i5)<=1&&abs(i6)<=1) 
            l=0; 
        end 
    end 
    dmap.imat(i,1)=roundn(i1,-1); 
    dmap.imat(i,2)=roundn(i2,-1); 
    dmap.imat(i,3)=roundn(i3,-1); 
    dmap.imat(i,4)=roundn(i4,-1); 
    dmap.imat(i,5)=roundn(i5,-1); 
    dmap.imat(i,6)=roundn(i6,-1); 
     
    %Generate fervor for issue 
    dmap.fmat(i,1)=0.683727397260277; 
    dmap.fmat(i,2)=2.164695652173919; 
    dmap.fmat(i,3)=0.793663492063505; 
    dmap.fmat(i,4)=2.615500000000002; 
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    dmap.fmat(i,5)=0.573458139534889; 
    dmap.fmat(i,6)=0.249504500000000; 









dmap.inames(6)={‘Opposition to Occupation’}; 
  
%Update the map 
dmap=dmap.update; 
  
%Get initial fervor levels 
finit=dmap.fervor; 
  




%%% MAP CREATED %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
  








ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,18); 







ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
title(strcat({‘B. Preference - ‘},dmap.inames(3),{‘ Low Fervor’}),... 









ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
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title(strcat({‘C. Preference - ‘},dmap.inames(3),{‘ Moderate 
Fervor’}),... 













    subplot(2,5,i); 
    dmap.plotibar(i); 
    axis([-1,1,0,15]); 
    xlabel(‘Ideology Position’,’fontsize’,14); 
    ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,14); 
    title(strcat(dmap.inames(i),{‘ - A’}),’fontsize’,18);  
end 
for i=1:5 
    subplot(2,5,5+i); 
    dmap.plotpbar(i); 
    axis([-3,3,0,15]); 
    xlabel(‘Preference Position’,’fontsize’,14); 
    ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,14); 
    title(strcat(dmap.inames(i),{‘ - B’}),’fontsize’,18); 
end 
  





line([ 0,15],[  0, 0],’color’,[.5,.5,.5]); 
line([ 3, 3],[-15, 0],’color’,[.5,.5,.5]); 
line([12,12],[-15, 0],’color’,[.5,.5,.5]); 
line([ 0,12],[ -9,-9],’color’,[.5,.5,.5]); 
plot(x,y,’-k’,’linewidth’,3); 
text( 0.1, -8.25,’Cost of Conflict = 9’,’fontsize’,14); 
text(12.1,-14.25,’Range of Normal Politics = 12’,’fontsize’,14); 
text( 3.1,-14.25,’Span of Natural Control = 3’,’fontsize’,14); 
xlabel(‘Distance from Coalition to Constituent’,’fontsize’,18); 
ylabel(‘Expected Utility of Constituent’,’fontsize’,18); 
title(‘Utility Curve for Doulah’,’fontsize’,24); 
axis([0,15,-15,4]); 













title(‘Population Map of Doulah at Incipient Stage’,’fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 






    dmap.ploti(i,4.75,4.1–1.3*i); 
end 
text(6,3.75,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
text(-2,2,’Span of Natural Control = 3’,’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],... 
    ‘fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-2,1.7,strcat({‘Population Under Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(0,3.6,’Artificial Control = 
5’,’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’... 
    ,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,5); 
t=s-t; 
text(0,3.3,strcat({‘Population Under Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,5); 
text(0,3.0,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 















ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,18); 










ylabel(‘% Pop at Position’,’fontsize’,18); 
















title(‘Population Map of Doulah during Arab Spring’,’fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 







    dmap.ploti(i,6,4.1–1.3*i); 
end 
text(7,3.75,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
text(-3,2.5,’Span of Natural Control = 3’,’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],... 
    ‘fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-3,2.2,strcat({‘Population Under Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(0,3.6,strcat({‘Artificial Control = ‘},num2str(roundn(d,-2))),... 
    ‘backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,d); 
t=s-t; 
text(0,3.3,strcat({‘Population Under Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,d); 
text(0,3.0,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 


















title(‘Population Map of Doulah After Regime Reaction’,’fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 








    dmap.ploti(i,11,7.5–2.2*i,.75); 
end 
text(14,7,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
text(-8.5,-4,’Span of Natural Control = 
3’,’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],... 
    ‘fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-4.75,strcat({‘Population Under Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(-7,7,strcat({‘Artificial Control = ‘},num2str(roundn(d,-2))),... 
    ‘backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,d); 
t=s-t; 
text(-7,6.25,strcat({‘Population Under Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,d); 
text(-7,5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(1,-7,’Range of Normal Politics = 12’,’backgroundcolor’,... 




















title(‘Population Map of Doulah at Start of Civil War’,’fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 












    dmap.ploti(i,11,7.5–2.2*i,.75); 
end 
text(14,7,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-4,strcat({‘Government Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(-8.5,-4.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(gd,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
t=s-t; 
text(-8.5,-5,strcat({‘Government Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
text(-8.5,-5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(2,-4,strcat({‘Insurgent Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(2,-4.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(id,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
t=s-t; 
text(2,-5,strcat({‘Insurgent Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
text(2,-5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 



















title(‘Population Map of Doulah with Growing Ethnic Tension’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 












    dmap.ploti(i,11,7.5–2.2*i,.75); 
end 
text(14,7,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-4,strcat({‘Government Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(-8.5,-4.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(gd,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
t=s-t; 
text(-8.5,-5,strcat({‘Government Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
text(-8.5,-5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(2,-4,strcat({‘Insurgent Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(2,-4.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(id,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
t=s-t; 
text(2,-5,strcat({‘Insurgent Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
text(2,-5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 



















title(‘Population Map of Doulah with Increasing Insurgent 
Resources’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 












    dmap.ploti(i,11,7.5–2.2*i,.75); 
end 
text(14,7,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-4,strcat({‘Government Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(-8.5,-4.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(gd,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
t=s-t; 
text(-8.5,-5,strcat({‘Government Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
text(-8.5,-5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(2,-4,strcat({‘Insurgent Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(2,-4.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(id,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
t=s-t; 
text(2,-5,strcat({‘Insurgent Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(2,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
text(2,-5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 



















title(‘Population Map of Doulah with Insurgent Shift in Platform’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 











    dmap.ploti(i,11,7.5–2.2*i,.75); 
end 
text(14,7,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-4,strcat({‘Government Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(-8.5,-4.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(gd,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
t=s-t; 
text(-8.5,-5,strcat({‘Government Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
text(-8.5,-5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(2,-4,strcat({‘Insurgent Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(2,-4.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(id,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
t=s-t; 
text(2,-5,strcat({‘Insurgent Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
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t=dmap.getcost(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
text(2,-5.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 



















title(‘Population Map of Doulah with Fractured Insurgency’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 











    dmap.ploti(i,13,7.5–2.2*i,.75); 
end 
text(16,7,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-5,strcat({‘Government Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(-8.5,-5.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(gd,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
t=s-t; 
text(-8.5,-6,strcat({‘Government Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
text(-8.5,-6.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(2,-5,strcat({‘Insurgent Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(2,-5.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
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    num2str(roundn(id,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
t=s-t; 
text(2,-6,strcat({‘Insurgent Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
text(2,-6.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 






















title(‘Population Map of Doulah Four Years Post Invasion’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 
















    dmap.ploti(i,10,7.5–2.2*i,.75); 
end 
text(11,7,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-5,strcat({‘Government Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
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text(-8.5,-5.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(gd,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
t=s-t; 
text(-8.5,-6,strcat({‘Government Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
text(-8.5,-6.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(2,-5,strcat({‘Insurgent Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(2,-5.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(id,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
t=s-t; 
text(2,-6,strcat({‘Insurgent Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
text(2,-6.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 



















title(‘Population Map of Doulah with Non-Lethal Aid’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 
















    ‘fontsize’,18); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-5,strcat({‘Government Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(-8.5,-5.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(gd,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
t=s-t; 
text(-8.5,-6,strcat({‘Government Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
text(-8.5,-6.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(2,-5,strcat({‘Insurgent Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(2,-5.5,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(id,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
t=s-t; 
text(2,-6,strcat({‘Insurgent Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
text(2,-6.5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 



















title(‘Population Map of Doulah with Lethal and Non-Lethal Aid’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,24); 
xlabel(‘Primary Spectrum of Division’,’fontsize’,18); 













    dmap.ploti(i,12,6.2–2.2*i,.75); 
end 
text(14,5.5,’Issue Projections’,’horizontalalignment’,’center’,... 
    ‘fontsize’,18); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(-8.5,-3.5,strcat({‘Government Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(-8.5,-4,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(gd,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
t=s-t; 
text(-8.5,-4.5,strcat({‘Government Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(1,:).*dmap.fervor,gd); 
text(-8.5,-5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
    num2str(roundn(t,5))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor); 
text(2,-3.5,strcat({‘Insurgent Natural Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
text(2,-4,strcat({‘Range of Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(roundn(id,-2))),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
s=dmap.getsize(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
t=s-t; 
text(2,-4.5,strcat({‘Insurgent Artificial Control = ‘},... 
    num2str(t*100),{‘ %’}),’backgroundcolor’,[1,1,1],’fontsize’,14); 
t=dmap.getcost(pos(8,:).*dmap.fervor,id); 
text(2,-5,strcat({‘Cost of Artificial Control = $’},... 
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